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ABSTRACT
Trading Interests: Domestic Institutions, International Negotiations, and the
Politics of Trade
by
Timm Betz
This dissertation addresses the relationship between domestic and international
institutions in the context of the politics of trade. The dissertation identifies spe-
cific instances of how international institutions modify the effects of domestic
institutions, and it shows how domestic institutions affect government behavior
in international institutions. The first chapter focuses on the domestic politics of
trade. A prominent literature argues that electoral institutions favoring narrow
interest groups result in higher average tariff rates. The chapter argues that this
literature has largely ignored the role of exporter interests and shows that, in the
presence of trade agreements, this omission results in a biased understanding of
trade politics. The second chapter expands on these issues, turning to electoral
campaigns. Narrow interest institutions are not only associated with more support
for protectionist trade policies in campaign statements, as would be expected from
standard accounts, but also with more support for free trade. The finding further
underscores the contemporaneous influence of protectionist and free trade interest
groups in trade politics. The third chapter turns to government behavior in interna-
tional institutions. It shows that domestic institutions can provide an explanation
for differences in government engagement with dispute settlement procedures.
Governments under institutions that are more prone to support narrow interest
groups are more active in filing trade disputes against other governments. The final
chapter addresses the question of why many international agreements lack strong
enforcement and commitment mechanisms, even where agreements are used as
hands-tying mechanisms by governments. The chapter emphasizes an incompati-
bility between institutions that tie the hands of governments, and thereby lock in
policies, and international cooperation that is driven by domestic pro-cooperation
groups. Agreements which lock in policies take an issue off the table, such that
a government can no longer leverage it in political campaigns. Anticipating this,
governments may be reluctant to lock in policies through international agreements.
xii
CHAPTER I
Introduction
Governments face opportunities and constraints that are shaped by institutions
at the domestic and at the international level. How do domestic and international
institutions interact in creating these incentives? This dissertation addresses the
interplay of domestic institutions and international institutions with respect to
trade politics, and it addresses in particular questions about the joint influence
of domestic and international institutions. Trade policies regulate flows of goods
(and, increasingly, services) across borders, which underlines the international
implications of trade policy choices. At the same time, by affecting prices and
opening or closing markets to foreign competition, trade policies have domestic
distributional consequences. As such, studies of trade policies feature prominently
in several subfields of international relations. On the one hand, a large body of
research, rooted in the literature on special interest politics, attempts to explain why
some governments provide more protectionist trade policies and higher average
tariff rates than others. Starting at least with Rogowski (1987), this literature asserts
that electoral institutions influence a government’s choice of trade policies. Similar
arguments have been made with respect to the distinction between democracies and
autocracies (Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 2000; Milner and Kubota, 2005).
On the other hand, a large literature draws on trade agreements to gain an
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understanding of the design and effects of international institutions. Indeed, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization
(WTO), as the global trade institutions, are akin to the paragon of the institutionalist
literature in international relations. They have been part of a rich “institutionalist
literature that regards the GATT/WTO as its beau ideal” and accordingly are among
“the most cited examples of a successful international institution” (Goldstein, Rivers
and Tomz, 2007, p. 38). With currently 159 members, the WTO encompasses
most countries in the world, as shown in Figure 1.1., and it is supplemented by a
dense network of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) among subsets of countries
(Mansfield and Milner, 1999). Much of this literature invokes commitment and
information problems to explain the negotiation of trade agreements. Trade
agreements are, for instance, considered to be commitment devices used by
governments to tie their own and their successors’ hands with respect to trade
policy (Baccini and Urpelainen, 2014; Busch and Mansfield, 2011), to provide
external enforcement mechanisms for human rights (Hafner-Burton, 2005), to
provide signals about a government’s preferences to its own electorate (Mansfield,
Milner and Rosendorff, 2002), or to provide signals about the liberal economic
preferences of governments to investors (Büthe and Milner, 2008). Additionally,
the dispute settlement body of the GATT/WTO received much attention as an
example of the legalization of world politics (Goldstein et al., 2000). Several authors
suggested that governments use the dispute settlement body to tie their hands
(Busch, 2000), examined how governments strategically choose dispute settlement
venues (Busch, 2000), or how governments exploit the dispute settlement body to
set legal precedent – even in an environment that explicitly rules out the legitimacy
of legal precedent (Pelc, 2014).
Yet, to date, few if any connections have been formed between the literature
that addresses the domestic sources of trade policies – such as domestic electoral
2
Figure 1.1.: GATT/WTO membership by March 2013. Darker shade corresponds to
GATT/WTO membership. Data from the World Trade Organization’s website.
institutions – and the literature that addresses those international institutions
that are concerned with trade policies – such as international trade agreements.
In fact, as Lake (2009, p. 237) notes, “if international institutions really matter,
they will alter the interests and possibly institutions within states as well. This
feedback from the international political economy to the domestic arena is now
almost entirely ignored.” This disconnect mirrors the international relations
more generally. It is widely acknowledged that domestic politics matter for
government behavior in international relations. Maybe most prominently, the
difference between democratic and autocratic forms of government has been linked
to the behavior of states in international conflict (Doyle, 1986; Bueno de Mesquita
et al., 1999; Schultz, 2001). Domestic considerations have also been used to
explain participation in and compliance with human rights agreements (Moravcsik,
2000; Vreeland, 2008; Powell and Staton, 2009; Simmons, 2009), involvement
with the International Monetary Fund (Vreeland, 2003; Mukherjee and Singer,
2010), and engagement in international disputes over territorial conflict (Allee
and Huth, 2006a). Similarly, domestic constraints in the form of democratic
institutions or ratification constraints may affect a government’s bargaining leverage
in international negotiations (Putnam, 1988; Fearon, 1994; Mo, 1995; Schultz,
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1998, 2001; Tarar, 2001; Leventoglu and Tarar, 2005). Conversely, international
forces may affect domestic political choices (Clark and Hallerberg, 2000; Dai, 2007;
Franzese and Hays, 2007; Grieco, Gelpi and Warren, 2009). Yet, with few exceptions
(see, e.g., Morrow 2013), the literature shows little concern for how international
and domestic institutions may interact in shaping government behavior.
In the following chapters, I argue that ignoring this interplay between
international institutions and domestic politics yields a biased picture of trade
politics and, by extension, an incomplete and biased understanding of the effects
of both domestic and international institutions. Integrating the largely distinct
literatures on domestic institutions and on international trade agreements results
in several new theoretical results and empirical implications, which affords a richer
and better understanding of the politics of trade and a number of new insights on
how international institutions can affect domestic politics.
The following chapters are tied together by the observation that the literature has
largely ignored a simple motivation for negotiating international trade agreements:
to reduce foreign trade barriers and improve market access abroad. Indeed, as a
consequence of numerous rounds of trade negotiations, by now tariffs on many
products have internationally negotiated upper bounds. Figure 1.2. displays the
percentage of tariff lines in each country, for the year 2012, that are subject to such
upper bounds. On average, for countries where data are available, 83 per cent of
tariff lines are subject to bound tariffs.
Because trade agreements allow governments to negotiate lower tariffs abroad,
they potentially insert a new set of interest groups into the domestic political
contest over trade policy: exporters, who gain from improved and secured market
access abroad (Gilligan, 1997a; Pahre, 2008; Handley, 2014). Exporters have a
number of attributes that make them potentially powerful political actors: as is
discussed in later chapters, they tend to be more productive and to have more
4
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Figure 1.2.: Binding coverage in 2012: Percent of tariffs that are subject to
internationally negotiated tariff bindings. Darker shades correspond to higher
binding coverage. Data from the World Trade Organization’s website.
employees than firms producing solely for the domestic market (Bernhard and
Leblang, 1999; Melitz, 2003; Osgood, 2013). Additionally, on each product the
gains from exporting tend to be concentrated on only few firms, which provides
large incentives to overcome any potential collective action problems that could
otherwise inhibit political action. The following chapters explore some of the joint
effects of domestic and international institutions that arise from taking into account
exporters in the context of trade agreements and domestic institutions.
The next chapter is primarily concerned with the literature that suggests a
relationship domestic electoral institutions and protectionist trade policies. This
literature so far has largely focused on the political conflict between two groups.
On the one hand, import-competing, protectionist interest groups are composed
of firms and industries that are harmed by foreign competition and hence ask
their government for protectionist trade policies. On the other hand, consumers
as voters prefer lower prices and hence oppose free trade. Thus, the literature
posits that governments face a trade-off between the interests of protectionist,
import-competing interest groups and the interests of consumers, who prefer free
trade (see, e.g., Kono 2006; Copelovitch and Pevehouse 2010; Mansfield and Milner
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2012). The costs of protectionist trade policies are dispersed on a large number of
voters, who will each perceive only a slight loss, whereas the benefits are typically
concentrated on a small number of firms, and “This circumstance makes it easier to
put a protection measure in place” (Pareto, 1927, p. 379).
The literature concluded that this implies that institutions favoring interest
groups over the general public in the policy-making process will result in policies
geared towards interest groups, and consequently more protectionist trade policies
and higher average tariff rates (Rogowski, 1987; Rogowski and Kayser, 2002;
Milner and Kubota, 2005; Ehrlich, 2007). A central distinction in this regard
has been drawn between plurality rule and proportional representation.1 Because
the gains from protection tend to be concentrated, relative to the costs, there is
some theoretical consensus in this literature that plurality rule should benefit
protectionist interest groups and therefore be associated with higher average levels
of protection. However, the literature has produced mixed empirical evidence on
this proposition. The chapter provides an explanation for some of these inconclusive
results by showing that the relationship between domestic institutions and policy
outcomes is altered substantially in the presence of international trade agreements.
Trade agreements are predominantly negotiated under the principle of
reciprocity. Under reciprocity, obtaining improved market access for exports
requires a government to lower restrictions on some of its own imports. Thus,
satisfying exporter demands requires sacrificing the interests of some protectionist
firms. Because institutions favoring narrow interests should accede to protectionist
interests as well as exporters, reciprocal trade negotiations break the relationship
between narrow interest institutions and average tariff levels: governments can
provide protection on some goods and, in exchange for market access abroad,
1In plurality electoral rule, legislators are elected through single-member districts and the
contestant with the highest vote share in each district wins. This contrasts with proportional
representation, where legislators are elected in multi-member districts and seats are allocated
according to vote shares.
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dismantle trade barriers on others. The joint omission of exporter interests and
reciprocal trade agreements therefore results in a biased understanding of trade
politics, as it renders average tariff levels largely meaningless for evaluating the
impact of electoral institutions.
Moreover, the demands for both protection and liberalization create incentives
for governments under narrow interest institutions to provide higher tariff rates on
some goods and lower tariff rates on others. This results in more dispersed tariff
rates across products and within industries. By focusing attention on tariff rates at
the product level, and dispersion across different products, this implication squares
well with recent research in economics and political science on intra-industry
conflict over trade policies, and it further underscores the need to move away from
average tariff rates for empirical assessments of protectionist influences.
The third chapter expands on the link between domestic institutions and trade
politics. The chapter moves away from tariff rates as the dependent variable and
instead turns to political campaigns. If both exporters and protectionist firms
are politically relevant interest groups, then politicians under narrow interest
institutions should have incentives to cater to both types of groups and make
references to both of them in political campaigns. Thus, countries with institutions
favoring narrow interests should be associated with more appeals in political
campaigns to both protectionism and free trade, not just to protectionism. This
result contrasts with a model of trade politics based on a unilateral view, in which
case only protectionist groups are relevant campaign targets under narrow interest
institutions.
The chapter also introduces a new empirical model to account for the dependent
variable, which is a percentage with a substantial fraction of zeros. The model
combines a beta regression model, which accounts for positive values on the
dependent variable, and a logit model, which accounts for zeros, not unlike a
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zero-inflated count model typical for discrete count data. I briefly discuss various
quantities of interest that can be estimated from the model and, through a small
number of simulations, assess its performance in finite samples and relative to
common alternatives.
The fourth chapter turns to government behavior in international institutions in
the context of dispute settlement procedures. Many international agreements
contain dispute settlement mechanisms (Koremenos and Betz, 2012), which
contribute to the enforcement of international norms. In the majority of
international agreements, only governments have the authority to initiate disputes,
even where non-state actors are those most adversely affected by violations of
international norms. These non-state actors may have incentives to bring disputes
against another government, but they need to rely on their government to file
the dispute on their behalf. In particular, this is the case at the GATT and the
WTO, where governments enforce international commitments by trading partners
through the initiation of trade disputes, typically on behalf of exporting firms.
Although almost all governments have a deep bench of potential cases they could
bring to the dispute settlement body, only few of these result in actual dispute
initiations (Allee, 2008).
The chapter shows that domestic institutions can provide one explanation for
these differences. Domestic institutions that are more prone to cater to narrow
interest groups – such as plurality rule – are more likely to pursue trade disputes
on behalf of exporting firms. This finding relates domestic political institutions
to differences in government engagement with international institutions, which
can have important distributional consequences, especially as the benefits of (often
discriminatory) settlements accrue and compound over time (Shaffer, 2003; Kucik
and Pelc, 2013). That governments under plurality rule are more likely to force
compliance onto other governments further underscores that there is nothing
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inherently protectionist about narrow interest institutions and plurality rule, but
is also bears a certain irony: while plurality is associated with more attempts to
enforce a liberal international trading order on behalf of domestic exporters, others
find that plurality rule is associated with more incentives to violate international
commitments (Rickard, 2010). This domestic explanation of dispute behavior
also adds to the extant literature, which points to factors such as the precision
of international law, the legal capacity of governments, the economic prowess of
countries, attempts of governments to gain political cover for unpopular decisions,
or the need to attract foreign currency as drivers of dispute participation (Huth,
Croco and Appel, 2011; Busch, Reinhardt and Shaffer, 2009; Sattler and Bernauer,
2010; Allee and Huth, 2006b; Betz and Kerner, 2014).
The fifth chapter addresses the interaction between domestic politics and
international institutions from the perspective of arguments that governments use
international agreements to lock in policies. From this perspective, international
institutions with weak or absent enforcement mechanisms are puzzling. To be
sure, the literature puts forward that such agreements can be attractive when
governments anticipate random shocks in the future that require them to abandon
their obligations (Koremenos, 2001; Rosendorff, 2005). But such agreements are
surprising if governments use international agreements to solve commitment
problems or to tie the hands of their successors, both of which are motivations for
international agreements suggested by a sizeable literature (see, e.g., Bernhard and
Leblang 1999; Abbott and Snidal 2000; Moravcsik 2000; Vreeland 2003; Baccini
and Urpelainen 2014).
The chapter points out an incompatibility between institutions that tie the hands
of governments, and thereby lock in policies, and international cooperation that
is driven by domestic political concerns. As a result, flexible agreements – those
that fail to lock in policies – become attractive to governments, and in particular
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so in situations in which the government’s preferences align with those of pro-
cooperation groups. The reason for the result is that agreements which lock in
policies effectively take an issue off the table, such that a government can no longer
leverage it in political campaigns. Consequently, if there are both groups opposed
to cooperation and groups supportive of cooperation (such as is the case in trade
agreements), governments lose the ability to exact concessions or political support if
they were to lock in policy through an externally enforced agreement that ties their
hands. Conversely, an international agreement without external enforcement allows
the government to continue collecting support from pro-cooperation groups, which
is needed to maintain the agreement and sustain cooperation. One implication
is that a lack of formal enforcement mechanisms need not be evidence of a lack
of a government’s incentives or intentions to comply with the agreement (Downs,
Rocke and Barsoom, 1996); instead, it may reflect a government’s unwillingness to
surrender an issue’s political salience, which it can leverage for domestic political
gains.
The conclusion, as the final chapter, summarizes some of the main points,
emphasizes implications for the international relations and political economy
literature, and suggests some directions for future research.
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CHAPTER II
Reciprocity and Domestic Politics
What explains differences in trade policies across countries? A large literature,
starting at least with Rogowski (1987), points to a country’s electoral institutions as
a key explanation. Much of the literature shares some common lines of argument:
Trade politics is about the conflict between narrow interest groups and the general
public. Firms that benefit from protectionist trade policies form narrow interest
groups. Electoral institutions that favor narrow interests over the general public
(‘narrow interest institutions’) consequently produce more protectionist trade
policies, resulting in higher average tariff rates. Aside from the central role of
trade politics in the international political economy literature, this straightforward
link has made trade policies a prominent application for evaluating the effect of
domestic institutions on economic outcomes.
While there is some theoretical agreement that plurality electoral systems,
through a large number of electoral districts and weak parties, increase access
for narrow interest groups (Rogowski, 1987; Grossman and Helpman, 2005), the
empirical evidence is mixed. Some find plurality systems to be conducive to
protectionism (Rogowski, 1987; Evans, 2009). Others find them to result in less
protectionism (Mansfield and Busch, 1995; Pinheiro, 2013). And while Hatfield and
Hauk (2014) find an association between plurality rule and higher average tariffs,
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they note that the association is not explained by plausible mechanisms, such as
the number of electoral districts. These results suggest the need for an explanation
for the mismatch between existing theoretical arguments and empirical results.
This chapter provides such an explanation. Much of the extant literature is based
on a unilateral view of trade policy-making. Yet, trade policies are predominantly
set in reciprocal trade agreements, such as the World Trade Organization and
preferential trade agreements, rather than determined unilaterally. With reciprocal
trade agreements, exporters support domestic trade liberalization in exchange for
market access abroad, and therefore form narrow interest groups as well. The
focus on protectionist interest groups in the extant literature implies too narrow
a definition of narrow interests. Narrow interest institutions should support
protectionist interests by raising trade barriers, but they should also support
exporting interests, which with reciprocal trade agreements requires cutting some
domestic trade barriers. This effect breaks the link between institutions and average
tariff levels, and average tariff levels are no longer meaningful for evaluating
differences in the influence of narrow interest groups across institutional settings.
Given the ubiquity of trade agreements, this effect explains some of the inconclusive
results in the literature.
This chapter suggests a number of new theoretical implications and provides
empirical support for these. First, it emphasizes the structure of tariff rates, as
opposed to the average tariff rate, as a measure of the influence of narrow interest
groups. The incentives to both protect and to liberalize are higher under narrow
interest institutions, which creates more dispersion in tariff rates across products.
Second, the protectionist bias of narrow interest institutions decreases with the
degree of participation in reciprocal trade negotiations, such that differences
between electoral institutions in their impact on average tariff levels disappear. By
incorporating trade agreements into the literature on the domestic politics of trade,
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the view of trade politics presented in this chapter departs from the conventional
perspective, which largely equates trade policy with protectionist trade policy.
In the presence of trade agreements, trade politics is not just about the balance
of political power between consumers and protectionist producers, but it has to
incorporate exporters as well. Reciprocal negotiations drive a wedge between these
groups and ensure that accommodating protectionist interests comes at the expense
of exporter interests.
Of course, neither the existence of exporters nor of trade agreements is news
to political science. Exporters and intra-industry trade have been considered as
important influences on trade policies elsewhere (Milner, 1988; Gilligan, 1997b).
Likewise, international trade institutions, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO), have
been described as “one of the most cited examples of a successful international
institution”, subject of a rich “institutionalist literature that regards the GATT/WTO
as its beau ideal” (Goldstein, Rivers and Tomz, 2007, p. 38). This literature
puts forth a large number of arguments surrounding trade agreements. Trade
agreements have, for instance, been considered as commitment devices used
by governments (Baccini and Urpelainen, 2014; Busch and Mansfield, 2011), as
external enforcement mechanisms for human rights (Hafner-Burton, 2005), as
signals used by governments to demonstrate sound economic policies to domestic
populations (Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 2002), or as signals to investors
about the liberal economic preferences of governments (Büthe and Milner, 2008).
However, this literature largely ignored a simpler motivation for negotiating trade
agreements: reducing foreign trade barriers and improving market access abroad
for exporting firms. What is missing, as a consequence, is the link between the
largely distinct literatures on trade agreements, exporter interests, and electoral
institutions. Despite a prominent literature on international institutions, few
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of its insights have been brought to bear on the relationship between domestic
institutions and policy outcomes, and no attempt has been made to consider
the interaction between international and domestic institutions in explaining
trade politics. This omission is far from trivial, and this chapter suggests that
it results in a biased view of trade politics. Integrating these aspects – the existence
of exporters, reciprocal trade negotiations, and domestic electoral institutions –
yields an improved theoretical understanding of trade politics and produces novel
empirical implications.
Indeed, the argument in this chapter provides a specific instance of how
international institutions, by modifying the effect of domestic institutions, affect
domestic politics, and shows that the effects of domestic institutions cannot be
understood independently of international factors. The chapter thereby isolates
a new effect of international institutions. They can mute the effects of domestic
institutions on policy outcomes – in this case, driving down the protectionist bias
of narrow interest institutions as evidenced in average tariff rates. At the same time,
reciprocity is rechanneling the political incentives created by electoral institutions
by contributing to more dispersion in tariff rates across products.
To the extent that questions of distributive politics are at the center of much
of political science, these results provide an illustration of the powerful effects of
international institutions on domestic politics, which become even more relevant
when considering the implications of trade policy and trade reform on social
stability (Ruggie, 1982), welfare policies (Hays, Ehrlich and Peinhardt, 2005),
growth (Wacziarg and Welch, 2007), inequality (Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding,
2010), and the respective links to domestic political institutions. For instance, if
trade policy is a more contentious issue in certain electoral systems, due to the
increased pressures on policy-makers to trade off conflicting goals, we might expect
more discontent with economic globalization in such settings.
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The next section discusses the role of reciprocal negotiations for breaking the
link between institutions and average tariff levels and derives a number of empirical
implications; the appendix offers a formal model. The second section provides
empirical evidence. The final section concludes.
II.1 Trade politics under reciprocity
The literature on electoral institutions and trade policies largely focuses on the
political conflict between protectionist, import-competing firms and consumers,
who prefer free trade.1 Protectionist groups are thought to be better able to
overcome collective action problems than consumers: Protectionist measures
provide large benefits to a small number of firms, which therefore form narrow
interest groups. It follows, according to this literature, that political institutions
furthering the influence of narrow interest groups result in more protectionist trade
policies and higher average tariff rates.
The presence of trade agreements changes this relationship between electoral
institutions and protectionism: because trade agreements invite lobbying by
exporters in support of domestic trade liberalization, and because exporters become
relevant narrow interest groups.2 International trade institutions, such as the GATT
and WTO, have the explicit goal of “negotiating the reduction or elimination of
obstacles to trade.”3 Membership in trade institutions is quite ubiquitous. With
currently 159 members, the WTO encompasses most countries in the world, and
it is supplemented by a dense network of preferential trade agreements (PTAs);
1A number of authors emphasized exporters and multinational corporations as potentially
important actors (see, e.g., Milner 1988; Gilligan 1997a; Pahre 2008), but none of these touches on
the link between domestic institutions and trade policies.
2Which specific institutions are thought to be associated with more support for narrow interest
groups is inconsequential for the main propositions in the following: narrow interest institutions –
however defined – have an ambiguous effect on average tariff levels, but increase the dispersion in
tariff rates.
3Mission Statement of the WTO, at http://www.wto.org.
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almost 600 trade agreements have been negotiated and notified to the GATT/WTO
between 1948 and 2014. In “negotiating the reduction or elimination of obstacles to
trade,” almost all trade agreements rely on the principle of reciprocity. Reciprocity
implies that, in order to gain tariff concessions for some of its products abroad, a
government has to liberalize tariffs on some of its own products. These concessions
do not necessarily apply to the same products or industries, and tariff concessions
on one good are usually reciprocated in another good (Barton et al., 2008). This
intersectoral reciprocity is considered the standard negotiation procedure (Freund,
2003), in part because it allows countries to take advantage of differences in
comparative advantage (Takatoshi and Krueger, 1997). In the negotiations over the
North American Free Trade Agreement, for instance, the United States offered to
lower its restrictions on sugar imports from Mexico, receiving lower restrictions
on automobile exports to Mexico in turn (USITC, 2009, p. 82). This exchange of
concessions has been dubbed first-difference reciprocity (Bhagwati, 1988), because
it involves tariff reductions of equivalent value, but not a reduction to equivalent
levels. In addition to being the guiding principle in negotiations at the GATT
and the WTO (Bhagwati, 1988; Stern, 2007; Oatley, 2010), over 96 per cent of
current preferential trade agreements are based on reciprocity (Mansfield and
Milner, 2012). Reciprocity was also common in less recent trade negotiations. In
negotiations between Germany and Switzerland over a trade agreement in 1891,
“it was known that Switzerland would accept a trade agreement [to lower tariffs
on German machinery] only if it would achieve advantages for its cheese exports”
(Weitowitz, 1978, p. 93).
Under reciprocity, exporters have incentives to support trade liberalization of
the domestic market in exchange for concessions abroad. Exporters benefit from
tariff concessions of other countries in several ways. Lowering tariffs increases sales
and profits for exporters and can create new export markets. Even if exporters
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do not exist yet for a specific target market, the possibility of creating new export
opportunities can result in pressure by exporters for market liberalization. Such
demands are likely to come from firms that have experience in other export markets
and can transfer existing infrastructure and knowledge to new markets (Albornoz
et al., 2012). Existing and potential exporters also benefit from the policy certainty
of legally binding and formally negotiated tariff rates (Handley, 2014).4
Numerous anecdotes illustrate instance where exporters were willing to support
domestic trade liberalization in order to gain improved foreign market access. In
1907, D. M. Perry, Vice-President of the Manufacturers Bureau of Indiana, pointed
out that protectionist trade policies in the United States, by preventing a reciprocal
agreement, are “barring us out of Canada and building up the industries of that
country. Many factories have been established there in late years to supply a trade
that could just as well have been supplied by our own factories. This is an example
in which the tariff serves to protect the foreign producer instead of the home
producer” (Perry, 1907, p. 465). Another lobbyist, recognizing that “reciprocity
is the game of give and take,” was even more explicit in specifying demands for
domestic trade liberalization, noting about reciprocal trade negotiations between
the United States and European countries in the early 20th century that, “If
arrangements for the entry of many farm and factory products to these great
continental markets can be made on the basis of conceding up to twenty per cent
of the Dingley duties, the bargain is a good one, and in the present temper of the
people may not with impunity be strangled by interests that have grown rich and
powerful by virtue of special privileges long enjoyed. We maintain that four-fifths
4Exporters may still benefit from protectionist trade policies in their home markets. For instance,
the United States auto industry would benefit from reduced tariffs on their products abroad;
at the same time, the auto industry benefits from restricted access to the United States market.
While such intra-industry trade could potentially undermine the incentives for firms to lobby
for trade liberalization, intersectoral reciprocity allows exporters to lobby for tariff liberalization
without sacrificing their own domestic market. Moreover, exporting firms can benefit from market
liberalization even if this implies an increase in foreign competition in their domestic market. For
theoretical models with these results, see Melitz (2003) and Osgood (2013).
17
of the existing duties, plus 3,000 miles of transportation, is protection enough for
any domestic industry” (Sanders, 1907, pp. 452-453). Instances of unilateral trade
policy-making, consequently, are seen critical by exporting firms. In a presentation
at the European Commission in January 2012, Liam Benham, a Ford representative,
lamented that recent one-sided trade policies “provide insufficient opportunities for
exports.”5 Similar demands for domestic concessions in exchange for market access
abroad were made by the semi-conductor and aviation industries in the United
States in the 1980s (Milner and Yoffie, 1989). The economic incentives underlying
exporter demands can break up even the strongest political alliances, as in late
19th century Germany, where the alliance of “iron and rye” did not withstand
the political conflict over trade. While agricultural groups wanted to maintain
protectionist policies, firms in the manufacturing sector pushed for a liberalization
of the agricultural market in exchange for market access in Russia and Austria in
particular (Weitowitz, 1978, p. 255). Multinational firms have been particularly
vocal in this regard, for instance in supporting European integration as well as the
North American Free Trade Agreement, since such trade agreements allow them to
take advantage of production networks across countries (Milner, 1988; Kim, 2015).
Exporters are also well-positioned to be politically influential and to successfully
make demands on governments. As stated succinctly by Bernard and Jensen
(1999, p. 1), “Exporters are better than non-exporters,” and they are so on many
dimensions that are politically relevant. Exporting firms tend to be larger, more
profitable, and to pay higher wages than firms that are producing only for the
domestic market (Bernard and Jensen, 1999). Anecdotally, this is particularly
evident from multinational corporations, which in many countries tend to be
among the politically most influential and most prominent firms (Jensen, 2003).
To illustrate the point more generally with respect to exporting firms, Figure
5http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/february/tradoc_149058.pdf.
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Figure 2.1.: Log number of employees (left panel) and log output (right panel) for
industries in the lower quartile and upper quartile of the export-import ratio. Data
from Nicita and Olarreaga (2006), covering 96 countries. Graph shows mean, upper
and lower quartile, and upper and lower adjacent values.
2.1. displays box plots of the logged number of employees and logged output for
industries that are in the lower and upper quartile of the export-import ratio, using
data from 96 developed and developing countries (Nicita and Olarreaga, 2006).6
Figure 2.1. shows that industries heavily dependent on exports have both more
employees and higher output. Industries in the upper quartile of the export-import
ratio have about eleven times as many employees than industries in the lower
quartile; their output is about twenty times as large as that for industries in the
lower quartile.7 Their attributes put exporters into a position to successfully exert
political influence.
Second, exporting firms can have substantial bargaining leverage over govern-
6I calculate the export-import ratio as the difference between the value of exports and the value
of imports for each industry, divided by the sum of exports and imports for that industry. The
resulting ratio is bound between -1 and 1 and provides a measure that is not a function of industry
size. Industries are identified at the three-digit level. Because the ratio is bound between -1 and 1
and hence not dependent on industry size, the data in Figure 2.1. do not simply reflect that larger
sectors have larger net trade balances and more employees.
7These characteristics have been well understood by policy-makers for a long time. In 1890,
German chancellor Caprivi noted that exports “happen predominantly in firms which offer higher
wages” (Weitowitz, 1978, p. 42).
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ments. Import-competing firms are attractive targets for government support in
part because they have a credible exit threat: If unable to maintain production
when unshielded from international competition, governments have incentives to
avert job losses through protectionist policies (Goodhart, 2014). Many exporting
firms do not lag behind when it comes to credible exit threats. They have the
option of leaving the home country and relocating production to the target market
through tariff jumping – circumventing trade barriers by substituting foreign direct
investment for exports (Ossa, 2010).
Third, collective action problems are unlikely to be more pronounced among
exporting firms than among import-competing firms. Often, the gains from
increased export opportunities for any specific good are concentrated on only
a small number of firms (Cebeci et al., 2012). Especially where exporting comes at
high start-up costs only the most competitive firms are able to take advantage of
improved export opportunities (Bustos, 2011). As a consequence, even within
generally competitive industries, few firms are able to reap the gains from
exporting, as emphasized in recent theoretical models (Melitz, 2003) – which
also underscores that exporters should in fact be considered ‘narrow’ interest
groups. Consequently, reciprocal trade negotiations change the usual impact of
collective action differentials on trade politics. “A protectionist measure provides
large benefits to a small number of people, and causes a very great number of
consumers a slight loss. This circumstance makes it easier to put a protection
measure in place” (Pareto, 1927, p. 379). In reciprocal negotiations, a protectionist
measure also causes a large loss to firms that lose or forego access to export markets,
which makes it harder to put a protection measure in place.
That trade agreements allow governments to negotiate tariff reductions in
foreign countries in exchange for own concessions, and that this effect turns
exporters into supporters of domestic trade liberalization, has not gone unnoticed
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in political science (see, e.g., Gilligan 1997a; Pahre 2008), but it has been absent
from the literature on domestic institutions and trade policy-making. The
latter implicitly rests on a unilateral view of trade politics that ignores trade
agreements. If trade policy is set unilaterally, exporters do not affect the incentives
of governments to provide protectionist trade policies at home. Governments may
offer various policies to support exporters, such as subsidies, or gain market access
abroad by force, as in European mercantilism in the 17th and 18th centuries. But
the incentives to cater to exporters do not interfere with a government’s ability to
provide protectionist trade policies to import-competing firms. It follows that only
import-competing firms, which oppose trade liberalization, and consumers, which
support trade liberalization, have a stake in domestic trade policies. It follows, in
the established unilateral framework, that the presence of exporters is irrelevant for
the link between domestic institutions and tariff levels, and political institutions
furthering the influence of narrow interest groups should be associated with higher
average tariff rates.8
Reciprocity breaks this relationship between institutions and protectionism.
Given the incentives for exporters to lobby for tariff reductions in the domestic
market, and their potential ability to do so, electoral institutions that favor narrow
interests should support some of these exporting interests and cut domestic trade
barriers in order to gain market access abroad. Consequently, reciprocal trade
negotiations require governments to provide protectionism more selectively, and
governments can do so, since “full liberalization, the elimination of all trade
barriers, is rarely if ever achieved in practice” (USITC, 2009, p. 91). Indeed,
8In the seminal model of trade politics (Grossman and Helpman, 1994), exporters may receive
political support through export subsidies. This presence of exporters makes (almost) no difference
to a government’s decision to provide tariffs to protectionist sectors. Governments that are more
dependent on contributions and therefore support from narrow interests will provide more benefits
to exporting firms in the form of export subsidies and at the same time provide more benefits to
import-competing firms in the form of tariffs. This is different under reciprocity, where supporting
exporters comes at the expense of import-competing firms, and vice versa.
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few trade agreements eliminate tariff barriers uniformly and across-the-board, such
that “some sensitive sectors are typically excluded” from tariff cuts (Freund, 2003),
and which sectors are considered sensitive will depend on the trading partner in
question (Kono, 2008).
The selective provision of protectionism is possible, moreover, because tariff
rates can be set individually for distinct goods – with more than 5,000 tariff lines
in modern tariff schedules (Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga, 2009) – governments have
the opportunity to accommodate exporters and protectionist groups at the same
time: they can maintain high tariff rates on some goods, thereby providing support
to select protectionist firms, and liberalize tariffs on goods where concessions can
be turned into valuable market access abroad and where political pressure from
protectionist groups is outweighed by exporters. The existing literature identifies a
number of variables that affect the political influence of import-competing firms
and industries – such as industry size, the number of employees, collective action
problems, import levels, and the political and economic geography of industries
(Alt and Gilligan, 1994; Busch and Reinhardt, 1999; McGillivray, 2004; Gawande
and Krishna, 2003). Firms and industries that fall short on any of these measures
are valuable targets for reciprocal liberalization if governments can sacrifice them
in exchange for access to export markets. At the same time, politically influential
firms and industries will be able to maintain protectionist trade policies.
This has several implications. First, if governments can sacrifice some import-
competing firms in exchange for market access abroad, narrow interest institutions
are not necessarily more protectionist on average. More influence for narrow
interest groups should have two important effects. First, more influence makes it
easier for exporters to lobby for tariff concessions in the home market in exchange
for market access abroad. Second, because reciprocity is based on equivalent
concessions under the principle of first-difference reciprocity, more influence allows
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exporters to achieve larger tariff concessions in the home market, which offsets
the potentially higher tariffs granted on some products for import-competing
firms. Consequently, electoral institutions have an ambiguous impact on average
tariff levels. Instead, different electoral institutions should produce systematic
differences in the pattern of tariff rates across products. As institutions facilitate the
influence of narrow interest groups, policies are increasingly geared toward both
protectionist and exporting interests: some firms succeed in gaining protectionist
tariff rates, resulting in higher tariffs on some products, while some exporting firms
succeed in gaining access to foreign markets, which requires lowering domestic
tariff rates on other goods. The guiding principle of first-difference reciprocity
ensures that stronger demands for liberalization of export markets translate into
stronger demands for tariff cuts at home.
If narrow interest institutions are more susceptible to these demands, then these
demands should create more dispersed tariff rates across products under narrow
interest institutions. Because governments can set tariffs on narrowly defined
products (for instance, the United States tariff schedule lists different rates for zinc
dust and zinc powders, or for cymbals and drums), the pattern of liberalization
and protection should be evident even within sectors (such as metal products
or musical instruments): producers of some of these products should succeed in
gaining protection, and producers of others should be sacrificed in exchange for
market access abroad. Thus, even within sectors, reciprocal trade negotiations
imply that narrow interest institutions should create more dispersed tariff rates.
This result moves the empirical focus away from average tariff rates as a measure
of the influence of narrow interest groups, thereby also avoiding the difficulties
of aggregating protectionist measures for a vast number of products (McGillivray,
2004).
This discussion leads to a first conjecture on electoral institutions and trade
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policies.
Proposition 2.1. Narrow interest institutions should be associated with more dispersion
in tariff rates across products than broad-based institutions, both across and within
sectors.
Second, while narrow interest institutions should have a protectionist bias in
the absence of reciprocal negotiations, as the opportunities for reciprocal trade
liberalization increase and more exporters push for trade liberalization of the
domestic market, the protectionist bias of narrow interest institutions should
decrease. Indeed, where the number and political strength of exporters outweighs
protectionist firms, narrow interest institutions may produce a free trade bias.9 As
an example, a United States lobbyist proclaimed in 1907 that “Under the McKinley
law, little of special value to American agriculture was to be had. [...] Hence the
farmer took little interest in any of those arrangements. But now he is awake!
European reciprocity means something to him. It means, in fact, millions annually
to those who dwell upon the soil” (Sanders, 1907, p. 453). Agricultural interests
in the United States had little reason to support trade liberalization in the United
States in a number of earlier trade agreements, predominantly with Latin American
countries. By contrast, gaining access to European markets was a sufficiently
promising prospect to create explicit demands for domestic trade liberalization.
Thus, as opportunities for reciprocal trade liberalization increase, demands for
domestic trade liberalization should increase, and the protectionist bias of narrow
interest institutions declines. That reciprocal trade negotiations can modify the
impact of electoral institutions on tariff levels results in a second proposition.
Proposition 2.2. The positive effect of narrow interest institutions on average tariff
9Thus, while narrow interest institutions create more dispersed tariff rates within countries, a
larger sensitivity to interest groups might also create more variance in average tariff rates across
countries, a proposition that is not pursued further here.
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levels should decrease in the number of trade negotiations in which a country has
participated.
Before turning to an empirical evaluation of these two propositions, three
alternative explanations are discussed: comparative advantage, differences in
the political influence of industries, and the role of intermediate goods and
multinational firms.
Comparative advantage. It is plausible that a higher dispersion in tariff
rates across products arises under narrow interest institutions because different
industries enjoy different degrees of comparative advantage relative to trade
partners and electoral institutions reinforce these differences. For instance, in
a country that has a comparative advantage in producing wood products, but
a disadvantage in producing steel products, a government may have stronger
incentives to protect the latter than the former. If these incentives are a function
of electoral institutions, we might observe a larger dispersion in tariff rates under
narrow interest institutions. This dispersion would not be due to the pattern
of liberalization and protection described above. Instead, it is a function of the
structure of a country’s economy. Two empirical implications help distinguish
between these two explanations. First, in an explanation based on differences
in comparative advantage, the dispersion in tariff rates should arise across
sectors, while tariff rates should be quite level within sectors (where the extent of
comparative advantage is constant). By contrast, as noted above, the pattern of
liberalization and protection emphasized in this chapter should result in a higher
dispersion rate in tariff rates even within sectors. Second, in an explanation based
on comparative advantage, narrow interest institutions should have unambiguously
higher tariff levels, and trade agreements would be inconsequential for the average
tariff level. By contrast, the explanation in this chapter implies that the effect of
electoral institutions on tariff levels should be a function of trade agreements.
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Differences in political influence. This second point also helps distinguish the
argument from an explanation that emphasizes differences in the political strength
of import-competing industries, which may create more dispersed tariff rates if
such differences are amplified by political institutions. For instance, among two
otherwise equivalent industries, the geographically more concentrated industry
should be better able to secure protection (Busch and Reinhardt, 1999). If such
differences are reinforced by narrow interest institutions, then more dispersed tariff
rates arise based on differences in the political influence of firms, not because of
reciprocal trade liberalization. While this is a plausible explanation for observing
higher tariffs and a higher variance in tariff rates under narrow interest institutions,
it cannot explain the pressure to liberalize select goods, and it would therefore not
explain why the protectionist bias of narrow interest institutions decreases in the
presence of reciprocal trade negotiations. Similarly, because such arguments are
typically based on the political influence of industries, not firms, we should observe
a higher dispersion in tariff rates only across, but not within, industries or sectors.
Intermediate inputs and multinational firms. A third alternative explanation is
the presence of firms that use imported goods and the presence of multinational
corporations. Some firms lobby for tariff reductions on intermediate inputs,
and multinational corporations that take advantage of international production
networks may lobby for tariff reductions on goods they produce abroad and sell
in the home market (Milner, 1988). If narrow interest institutions are more
susceptible to these demands, they would create more dispersed tariff rates and
have an indeterminate effect on average tariff levels. Yet, because reciprocal
trade negotiations are irrelevant in this explanation, the effect of narrow interest
institutions on tariff levels should not be conditional on the presence of reciprocal
negotiations; thus, the second proposition helps distinguish this explanation
from the argument in this paper. Moreover, multinational corporations and
26
firms importing intermediate inputs do not require (unilateral or multilateral)
domestic trade liberalization. Import subsidies are a more attractive alternative
to governments, since they allow governments to avoid being caught in-between
the interests of protectionist firms and importing firms. Moreover, because import
subsidies benefit foreign producers, they are unlikely to raise complaints from
foreign governments and producers.
Finally, in all three explanations, a higher dispersion in tariff rates would be
caused by domestic institutions that are more susceptible to demands by narrow
interest groups. While the theoretical mechanism would be complementary to the
one proposed in this chapter, a higher dispersion in tariff rates remains a valid, but
so far unused, indicator to assess how domestic institutions translate interest group
demands into trade policies.
II.2 Empirical evidence
This section provides empirical evidence to assess the main propositions
discussed in the previous section: first, narrow interest institutions should be
associated with a higher dispersion in tariff rates, and, second, the protectionist bias
of narrow interest institutions should decline in the number of trade negotiations
in which a country has participated.
II.2.1 The structure of tariff rates
To measure dispersion in tariff rates, I draw on tariff data from the Trade
Analysis Information System (TRAINS) of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development, which provides tariff data for a cross-section of countries from
1988 to 2010 and, after accounting for data limitations on other variables, a sample
of up to 137 developed and developing countries; all of these are GATT/WTO
members. I use data at the four-digit level, which provides tariffs on up to 1255
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products for each country-year. For instance, the data provides separate tariffs for
‘Wrist-watches, pocket-watches and other watches, including stop-watches, with
case of precious metal or of metal clad with precious metal’, depending on whether
they feature a ‘case of precious metal or of metal clad with precious metal’ (code
91.01) or whether they do not (code 91.02). For each country-year, I then compute
the standard deviation in tariff rates across products.10 The standard deviation in
tariff rates across products provides a direct measure of the overall dispersion in
tariff rates; the appendix discusses alternative ways to evaluate the dispersion in
tariff rates.
As noted above, unless the dispersion is exclusively due to differences in
comparative advantage, the standard deviation should also increase within product
categories. As a second dependent variable, I therefore calculate the standard
deviation in tariff rates within broad product categories. To do so, I define fifteen
product categories by their product codes, such as Mineral Products, Textiles, or
Machinery and Electrical Products, following the Harmonized System classification
scheme.
To define narrow interest institutions, note that trade policies affect both
exporters and importers. Moreover, the argument in this chapter implies that
trade policy typically does not affect entire industries the same way. Tariffs can be
set on narrowly defined products, within and across industries. Indeed, for any
given good, in most cases less than half a dozen of exporters exist (Cebeci et al.,
2012). If conflict over trade policy is based on small sets of firms, not industries or
even classes, political conflict runs along narrow lines, rather than broad segments
of the population. Thus, interest groups are heterogeneous across districts – which
is a crucial difference among arguments that find plurality systems to support
narrow interest groups (such as Rogowski 1987) and those that find proportional
10Members of the European Communities are omitted from the data.
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representation systems to support narrow interest groups (such as Rogowski and
Kayser 2002).
Plurality systems tend to be more supportive of narrow, geographically
heterogeneous districts than proportional representation systems for a number
of reasons. Rogowski (1987) points to the small population size per district in
single-member districts and the typically weaker parties in plurality systems as key
factors enabling narrow interests to exert disproportionate influence. The smaller
district size implies that individual legislators should be more willing to influence
government policy on behalf of constituents. In the context of trade politics, smaller,
single-member districts also imply that the congruence between firm and voter
interests increases, reinforcing the incentives for legislators to provide policies that
benefit firms in their constituencies – especially when the fortunes of voters are
tied to local economic conditions, such as through home ownership (Scheve and
Slaughter, 2001).11
Data on political institutions are available from Beck et al. (2001); the variable
plurality is coded 0 for countries that use proportional representation systems and
1 for countries that use plurality rule.12 While an indicator for plurality rule masks
many differences within electoral systems, it has the advantage of being relatively
simple and unambiguous, therefore being available for a large number of countries,
and it is the variable used in the seminal literature. I consider several alternative
variables for narrow interest institutions below: the number of electoral districts,
the incentives to cultivate a personal vote, and the proportion of legislators with
11In the context of United States policy-making, the President and members of the Senate are
thought to pursue more broad-based interests than members of the House of Representatives, due
to the differences in constituency size. Yet, Karol (2007) finds that differences in constituency size
are a poor predictor of legislators’ attitudes towards free trade and protectionism. The present
argument provides an explanation for the result. Narrow constituencies need not be protectionist,
and hence some legislators might well be in favor of free trade – not despite, but because of the
small constituency size.
12In countries that use mixed systems, the variable is coded according to the rule that applies to
the majority of seats.
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subnational (hence particularistic) districts.
Country size is associated with both electoral institutions and trade openness
(Katzenstein, 1985), and together with wealth also with the ability to engage with
other countries in international negotiations. I therefore include the log of gross
domestic product, GDP, and gross domestic product per capita, GDP per capita,
as control variables. Because large agricultural sectors are prone to receiving
protection (Davis, 2004), some models control for agricultural production as a
percentage of gross domestic product, agriculture. The variables are obtained
from the World Development Indicators.
Table 2.1. reports the results from models relating the standard deviation in
tariff rates to political institutions; Table 2.2. replicates the models from Table
2.1., but uses the standard deviation in tariff rates within sectors as the dependent
variable. The first three columns report results from generalized linear models that
allow for serial correlation in the error term through a first-order auto-regressive
process. The reported results allow the parameter for the auto-regressive process to
vary for each panel. In almost all cases, larger coefficient estimates are obtained
when restricting the parameter for the auto-regressive process to be identical across
panels; similar results are obtained when allowing for serial correlation across
panels. The first column omits any control variables, the second column includes
two control variables, GDP and GDP per capita, and the third column additionally
includes agriculture. The results are consistent with the first proposition: plurality
electoral systems, as narrow interest institutions, are associated with more spread
in tariff rates than proportional representation. The difference corresponds to about
a thirty per cent increase compared to the sample average.
A small number of tariff rates assumes extreme values, some in excess of 2000
per cent. Such extreme values may skew results in linear regression models based
on means; they may also skew the dependent variable itself, the standard deviation
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in tariff rates. While such extreme values accurately reflect highly protectionist
trade policies, they may unduly influence the results. I consider three approaches
to assess the sensitivity of the results in Tables 2.1. and 2.2. to such extreme values.
First, I drop tariff rates in excess of 1000 per cent from the calculation of the
standard deviation. Second, I drop observations where the calculated standard
deviation exceeds 100. The results are robust to these approaches (not reported).13
Third, instead of relying on a linear regression model based on means, column 4
reports the results of a quantile regression at the median of the data, which provides
estimates that are more resilient to outliers. The results are substantively similar,
suggesting that the results are not driven by few large observations.
13Dropping the largest one per cent or largest .1 per cent of tariff rates does not affect the results.
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Table 2.1.: Standard Deviation in Tariff Rates,
Country-Year Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
plurality 1.54*** 2.17*** 2.53*** 2.73***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
GDP .447*** .489*** .094
(.000) (.000) (.302)
GDP per capita .052** .038 -.013
(.023) (.106) (.698)
Agriculture .023*** -.009
(.000) (.326)
Constant 10.3*** -1.46 -2.80 4.85**
(.000) (.381) (.108) (.029)
Number Obs. 1804 1780 1675 1679
Number Countries 137 136 129 134
Coefficient Estimates and p-values.
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Columns (1)-(3): GLS, AR(1) error process. (4): Quantile regression.
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Table 2.2.: Standard Deviation in Tariff Rates,
Country-Year-Sector Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
plurality 1.10*** 1.39*** 1.53*** 1.02***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
GDP .190*** .215*** -.099***
(.000) (.000) (.000)
GDP per capita -.009*** -.013*** -.080***
(.005) (.004) (.000)
Agriculture .014*** .001
(.000) (.654)
Constant 7.06*** 2.36*** 1.51*** 7.90***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Number Obs. 25,860 25,500 23,964 24,036
Coefficient Estimates and p-values.
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Columns (1)-(3): GLS, AR(1) error process. (4): Quantile regression.
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The appendix provides a number of robustness checks and assesses alternative
explanations, and considers, for instance, the role of government partisanship, veto
players, region- and country-specific effects, or spatial dependence. The following
addresses the four most salient robustness checks; the results are reported in Tables
2.3. and 2.4.. First, while the sample used for the previous models contains only
countries that participate in at least one reciprocal trade agreement, the effect of
plurality rule should increase in the number of trade agreements a country has
negotiated. Many exporters have only a limited number of export markets, such
that in any specific trade agreement only a limited number of exporters may be
pushing for liberalization. The more trade agreements a country is member to,
the larger is the number of exporters that had a chance to support domestic tariff
reductions, and the stronger the link between narrow interest institutions and the
dispersion in tariff rates should be. I therefore interact the variable on plurality rule
with the logged number of a country’s preferential trade agreements, obtained from
Kucik (2012). As expected, the interaction between trade agreements and electoral
rule is positive, such that the effect of plurality rule on the standard deviation in
tariff levels increases in the number of trade agreements (column 1, Table 2.3.).
Figure 2.2. reports the marginal effect of plurality rule as a function of the
number of trade agreements, with the distribution of the data on trade agreements
shown in the background. For countries with the lowest number of trade
agreements, the effect is close to zero; at the upper end of the distribution, the
effect is about twice as large as in the models not accounting for the interaction
term. This conditional effect is consistent with the theory based on reciprocal
trade negotiations. By contrast, if the standard deviation in tariff rates arose from
pressure from multinational corporations or reflected differences in the political
influence of import-competing firms, the effect should not depend on the number
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of trade agreements.14
Second, and as noted previously, multinational corporations may push for
unilateral trade liberalization on goods that are produced abroad and re-imported.
Then, the dispersion in tariff rates would not be due to reciprocity, but to unilateral
liberalization. I include a variable measuring a country’s stock of outward foreign
direct investment as a percent of GDP, available from the World Bank, to account
for the potential influence of multinational corporations (column 2, Table 2.3.).
If a country’s stock of foreign direct investment abroad is associated with the
activities and political influence of multinational corporations (Wacker, 2013), then
the variable on foreign direct investment stocks will account for this alternative
explanation, such that the coefficient on plurality rule isolates the effect emphasized
in this chapter. The coefficient on plurality rule remains statistically significant and
slightly increases in size.
Third, I include the average tariff rate for the country-year as control variable
(column 3, Table 2.3.). If plurality rule is associated with higher average tariff
rates, and higher average tariff rates are associated with more dispersed tariff
rates (because there is more room for downward movement), then the previously
reported results would be biased. The results are also robust to this specification.
Finally, Table 2.4. considers three alternative measures for the incentives to
provide policies to narrow constituencies, each representing a different dimension
of common differences between plurality rule and proportional representation.
First, as the number of electoral districts increases, the incentives to provide policies
to narrow interest groups should increase as well: through a larger number of
districts, smaller interest groups can gain representation in the political process
14Countries negotiating a large number of trade agreements could differ systematically from those
countries that negotiate few trade agreements. To account for this potential endogeneity of trade
agreements, I split the sample according to the electoral system variable and use the number of
trade agreements by countries in the same geographic region in the previous year as instrument for
a country’s trade agreements (see Büthe and Milner (2008) for a similar strategy). The results are
substantively similar.
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Table 2.3.: Dispersion: Alternative Explanations
(1) (2) (3)
plurality -.602* 3.05*** 2.76***
(.051) (.000) (.000)
x PTAs 1.55***
(.000)
Outward FDI -.004
(.824)
Average tariff .040***
(.000)
GDP .413*** .490*** .347***
(.000) (.088) (.000)
GDP per capita .059** .016 .074**
(.011) (.534) (.016)
Agriculture .019* .034*** .006
(.079) (.001) (.552)
PTAs -.176
(.406)
Constant -.461 -2.73 -.080
(.836) (.182) (.966)
Number Obs. 1456 1375 1657
Number Countries 108 110 129
Coefficient Estimates and p-values.
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Columns (1)-(3): GLS, AR(1) error process.
(Rogowski, 1987; Ehrlich, 2007). Data on the number of electoral districts are
available from Golder (2005).15 Second, legislators from national constituencies
should have more broad based interests than legislators from smaller geographic
constituencies. I obtain a variable on the proportion of national constituencies
from Seddon et al. (2002). The variable ranges from zero to one, where a value of
zero represents a system where all legislators come from national districts. Third,
the influence of narrow interest groups should increase as legislators have more
‘Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote’ (Carey and Shugart, 1995). Data are again
available from Seddon et al. (2002). The variable is an index of party control
15Because the data are only available for one or two years for many countries in the sample, the
table reports ordinary least squares estimates with standard errors clustered by countries.
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over ballots, whether and how votes are pooled, and how votes are allocated. The
resulting index ranges from zero to eight, with higher values indicating more
incentives to cater to narrow interest groups. As with the variable on plurality
versus proportional representation, incentives to cultivate a personal vote have
been associated with more protectionist trade policies (Nielson, 2003).
The results using these alternative measures confirm the previous results: as
the number of electoral districts increases, the share of legislators from nation-
wide districts decreases, and incentives for individual legislators to cater to narrow
groups increase, the standard deviation in tariff rates increases. Moreover, these
variables appear to pick up relevant aspects of the distinction between plurality rule
and proportional representation. When including each of them in addition to the
plurality rule variable, the coefficient on plurality rule loses statistical significance
at conventional levels (except for the variable on subnational districts, where both
coefficients remain significant).
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Figure 2.2.: Marginal effects of electoral system on standard
deviation of tariff rates and 95 per cent confidence intervals, as a
function of logged number of trade agreements. Histogram in the
background shows the distribution of the data on trade agreements
in the sample. Based on column 1 in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.4.: Dispersion: Alternative Institutions
(1) (2) (3)
Districts 1.78**
(.018)
Subnational districts 5.06***
(.000)
Personal Vote 1.28***
(.000)
GDP -.478 .331** .712***
(.351) (.013) (.000)
GDP per capita .264* .031 .034
(.062) (.400) (.258)
Constant 13.9 -1.38 -8.64
(.290) (.679) (.005)
Number Obs. 124 726 722
Number Countries 67 94 94
Coefficient Estimates and p-values.
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Column (1): OLS, clustered standard errors.
Columns (2) and (3): GLS, AR(1) error process.
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II.2.2 Institutions and tariff levels
Proposition 2.2 suggests that the protectionist bias of narrow interest institutions
decreases in the presence of reciprocal trade liberalization. To assess this
relationship, I rely on average tariff levels as the dependent variable, obtained
from the World Bank. Figure 2.3. shows preliminary evidence that the effect of
plurality systems on tariff levels declines over time, as the number and – plausibly
– the importance of reciprocal trade negotiations increases. The graph displays
the average tariff rate for plurality and proportional representation systems from
1990 to 2010. Average tariff rates differed substantially across electoral systems
in the early 1990s. The average tariff rate stayed relatively stable for proportional
representation systems, but declined steadily for plurality systems, such that at the
end of the sample period the differences between electoral systems are eliminated
almost entirely.
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Figure 2.3.: Average tariff rates (World Development Indicators)
1989-2010, 145 countries.
Table 2.5. provides results from a number of regression models that account
for the conditional effect of electoral institutions on tariff levels more rigorously.
Proposition 2.2 suggested that the effect of plurality rule should be conditional on
the number of trade agreements a country has negotiated, because opportunities
for exporting firms to lobby for reciprocal trade liberalization increase with the
number of a country’s trade agreements. For the number of trade agreements, I
rely on the same variable used above, obtained from Kucik (2012).16 Table 2.5.
also presents results from two alternative measures. The second column relies
on the number of negotiation rounds at the GATT/WTO a country participated
in. I compute for each country the number of GATT/WTO negotiation rounds
in which it participated.17 This variable ranges from zero to seven. The third
16Similar results are obtained when using the number of trade agreements by countries in the
same geographic region in the previous year as instrument for the number of a country’s trade
agreements.
17While joining the GATT/WTO is a decision by individual countries, and therefore potentially
gives rise to endogeneity concerns (only those countries with plurality systems that have an unusually
strong interest in free trade enter into trade agreements), the timing of GATT/WTO rounds is not
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column instead relies on the strength of exporters. More tariff reductions should be
achieved in the presence of powerful interest groups pushing for improved export
opportunities. One measure for the strength of exporter interests would be the
size of the exporting sector. This variable, however, has clear disadvantages. Most
importantly, firms may have strong interests in expanding export opportunities
because they currently have relatively low exports. Thus, I consider the logged
number of patents held by residents of a country in any given year as a measure for
the global competitiveness of domestic firms. The more patents domestic residents
hold, the more likely they are to benefit from export opportunities and therefore to
support reciprocal trade liberalization. This variable is obtained from the World
Intellectual Property Organization. The logged variable ranges from 0 to 14.5,
which corresponds to a sample maximum of just over two million patents.
The results in Table 2.5. and the marginal effects displayed in Figure 2.4. indicate
that at the upper end of the distribution – those countries with the most trade
agreements, those countries that participated in the WTO the longest, and those
countries whose residents hold the most patents – the effect of plurality rule on
tariff levels either is close to zero or even turns negative. By contrast, at the
lower end of the distribution – where reciprocal trade negotiations had the least
effect – plurality rule is still associated with higher average tariff rates. These
results demonstrate a conditional effect of domestic institutions on trade policies,
consistent with Proposition 2.2. The results also provide evidence for an effect
of international institutions on domestic politics that is more subtle than what
is commonly ascribed to them. While there is little evidence that international
institutions in general reduce average tariff rates, the protectionist bias of plurality
rule is muted as the importance of reciprocal trade negotiations increases.
a decision by individual countries or governments. The drawback is that there are substantial
concerns about whether participation in GATT/WTO rounds means the same thing for different
countries, given that not all governments participate in GATT/WTO rounds with an equally strong
voice.
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The countries that participated in international institutions the most actively
and that have the strongest exporting sectors tend to be developed countries. The
effects of electoral institutions on tariff levels should be most muted among these
countries, and the effects should differ from the effects among developing countries.
A common distinction in this regard is membership in the Organization for
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), which is usually equated with
the category of high-income countries. Column 4 in Table 2.5. interacts the variable
for plurality rule with a dummy variable that equals one for OECD members and
zero otherwise. The results indicate that plurality rule is associated with higher
tariff levels in non-OECD countries, but the protectionist bias of plurality rule is
more than offset for OECD countries, where proportional representation systems
are associated with higher average tariff rates.
The differential impact of domestic institutions may go some way in explaining
existing mixed results on the impact of electoral rule on average tariff levels, because
data are often collected along income levels. For instance, Ehrlich (2007) looks at
tariff levels in developed democracies, while Nielson (2003) looks at trade protection
in middle-income countries, and Rogowski and Kayser (2002) look at price levels
in OECD countries. Similarly, there may be little relationship between district size
and trade policy stances of United States legislators (Karol, 2007), but this need
not be the case in settings where opportunities for reciprocal trade concessions are
fewer and exporter pressures for liberalization weaker than in the United States.
The focus on specific product categories, such as agricultural products (see, for
instance, Weinberg 2012 and Park and Jensen 2007), introduces another source of
bias if the goal is to draw inferences about protectionism, or the balance between
producer and consumer power more generally. Narrow interest institutions may
result in lower average tariff levels for some product categories if those tariffs were
liberalized in exchange for market access in other goods.
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Table 2.5.: Tariff Levels and Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
plurality 3.40*** 3.44*** 1.04*** 1.99***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
x PTAs -.973***
(.000)
x GATT/WTO rounds -.668***
(.000)
x Patents -.073**
(.019)
x OECD -2.51***
(.000)
PTAs .234
(.117)
GATT/WTO rounds .446***
(.000)
Patents .098**
(.001)
OECD 1.17***
(.000)
GDP -2.05*** -2.22*** -1.58*** -2.15***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
GDP per capita .023 .034** -.013 .008
(.267) (.042) (.107) (.609)
Constant 25.6*** 26.1*** 21.3*** 27.2***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Number Obs. 1089 1144 409 1144
Number Countries 115 119 83 119
Coefficient Estimates and p-values.
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Columns (1)-(3): GLS, AR(1) error process.
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II.2.3 Additional results
This section provides two additional pieces of evidence to corroborate the
plausibility of the argument in this chapter. The first shows that the protectionist
bias of narrow interest institutions is still present with non-tariff barriers, which
have not been subject to as extensive international negotiations. The second shows
that the contemporaneous influence of import-competing and exporter interests is
also evident in political campaigns.18
II.2.3.1 Non-tariff barriers
Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are an important alternative to tariffs (see, e.g., Kono
2009; Mansfield and Busch 1995). NTBs have not been subject to as extensive
negotiations as tariffs. NTBs may also engender different political dynamics. For
instance, large firms may benefit from NTBs that are difficult or costly to meet and
thereby restrict market access for new entrants, essentially ensuring monopoly or
oligopoly rents to the incumbent firms. Because the harmonization of NTBs in many
cases imposes adjustment costs unilaterally, the political demands for liberalization
and standardization are reduced further. Thus, there may be less demand for the
(reciprocal) liberalization of NTBs than for tariffs. If reciprocal trade negotiations
have been less relevant for NTBs than for tariffs, then we may expect that differences
in electoral institutions should still be visible in the levels of NTBs. To obtain
comparable measures of protection through tariffs and protection through non-
tariff barriers, I draw on the Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI) provided
by Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009), which is an aggregate measure of protectionist
policies. The OTRI provides the tariff rate that, if applied uniformly across all
products, would leave aggregate imports unchanged. The OTRI measure is available
for a sample of 87 countries (once data limitations on electoral institutions are taken
18The next chapter provides a more thorough treatment of the second point as well.
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Figure 2.4.: Marginal effects of electoral system on
tariff levels and 95 per cent confidence intervals,
as a function of logged number of trade agree-
ments (top), GATT/WTO rounds (middle), and
log patents held by domestic residents (bottom).
Histograms in the background show the distribu-
tion of the data in the sample. Based on Table
2.5.
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Figure 2.5.: Average tariff barriers (left panel) and non-tariff
barriers (right panel) to trade for plurality and proportional
representation system, using OTRI data from Kee, Nicita and
Olarreaga (2009). Data covers 87 countries.
into account) in 2009 and on comparable scales for both tariff and non-tariff barriers,
which allows a direct evaluation of whether the differences are more pronounced for
NTBs than for tariffs. Figure 2.5. suggests that this is indeed the case. The left panel
shows that average tariff rates among plurality and proportional representation
systems are almost identical. By contrast, the right panel shows that the equivalent
average rate for non-tariff barriers is substantially higher for plurality systems than
for proportional representation systems (however, the difference is not statistically
significant at the conventional five per cent level). The differences between tariffs
and NTBs are consistent with the interpretation that governments increasingly turn
to NTBs instead of tariffs to provide protectionist trade policies (Marvel and Ray,
1983). In this view, tariffs and NTBs are substitutes, and the incentives to engage
in this form of substitution are plausibly larger in plurality systems, limiting the
impact of international negotiations on effective trade liberalization, as it might be
observed in trade flows.
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II.2.3.2 Electoral campaigns
The incentives to appeal to both protectionist and exporter interests should
also be evident in political campaigns. While the existing literature focuses on
protectionist interest groups, exporting firms can be a valuable target in political
campaigns. In 1986, John Dingell, who at the time chaired the Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigations, circulated a report which concluded that “U.S.
trade policy generally, and policy toward export promotion specifically, has been
conducted on an ad hoc basis, addressing problems only after significant political
pressure has been applied” (cited in Bayard and Elliott 1994, p. 32). The statement
shows that exporters were able to exert political pressure and, conversely, suggests
that exporters can be a valuable target in political campaigns. Thus, if exporters and
protectionist groups are targeted as narrow interest groups in political campaigns,
plurality rule should be associated with more references to both free trade and
protectionism. This proposition contrasts with the existing literature, according
to which institutions that create more incentives to appeal to the general public
should create more incentives to appeal to free trade (which benefits consumers)
than to protectionism (which benefits protectionist firms as narrow interest groups).
A finding that the same set of political institutions is associated with more appeals
to both free and trade protectionism would be puzzling from the perspective of
standard accounts, but consistent with the theory presented here.
To assess the relationship between electoral systems and political rhetoric, I
leverage data from the Comparative Party Manifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2011),
which codes the proportion of sentences in electoral platforms of political parties
devoted to specific topics. I create three variables, aggregating data across parties for
each election-year. The first is the proportion of positive references to protectionism
by all parties in a country. In order to avoid that the positions of a few extreme, but
politically irrelevant, parties bias the results, the parties’ positions are weighted by
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their vote shares in the election.19 The variable may therefore be interpreted as the
electoral appeal of protectionist trade policies in a country. The second variable
measures negative references to protectionism and positive references to free trade,
mirroring the first variable. The third variable is the difference between these two
variables and can be interpreted as the net appeal of free trade policies. In total,
the data set contains observations on 48 countries from 1975 to 2010. The first two
variables are proportions. In about 13 per cent of the observations no party made
any references to protectionism or free trade (the results in the following are robust
to omitting these cases). Because of the presence of observations that assume zero
values, I estimate a generalized linear model with logit link (Papke and Wooldridge,
1996). The results in the following are similar when estimating a linear regression
model. Similar results are also obtained from non-linear least squares estimates
when modeling the dependent variable using a logistic function and including a
lagged dependent variable additively, as show in the appendix. The next chapter
provides results when estimating the models using an adjusted beta regression
model, which allows for distinct processes to produce zeros and positive values.
The third variable may take on positive or negative values. I therefore estimate a
linear regression model. All three models include the previous control variables,
GDP and GDP per capita.
The results in Table 2.6. suggest that plurality systems in fact make more
positive references to protectionist trade policies. Moving from a proportional
representation system to a plurality system roughly doubles positive references
to protectionism. However, plurality systems are also associated with more
references to free trade and negative references to protectionism. Substantively,
plurality system make about three times as many references in favor of free
19The results are robust to using the unweighted measure, but conceptually the weighted sum
seems the more appropriate measure. The variable is normalized by the number of parties in a
country; otherwise, countries with a larger number of parties would receive higher values.
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Table 2.6.: Manifestos and Institutions
(1) (2) (3)
Protectionism Free Trade Difference
plurality .771*** 1.09*** .001
(.002) (.000) (.183)
GDP -.038 -.074 -.000
(.445) (.316) (.734)
GDP per capita -1.55 -.026 .001
(.122) (.976) (.238)
constant -5.80*** -5.07*** .001
(.000) (.006) (.773)
Number Obs. 341 341 341
Number Countries 48 48 48
Coefficient Estimates and p-values. *** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%.
Column (1): GLM, logit link. DV: Protectionism. Column (2): GLM, logit
link. DV: Free trade. Column (3): OLS. DV: Protectionism – Free trade.
trade as proportional representation systems. In both cases, the effects are
statistically significant, with p-values of .000. The third column, finally, shows
that plurality systems are not biased in favor of protectionism in terms of net
references: the difference between proportional representation and plurality
systems is small and not statistically significant at conventional levels. There
is nothing inherently protectionist about plurality rule. While narrow interest
institutions are plausibly geared towards pleasing narrow interest groups, these
groups need not be protectionist.
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II.3 Conclusion
This chapter highlights a specific instance of how international institutions
affect domestic politics. In the unilateral framework, institutions favoring narrow
interests are expected to produce more protectionist trade policies. In the context
of international institutions, these same institutions are no longer linked to more
protectionist trade policies, but to more dispersed tariff rates across groups. This
result responds to calls for more research on how international institutions affect
domestic politics (West and Lee, 2014), in particular in the field of open economy
politics (Lake, 2009, pp. 237-238), and it shows how the joint effects of domestic
and international institutions differ substantially from their effects in isolation.
An international political economy approach that accounts for both international
factors, such as the possibility of international agreements, and domestic factors,
such as domestic electoral institutions, is required to account for the political
dynamics in trade politics.
Reciprocity is one of the main pillars of the GATT/WTO’s success in reducing
tariff barriers (Oatley, 2010). The argument in this chapter suggests that reciprocity
may be poorly suited to achieve universal trade liberalization. First, if protectionism
becomes a more scarce policy, granting protectionism to specific firms becomes
a more meaningful tool to policy-makers. Reciprocity makes protectionism
less attractive to grant for some goods – those where the government can turn
liberalization into a valuable concession to domestic exporters – but more attractive
for others. In several instances, protectionist trade policies in the United States were
contested by exporters, and yet the government upheld the protectionist policies
(Destler and Odell, 1987). In these cases, resisting demands for liberalization
strengthened the government’s ability to demonstrate its support to protectionist
groups.
Second, reciprocity creates incentives to maintain protectionist trade policies as
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bargaining chips in negotiations. For instance, in the negotiations between Germany
and Austria over a trade agreement in 1891, the German government faced domestic
demands to reduce tariffs on agricultural goods in order to lower food prices. While
in general inclined to do so, German negotiators quickly recognized that a unilateral
tariff reduction would weaken Germany’s bargaining position, since it could no
longer demand a reduction of Austrian tariffs on industrial goods in exchange.
Consequently, German negotiators went to all lengths to avoid a unilateral tariff
reduction and to diffuse rumors about mounting domestic demands that could
force a unilateral reduction (Weitowitz, 1978, p. 27). Similarly, many proponents
of free trade in the United States in the early 20th century pushed for temporarily
protectionist trade policies at home in order to force open foreign markets and
increase the concessions extracted during negotiations. However, once protectionist
policies are granted to some firms, it can be difficult to reverse these policies if
reciprocal negotiations stall or fail. In this case, reciprocal trade negotiations would
contribute to an increase in tariff rates on some products.20
Both of these effects put a dent into arguments that regard reciprocity as key to
liberalizing trade universally. The most politically savvy firms may well be able to
maintain protectionist policies in their favor, and some firms may receive protection
merely for the sake of maintaining a strong bargaining position. Instead of resulting
in universal free trade, reciprocity results in spotty liberalization: Compared to
unilateral policy-making, the incentives to provide protection to some firms are
strengthened, while they are weakened for others. In this regard, the view on trade
agreements emphasized here differs from the literature that treats trade agreements
as solutions to domestic commitment or information problems, and in particular
from those parts of the literature that consider trade agreements as signals to voters
20Pond (2014) argues that the temporary protection afforded by trade sanctions strengthens
demands by import-competing firms in the sanctioned country for continued protection through
tariffs, even once sanctions are lifted. Temporarily provided protection, used as bargaining chip in
negotiations, plausibly can have similar effects on strengthening protectionist demands.
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that the government is free of influence by special interest groups (Mansfield and
Milner, 2012, pp. 15-16). The tariff reductions achieved in trade agreements are
as much a signal of the influence of special interest groups as are the exemptions
granted. Rather than signaling a government’s independence from special interest
groups, trade agreements demonstrate the government’s support for a specific set
of interest groups, some of them protectionist and some of them exporters.
The chapter also speaks to the literature that emphasizes the ability of
international institutions to create pro-cooperation groups that monitor and enforce
agreements (Dai, 2007). Trade agreements, from this perspective, create pro-
cooperation groups that push for domestic trade liberalization. The argument
in this chapter suggests that this relationship is dependent both on the strength of
anti-cooperation groups – protectionist firms – and the nature of domestic political
institutions. While international agreements may be able to mobilize domestic
pro-compliance groups, they tend to do so most successfully in environments
that also advantage groups opposing cooperation and compliance, potentially
resulting in more domestic contestation over policies and international agreements.
More generally, those governments that have the strongest domestic incentives to
cooperate and to comply with international agreements also tend have the strongest
incentives to defect from agreements, which suggests that there might be few
observable differences in the effects of international agreements on policy outcomes
and compliance rates across institutional settings.
The decision to support exporters can have implications beyond trade politics.
Many countries rely on foreign currency denominated debt to finance government
expenditures. Such debt requires foreign currency for repayment, and export
revenue can be a substantial contributor to a country’s foreign exchange position.
Revenue from export receipts can also be crucial for a country’s ability to operate
a managed exchange rate regime, because foreign exchange reserves are needed
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for the market interventions necessitated by a managed exchange rate regime.
Reciprocal trade negotiations may allow governments to score points politically
with exporting firms while at the same time securing access to foreign exchange.
The coincidence of political and economic motives in such circumstances can
make participation in international negotiations and institutions an important
tool to governments. Once established, the presence of strong exporters may
help governments carry foreign currency denominated debt and operate managed
exchange rates, both of which have important macroeconomic implications (Walter,
2008). Concerns about their external financial positions may trigger governments
to push stronger on behalf of their exporters. International institutions provide one
means to do so, such that the effects of international trade agreements may go well
beyond trade policies.
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II.A Appendix
II.A.1 Empirical models
This section of the appendix contains additional empirical models for the
propositions on the dispersion in tariff rates as well as for the data on electoral
party platforms. I consider a combination of additional control variables, different
variable measurements, and different estimation methods.
II.A.1.1 Dispersion in tariff rates
The empirical models in the main body of the chapter were very sparse and
included few control variables. Table 2.A.1. provides a number of additional
models that include control variables common in studies of trade politics. Column
1 controls for the logged length of a country’s coast line. Countries with longer
coast lines tend to be more reliant on trade; at the same time, longer coast lines also
make it harder to combat smuggling, which may have implications for a country’s
tariff rates. The variable is available from the CIA Factbook. While there are quite
substantial problems in measuring and estimating coast lines (mainly because of
the dependence on the level of aggregation), this variable is publicly available and
used elsewhere and appears as sufficient for the present purposes. Where different
measures were available, I used only the coast line of a country’s main land, not of
related islands. As the results show, countries with longer coast lines tend to have
more dispersed tariff rates, but the inclusion of the control variable does not affect
the coefficient on plurality rule.
Second, country size has been associated with both trade openness and the
electoral rule: smaller countries tend to be more dependent on trade and also tend
to be more likely to have electoral rules following proportional representation.
While log GDP is one measure of country size, logged population size, available
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from the World Bank, is a popular alternative. Column 2 shows that population size
is associated with more dispersed tariff rates, and that the coefficient on plurality
rule remains positive and significant after including the variable. The third column
includes a variable for natural resource wealth, obtained from the World Bank.
Again, the coefficient estimate on plurality rule is hardly affected by including this
control variable.
Fourth, left governments have been argued to pursue more protectionist trade
policies (e.g., McKibben and Taylor 2014). Left governments also tend to be
represented in government more often under proportional representation (Iversen
and Soskice, 2006), such that partisanship may be an important confounder.
Column 4 therefore includes a variable to control for the partisanship of the chief
executive, obtained from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001),
which emphasizes the economic orientation of governments. The results in column
4 show that left governments have more dispersed tariff rates, but including the
variable in the empirical model does not wash out the effect of the electoral rule;
while the coefficient drops in size, much of this change is attributable to the change
in the estimation sample that is due to including the additional variable; note that
the number of observations decreases by about a third.
Fifth, as an institutional variable, the number of veto players may be an
important confounding variable. Veto players are actors who can block a policy
change (Tsebelis, 2002). Moreover, previous authors have found that veto players
assume an important role in trade politics (Mansfield and Milner, 2012): Their
ability to block policy change may prevent the negotiation of trade agreements;
at the same time, governments with large numbers of veto players may feel
compelled to ‘tie their hands’ by negotiating trade agreements that overcome
domestic opposition. Column 5 includes the number of veto players, as measured
by the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001). The variable is increased
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by one, for instance, if in a presidential system the government is divided (the
chief executive is from a different party than the legislature’s majority), and in
parliamentary systems for each party in the government coalition. Since the number
of parties in particular has been related to the electoral rule, there is some concern
that the number of veto players may be correlated with the electoral rule. The
results in column 5 show, however, that the main results are unaffected by the
inclusion of the additional control variable. It is also notable that the coefficient on
veto players is negative, suggesting that a larger number of veto players is associated
with less dispersed tariff rates.
On the one hand, this result may be interpreted as being broadly consistent
with the theory in this chapter. If the dispersion comes indeed about through trade
negotiations and the incentives of governments to sacrifice some import-competing
interest groups for the sake of obtaining market access abroad in exchange, veto
players should facilitate blocking such changes in policy and consequently be
associated with less dispersed tariff rates. On the other hand, while it is encouraging
that the results are not affected by the inclusion of the variable on veto players,
the notion of veto players poses some conceptual problems for the trade politics
literature. In some ways, veto player theories takes a view of the policy-making
process that is vastly different from what is prevalent in the trade literature. In
the veto player literature, the dominant approach is to think about ways to block
change; by contrast, in the trade politics literature, much of the focus is on how
actors gain access to influence the policy-making process. While the two approaches
are not mutually exclusive, they do arrive at rather different conclusions: For
veto player theory, more access implies less change and greater policy stability;
for most theories related to trade politics, more access implies more policy bias
towards special interest group, largely regardless of the status quo. It seems
plausible that individual veto players, who could block trade liberalization, can
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be ‘flipped’ through political pressure from exporter interest groups who prefer
free trade; and those protectionist interest groups that fail to capture a veto player
may be sacrificed as well. But this is clearly not sufficient to reconcile the different
theoretical intuitions behind veto player theory and access-based approaches to
trade politics, and I would note that this topic deserves a more coherent and full
treatment elsewhere.
Finally, column 6 controls for regional fixed effects, since electoral rules and,
plausibly, tariff rates share some forms of regional clustering. Column 7 includes
year fixed effects as one way to account for contemporaneous correlation and
common time shocks. The main results are again robust to these additions.
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Table 2.A.1.: Dispersion: Alternative Explanations and Control Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
plurality 2.33*** 2.15*** 2.20*** 1.86*** 2.32*** 2.15*** 2.43***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Coast line .346***
(.000)
Population .604***
(.000)
Natural resources .001
(.564)
Left government .721***
(.000)
Veto players -.091**
(.011)
GDP .286*** .002 .451*** -.025 .492 .588*** .417***
(.000) (.975) (.000) (.690) (.000) (.000) (.000)
GDP per capita .049** .098 .056** .167*** .041* .056** .122***
(.012) (.000) (.016) (.000) (.052) (.029) (.000)
Constant .629 -.628 -1.59 8.27*** -2.28 -2.82 4.78*
(.638) (.616) (.348) (.000) (.182) (.280) (.069)
Number Obs. 1734 1773 1770 1087 1766 1780 1780
Number Countries 133 136 136 88 136 136 136
Region Dummies - - - - - yes -
Year Dummies - - - - - - yes
Coefficient Estimates and p-values. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at
10%. All models: FGLS, AR(1) error process.
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The previous tables reported mostly the estimates from models estimated
with feasible generalized least squares and allowed for serial correlation in the
error process through an AR(1) process. Table 2.A.2. considers three alternative
estimators, each of which accounts for cross-sectional, contemporaneous correlation
as well. Column 1 relies on the Driscoll-Kraay estimator for the covariance matrix,
which provides standard errors that are robust to cross-sectional correlation as
well as to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation that follows a moving-average
process (as opposed to an autoregressive process, which was the assumption
underlying the FGLS estimates). The estimator is robust to spatial correlation,
since it is a heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation (HAC) robust covariance matrix
estimator based on cross-sectional averages of the moment conditions (as opposed
to averages of each individual’s HAC covariance matrix). Vogelsang (2012) provides
an asymptotic theory (‘fixed-b asymptotics’) which improves inference substantially
compared to conventional inference based on a normal approximation.21 As shown
in Column 1, the results are robust to these alternative standard errors.
Column 2 provides estimates from ordinary least squares with clustered
standard errors. In order to account for serial as well as cross-sectional correlation,
which is a form of non-nested correlation, I compute standard errors that are
two-way clustered as described in Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011), which are
standard errors on standard sandwich-form variance estimators (White, 1980). In
particular, let V̂c be the estimated variance matrix clustered on countries, let V̂t be
the estimated variance matrix clustered on years, and let V̂tc be the estimated OLS
variance matrix. Then, the double-clustered standard errors are obtained as the
square root of the diagonal elements of
V̂ = V̂c + V̂t − V̂tc. (2.1)
21See Mueller (2014) for a discussion; Bunzel, Kiefer and Vogelsang (2001) provide additional
discussion and an application to non-linear models.
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These two-way clustered standard errors have a number of advantages over the
other alternatives considered above. Most notably, because they are non-parametric,
they do not rely on any specific assumptions about the error process in either the
cross-section or over time.22 Column 2 in Table 2.A.2. shows that the coefficient
estimate on plurality rule is significant at the 10 per cent level when using double-
clustered standard errors, but no longer at the 5 per cent level.
The third column models the potential spatial correlation explicitly through a
spatial lag, following the discussion in Franzese and Hays (2007). In particular, the
model to be estimated is, following equation 2 in Franzese and Hays (2007),
y = ρWy + Xβ + , (2.2)
with dependent variable y, covariate matrix X, coefficient vector β, scalar ρ,
residual vector , and a spatial-weighting matrix W. The spatial model defined in
equation (2.2) gives rise to two considerations. First, the spatial lag, Wy, allows
the dependent variable – tariff dispersion – to be affected by the tariff dispersion
in other countries. As noted by Franzese and Hays (2007, p. 142), this is different
from, for instance, time shocks that affect all countries the same way (which could
be modeled using year fixed effects) or external shocks whose effects may depend
country characteristics. Instead, the spatial lag allows the tariff dispersion in other
countries to directly affect a country’s tariff dispersion, and for this country’s tariff
dispersion to feed back into other countries’ tariff dispersion. As this latter part
indicates, spatial dependence thus defined implies endogeneity of the spatial lag,
and consequently estimating equation (2.2) by ordinary least squares results in
biased, inconsistent estimates. I therefore follow Franzese and Hays (2007) and
22The drawback, of course, is that this may come at a loss of efficiency and, with short or small
panels, potentially severely biased inference. A potential solution to address the small-sample
bias is, drawing on the literature on clustered standard errors in small samples (for a review, see
Cameron and Miller (2015)) to base inference on a T distribution with degrees of freedom equal to
min{#countries− 1,#years− 1}, but I leave this question open for future research.
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employ their spatial maximum likelihood estimator.
Second, to estimate the model, the spatial-weighting matrix W has to be
specified. I model these spatial effects as occurring through joint membership in a
preferential trade agreement. This implies that the spatial lag, Wy, for observation
i effectively becomes the average tariff dispersion in countries j , i that have
negotiated a trade agreement with i; the tariff dispersion in countries j , i that
have not negotiated a trade agreement with i does not enter the spatial lag for
country i at all. The results in Column 3 of Table 2.A.2. show that the positive
association between plurality rule and tariff dispersion remains. In addition,
the results show that there is an, albeit small, spatial interdependence in tariff
dispersion, as indicated by the coefficient on the spatial lag.
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Table 2.A.2.: Alternative Empirical Models
(1) (2) (3)
plurality 2.94*** 2.94* 3.16***
(.000) (.061) (.000)
GDP .760*** .760 .856***
(.000) (.152) (.000)
GDP per capita .076 .076 .062
(.123) (.487) (.127)
Spatial lag .004**
(.013)
Constant -9.02*** -9.02 -12.1***
(.003) (.461) (.018)
Number Obs. 1784 1784 1694
Coefficient Estimates and p-values. *** signifi-
cant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at
10%. (1) Driscoll-Kraay, fixed-b asymptotics.
(2) Two-way clustered standard errors, clus-
tered on country and year. (3) Spatial lag, using
membership in preferential trade agreements
as weights.
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Most of the previous models measured the dispersion in tariff rates as the
standard deviation in tariff rates across products. While the standard deviation
provides a familiar and convenient measure of dispersion, it also has a number of
drawbacks, not least due to its strong parametric form. Moreover, it makes the
previous models sensitive to outliers in two ways: single high tariff rates may skew
not only the coefficient estimates from linear models based on means, but also
the calculation of the standard deviation in the first place. As an alternative to
modeling the dispersion in tariff rates using the standard deviation, this subsection
provides results from quantile regression models.
Quantile regression provides a more flexible means to evaluate the relationship
between the variance in tariff rates and electoral rules. While a regression line
estimates a line at the mean, quantile regression provides a regression line for
percentiles of the data. Most commonly, this is the median, or the 50th percentile,
because the median is identical to the mean if the data is symmetric, yet it is more
robust to extreme values in the data than the mean. However, quantile regression
can also be applied to other percentiles of the data, which in turn can be used to
evaluate the relationship between the variance in the dependent variable and a
covariate. If the variance of the dependent variable is independent of the covariate,
then the regression lines for different percentiles should have the same slope, that
is, they should run in parallel. By contrast, if the variance of the dependent variable
is a (linear) function of the covariate, then the slopes for different percentiles
will differ. Most importantly, if the dependent variable fans out as the value of
the covariate increases, then the quantile regression lines for different percentiles
should also fan out. Specifically, the slope at lower percentiles should be smaller
than the slope at higher percentiles, and consequently the difference in the slope,
the interquartile range, should increase in x. Most commonly, the interquartile
slope is calculated for the 25th and the 75th percentile or the 10th and the 90th
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percentile.
Figure 2.A.1. provides two examples to illustrate these points. The left panel
represents data where the variance of the dependent variable on the y-axis is
independent of the covariate on the x-axis. Consequently, the slopes of the quantile
regression at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile are identical. By contrast, the right
panel represents data where the variance of the dependent variable increases with
the predictor variable. Consequently, the slopes of the quantile regression at the
25th, 50th, and 75th percentile fan out, indicating the larger dispersion in the data
at higher values of the covariate.23
23See Koenker and Bassett (1978) for the first description of quantile regression models. Deaton
(1997, pp. 80-83) offers a brief overview. Stasavage (2002) provides an application to assess whether
an increase in political constraints in associated with less variation in private investment levels.
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Figure 2.A.1.: Illustration of quantile regression to evaluate whether the
dispersion in tariff rates increases in a covariate x. In the left panel, the
dispersion in tariff rates is constant and not a function of x. In the right
panel, the dispersion increases in x. Both panels include quantile regression
lines for the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles. Note how the lines fan out
in the right panel, while they are parallel in the left panel. Consequently,
if the difference between quantiles, the interquantile range, increases in x,
the dispersion increases.
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The implication for the link between electoral systems and variation in tariff
rates is that the coefficient on plurality electoral systems should increase at higher
percentiles of the data, such that the interquartile range – the difference in the
slopes at different percentiles of the data – should be higher under plurality rule.
Table 2.A.3. shows that this is indeed the case for both the comparison between the
25th and the 75th percentile and for the comparison between the 10th and the 90th
percentile. The models in Table 2.A.3. are identical to previous ones and control
for log GDP and GDP per capita. To obtain p-values that take into account the
serial correlation in the data, standard errors were obtained through a bootstrap
clustered on countries. As the results show, the interquartile range indeed increases
in plurality rule; the coefficient estimate is positive and statistically significant at
the 1% level.
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Table 2.A.3.: Interquartile Range
25th-75th 10th-90th
plurality 2.45*** 3.84***
(.000) (.005)
GDP .062 -.033
(.631) (.927)
GDP per capita .019 .110
(.342) (.237)
Constant 2.17 9.79
(.477) (.244)
Coefficient Estimates and p-values. *** sig-
nificant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * sig-
nificant at 10%. p-values based on cluster-
bootstrap (by countries).
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II.A.1.2 Party platforms
Figure 2.A.2. displays the marginal effects of plurality rule on the number of
references to protectionism and free trade, respectively, for the models shown in
Table 2.6. in the main chapter. The marginal effect is expressed as a percentage and
represents the difference between plurality rule and proportional representation,
relative to proportional representation. Thus, Figure 2.A.2. shows that plurality rule
is associated with about 200 per cent more references in support of protectionist
trade policies, but also with more than 300 per cent more references in support of
free trade. As mentioned in the main body of the text, the first result is broadly
consistent with the extant literature, while the second is not. Moreover, and in
line with the mixed effects in the case of average tariff rates, there is no evidence
that plurality rule produces policy-makers that are, in terms of net statements in
favor of free trade, any more or less protectionist than those under proportional
representation (see Column 3 in Table 2.6.).
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Figure 2.A.2.: Marginal effects of plurality rule on references to
protectionism (left bar) and free trade (right bar). 95 per cent
confidence intervals based on Delta Method. GLM, logit link.
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Table 2.A.4. provides a number of robustness checks for the association between
plurality rule and support for free trade. First, the higher number of references
in favor of free trade may be reflecting a more contentious political climate with
respect to economic policies more generally, not support for exporters explicitly.
Thus, column 1 additionally controls for the total dispersion in the number of
references to economic issues across parties in a country. Second, party size, which
reasonably is correlated with the electoral system, may be an important confounder:
larger parties, and in particular ‘catch-all parties’, may need to appeal to a larger
number of segments of the population and thereby provide fewer references to
any specific topic. At the same time, plurality rule should be associated with
fewer, more centrist parties. As column 2 shows, larger parties (measured by the
percentage vote share) tend to make more references in favor of free trade, but
the result remains that plurality rule is associated with more references in favor of
free trade as well. Third, while the standard errors were clustered on countries in
order to take into account serial correlation, the strong correlation of the dependent
variable over time may warrant a lagged dependent variable. Column 3 therefore
presents the results from non-linear least squares, where the lagged dependent
variable enters additively the logistic function that ‘wraps’ the other covariates.
That is, column 3 reports the coefficient estimates and p-values from estimating
yi,t = yi,t−1 +
exp(x′i,tβ)
1 + exp(x′i,tβ)
+ i,t, (2.3)
with non-linear least squares, where i indicates the country, t is time, x′ is a vector
containing the variable on the electoral rule and the two control variables, y is
the dependent variable, and  is a residual. As column 3 shows, the coefficient
on the lagged dependent variable is indeed positive and statistically significant,
underscoring the temporal dependence in the data.
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Column 4 reports non-linear least squares estimates when using the ‘fixed-b
asymptotics’ for obtaining test statistics robust to serial correlation in the data
(Bunzel, Kiefer and Vogelsang, 2001). To obtain the test statistics and p-values,
moment conditions similar to HAC estimators familiar from time-series cross-
section models are used; similar to the Driscoll-Kraay estimates reported above, I
construct these as the HAC estimator of the cross-sectional average of the moment
conditions and then construct test statistics as described in Bunzel, Kiefer and
Vogelsang (2001). While Bunzel, Kiefer and Vogelsang (2001) only derive the
asymptotic distribution of their test statistic for the case of pure time series, based
on a limited number of simulations I have conducted, applying their procedure to
cross-sectional averages appears to perform well even in relatively small data sets.
That being said, I leave a more extensive treatment for future work.
Finally, column 5 reports the estimates when disaggregating the data by relying
on party-election level. I include two additional control variables relative to
the main model, the party size (since now the dependent variable is no longer
weighted by party size) and references by other parties running the same election to
protectionist trade policies, in order to ensure that more references in favor of free
trade are not simply an electorally driven response to more support for protectionist
trade policies by other parties (which, according to the standard account, should be
more attractive under plurality rule). Ideally, this would be constructed as a spatial
lag to explicitly model the interdependence in the data (Franzese and Hays, 2007),
but the non-linear structure of the model makes this difficult; I would like to mark
this as a potentially important future extension, especially since, to my knowledge,
spatial models have not been applied to model this kind of data.
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Table 2.A.4.: Manifesto Data: References to Free Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
plurality 1.09*** .935*** 1.56** 1.46*** .638**
(.000) (.000) (.014) – (.015)
GDP -.071 -.098* -.098 -.005 -.133**
(.183) (.065) (.371) – (.013)
GDP per capita -.038 .119 .015 -.009 .008
(.957) (.866) (.438) – (.313)
Issue polarization .857
(.503)
Avg Party size 2.62***
(.001)
Party competition .134
(.019)
Party size .016***
(.000)
Lagged DV .704***
(.000)
Constant -5.32*** -4.97*** -7.14*** -6.03* -3.31**
(.000) (.000) (.000) – (.012)
Number Obs. 341 341 315 315 2196
Coefficient Estimates and p-values. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at
5%, * significant at 10%. Columns (1)-(2): GLM, logit link. Column (3):
Non-linear least squares. (4): Non-linear least squares, Bunzel, Kiefer
and Vogelsang (2001) fixed-b asymptotics (p-values omitted). Column
(5): GLM, logit link. Standard errors clustered (by countries) for columns
(1)-(3), clustered by party for column (5).
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II.A.2 Formal model
This appendix provides a formal model to illustrate how, under reciprocal trade
negotiations, an increase in the reliance on narrow interest groups has an ambiguous
effect of on tariff levels. The model builds on a probabilistic voting model with
three sets of actors – individual voters, organized lobbies, and a government (see
in particular chapter 7.5 in Persson and Tabellini 2002) – and introduces the
distinction between import-competing and exporting groups to discuss the role of
reciprocal trade policy; the model also has some parallels to the model in Grossman
and Helpman (1994) and hence does not stray away too far from the seminal
literature, but it departs in two ways. First, it incorporates an electorally motivated
government which has to trade off consumer interests with those of narrow interest
groups. Second, it incorporates the trade off between import-competing interests,
which prefer higher tariffs on their own products, and exporters, which due to
reciprocity prefer lower tariffs on domestic products. I first describe the model and
its equilibrium under unilateral policy-making, deriving the standard result: an
increase in the reliance on narrow interest groups increases average tariff rates. I
then turn to trade policy under reciprocity.
II.A.2.1 Unilateral trade policy
The model contains three sets of actors: a government, which can set a vector
of trade policies, tg ; individual voters, each of whom belongs to one of J groups,
and who evaluate the vector tg relative to the status quo, to; and organized lobbies
which may represent the interest of voters in a group. An arbitrary group is denoted
by j ∈ J , and J is the set of all groups in the electorate. The game proceeds as
follows. First, the government, g, proposes a vector of trade policies to maximize its
probability of winning an election. Second, organized groups evaluate the proposed
policy vector relative to the status quo and decide whether to provide political
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support for or against the government. Third, given the proposed policy vector, the
groups’ contributions, and the status quo, voters in the electorate decide whether
to vote for or against the government.
I assume that all groups are of equal size and normalize the size of the electorate
to one, such that each group is of size 1J . Goods are produced either by import-
competers or by exporters, such that J comprises two mutually exclusive sets of
groups: the set of exporters, E, and the set of import-competers, I . All members of
group j are associated with the production of some good, also denoted by j, and
consume a basket of all goods that are produced by import-competers. A subset
of groups, denoted by L, is represented by organized interest groups, which can
make contributions. Total contributions in favor of the government are denoted
by Cg =
∑
j∈LCj,g , while contributions against the government are denoted by
Co =
∑
j∈LCj,o. Contributions are required to be non-negative.
The trade policy vector set by the government determines a specific price for
each good produced by an import-competer, and therefore for all goods in I ; the
government’s proposed tariff on good j is denoted by tg(j). Each group benefits
from a higher price on the good it produces, but also loses utility from an increase
in the price of all other goods. Specifically, the utility of individual i in group j
derived from the trade policy vector is determined by
Wij(tg) =Wj(tg) =Hj(tg)− 1I
∑
j∈I
t2g (j), (2.4)
where for individuals in import-competing groups, j ∈ I ,
∂Hj(tg)
∂tg(j)
> 0,
∂2Hj(tg)
∂tg(j)
2 < 0, and
∂Hj(tg)
∂tg(¬j) = 0, (2.5)
such that Hj(tg) = Hj(tg(j)) is increasing and concave in the group’s own tariff
and the tariffs set on the goods produced by other groups do not enter Hj(tg).
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Additionally, assume that Hj(0) = 0 and limtg (j)→0
∂Hj (tg )
∂tg (j)
=∞, which are aspects of
the common Inada conditions and imply that group j receives no utility if tariffs
are at zero, that the utility is increasing sharply at very low tariff levels, but that
the benefits of an additional increase in tariffs decline as tariffs increase. Hj here
can be interpreted as the economic well-being of the firm or industry to which a
voter is linked directly, such as through employment, or indirectly, such as through
ownership of assets whose value is associated with the fortunes of firm or industry
j (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). Group j’s utility further decreases in the tariffs set
on all goods at an increasing rate, as implied by the term τg =
1
I
∑
j∈I t2g (j). As in
Grossman and Helpman (1994), therefore, each individual in group j benefits from
an increase in the price of its own good, and is harmed by an increase in the price
of all other goods.24
Because tariffs neither increase nor decrease the utility of exporters (aside
from the higher prices on goods not produced by them), for j ∈ E it follows that
∂Hj (tg )
∂tg (m)
= 0 ∀m ∈ I such that individuals associated with exporters don’t gain
from tariffs and only lose from the higher prices implied by tariffs on goods they
consume.
In addition to the utility derived from economic policies described in equation
(2.4), the utility of individuals has a component that determines how much
individuals value the current government. This component may reflect ideological
attachment to the current government, it could reflect how much individuals value
other policies proposed by the government that are unrelated to trade policies, or it
could reflect uncertainty on part of the government about the specific preferences
24In order to focus the discussion on the political incentives, the model abstracts from many
economic characteristics on which goods may differ, such as differences in import elasticities,
which in Grossman and Helpman (1994) also play a role for equilibrium tariffs. Introducing such
differences across goods and groups would be quite straightforward and not change the main
conclusions, but add unnecessary notation for the present purposes.
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of voters. Voter i in group j votes for the current government if and only if
Wj(tg) + σij + δ > Wj(to),25 (2.6)
where σij and δ are both random variables reflecting the additional voter utility in
favor of the current government. σij is distributed uniformly, such that
σij ∼
[
− 1
2φj
,
1
2φj
]
, (2.7)
and let φ = 1J
∑
jφj be the average density; to simplify the model, let φ = φj in the
following. δ is an aggregate shock to voter utility that is not group-specific and can
be written as δ = δ˜+ h(Cg −Co). The term δ˜ is distributed uniformly as well, such
that
δ˜ ∼
[
− 1
2ψ
,
1
2ψ
]
. (2.8)
Through the term h(Cg − Co), campaign contributions by organized groups can
affect voter utility and thereby election outcomes. These campaign contributions
could reflect lobbying expenditures, advertisement campaigns, and other forms of
political support in favor of or against the current government. The term h reflects
the sensitivity of the electorate to such campaigns and expenditures, with larger
values corresponding to higher sensitivity.
To solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game by backwards
induction, consider first the voters’ decision. From equation (2.6), it follows that
a voter i in group j is indifferent between voting for and against the current
government if
σij =Wj(to)−Wj(tg)− δ˜ − h(Cg −Co) ≡ σj , (2.9)
and all voters with σij ≥ σj vote in favor of the current government, such that σj is
25Equivalently, utility of voter i in group j could be written as wij (t) =Wj (t) + (σij + δ)Ig , where Ig
is an indicator assuming the value one if the current government stays in office and zero otherwise.
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the swing voter in group j. An increase in total spending in favor of the current
government, Cg , pushes down this threshold, such that more voters vote for the
current government; the size of this effect increases (in absolute value) in h.
From the distribution of σij in equation (2.7), it follows that the share of voters
in group j that vote in favor of the government is
pij,g =
1
2
−φj
[
Wj(to)−Wj(tg)− δ˜ − h(Cg −Co)
]
, (2.10)
such that the total vote share of the government is
pig =
1
J
∑
j∈J
{1
2
−φjσj
}
=
1
2
− 1
J
∑
j∈J
φjσj . (2.11)
The government wins the election with probability pg = Pr
(
pig ≥ 12
)
, which, using
equations (2.10) and (2.11), yields
pg =
1
2
+
ψ
J
∑
j∈J
[
Wj(tg)−Wj(to)
]
+ψh(Cg −Co). (2.12)
Thus, the government is more likely to win the election as the proposed trade
policies increase, on average, in value for the j groups compared the status quo,
and as the contributions in favor of the government increase.
A subset L of the groups is represented by organized lobbies that can make
contributions, Cj,g if in favor of the government or Cj,o if in favor of the opposition;
as in Grossman and Helpman (1994), whether groups are organized is determined
outside the model. These organized lobbies could represent, for instance, industry
associations that can take political action on behalf of their members. Because
they are only concerned with the effects of trade policies on the firm’s or industry’s
welfare, these lobbies derive utility from the effects of tariffs on the economic
welfare of their group’s members in terms of Hj ; however, lobbies do not take into
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account the effects of tariff policies on the prices of other goods. On the one hand,
this assumption reflects that lobbies rarely engage in political action to drive down
prices of consumption goods. On the other hand, this assumption rules out that
lobbies engage in lobbying for intermediate goods that are imported. The following
does not depend on this assumption, but it allows focusing the discussion on the
effects of reciprocal trade negotiations on trade policies (as opposed to the influence
of imported inputs and intermediate goods). Thus, if group j is represented by an
organized lobby, the lobby chooses the size of its contributions in favor of or against
the current government in order to maximize
Uj = pgHj(tg) + (1− pg)Hj(to)−
(Cj,g +Co,g)2
2
, (2.13)
such that the utility of lobbies decreases in contributions at an increasing rate;
contributions are constrained to be non-negative.
It follows that lobbies provide contributions
Cj,g = max
{
0,
ψh
J
[
Hj(tg)−Hj(to)
]}
,
Cj,o = −min
{
0,
ψh
J
[
Hj(tg)−Hj(to)
]}
, (2.14)
such that lobby j makes contributions in favor of the government if the trade policy
set on good j is better for the lobby than the status quo, and the lobby makes
contributions against the government if the trade policy set on good j is worse
for the lobby than the status quo. Thus, a lobby makes contributions either for or
against the government, but it never makes both kinds of contributions. If the two
policies are identical, in equilibrium the lobby makes no contributions at all, where
policies only need to be identical with respect to good j; the proposed government
policy and the status quo may still differ with respect to other goods.
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Equation (2.14) implies that only organized import-competing groups make any
contributions under unilateral policy-making. Exporters do not lobby, even if they
are represented by organized groups. The reason is that under unilateral policy-
making, a government cannot affect the welfare of exporters through domestic
tariff rates aside from the effect on prices on other goods: for all j ∈ E, Hj(tg) is not
affected by changes in tg . While the government may still use export subsidies, for
instance, doing so is unrelated to domestic tariff rates. This underscores how the
assumption of unilateral policy-making justifies the focus on protectionist interest
groups at the expense of exporters in most of the existing literature.
Equation (2.14) further implies that lobbies make contributions that reflect
the marginal benefit from the proposed trade policy to their welfare, where the
marginal benefit is defined as the difference between the utility derived from the
proposed policy and the status quo. This is not dissimilar from the restriction to
equilibria with truthful contribution schedules in Grossman and Helpman (1994);
however, in the present game, such truthful contributions arise directly from the
groups’ equilibrium policies and are not the result of a restriction to the game.
Finally, note that lobbies do not have to make contingent promises in this game;
nor do they have to overcome a commitment problem. Because the lobbies have a
direct interest in either obtaining the government’s proposal or defeating it, and
because contributions affect the electorate’s choice, lobbies have an incentive to
make contributions in equilibrium, despite moving after the government.
From equation (2.14), it also follows that aggregate, net contributions in favor
of the current government are
Cg −Co = ψhJ2
∑
j∈L∩I
[
Hj(tg)−Hj(to)
]
. (2.15)
The government maximizes the probability of winning the election by proposing
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tg , taking into account the contributions by organized groups that this trade policy
vector elicits and its effect on the electorate’s voting decision. Substituting equations
(2.15) and (2.4) into the government’s probability of winning yields
pg =
1
2
+
ψ
J

∑
j∈J
[(
Hj(tg)− τg
)
−
(
Hj(to)− τo
)]
+α
∑
j∈L∩I
[
Hj(tg)−Hj(to)
] , (2.16)
where τg =
1
I
∑
j∈I t2g (j) and α =
ψh2
J . As pointed out in Persson and Tabellini (2002),
α in this model is similar to the weight on social welfare versus contributions in
Grossman and Helpman (1994), as it implies an additional weight on the welfare of
organized groups relative to unorganized groups, which in this model is due to the
effect of contributions on election outcomes.26 This parameter, in turn, has been
linked to the supply of protectionist trade policies under different electoral systems
(see, e.g., Nielson 2003): a larger dependence on contributions creates a larger
incentive for governments and policy-makers to rely on organized interest groups,
and therefore more influence of narrow interests. The main body of the text suggests
a number of reasons why plurality systems plausibly create a larger dependence
on organized interest groups, such that plurality systems should be associated
with larger values of α than proportional representation systems. However, which
specific institutions are thought to be associated with more support for narrow
interest groups is inconsequential for the main result in the following: under
reciprocity, narrow interest institutions – however defined – have an ambiguous
effect on average tariff levels, but increase the dispersion in tariff rates.
26In the original model of Grossman and Helpman (1994), α has the opposite interpretation, as it
reflects the government’s weight on social welfare relative to contributions.
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Maximization of equation (2.16) with respect to tg yields as first-order conditions
∂Hj(tg)
∂tg(j)
= 2ρ−1tg(j) for j < L, (2.17)
∂Hj(tg)
∂tg(j)
= 2[ρ(1 +α)]−1tg(j) for j ∈ L, (2.18)
which implicitly define the equilibrium tariff rates for all j ∈ I and where ρ = IJ is
the share of import-competers among all groups. Because limtg (j)→0
∂Hj (tg )
∂tg (j)
=∞ and
Hj(tg) is strictly increasing in tg(j) and concave, it follows that for each group j, a
tariff rate satisfying the equilibrium conditions exists and, moreover, is unique; it is
determined by the point at which the right-hand side in equation (2.17) and (2.18),
respectively, equals the slope of Hj(tg ), or, equivalently, the derivative of Hj(tg ) with
respect to tg(j).
The equilibrium tariff rates determined by equations (2.17) and (2.18) have a
number of properties. First, the equilibrium tariff rate for groups represented by
organized lobbies is always higher than the equilibrium tariff rate for unrepresented
groups. To see this, note that the right-hand side of equation (2.18) is always strictly
smaller than the right-hand side of equation (2.17), because (1 +α) > 1. It follows
that the slope ofHj at the equilibrium tariff rate must be flatter for organized groups
than for unorganized ones; because Hj is concave, this implies that the equilibrium
tariff rate must be larger for organized groups than for unorganized ones. Second,
the equilibrium tariff rate for groups represented by organized lobbies increases in
α. The intuition is the same: as α increases, the right-hand side of equation (2.18)
becomes smaller, such that the slope of Hj must be flatter, which implies a higher
equilibrium tariff rate.
Figure 2.A.3. illustrates these points (the implicit function theorem provides an
analytic alternative to the geometric interpretation). The downward sloping curve
represents the left-hand side of the equilibrium conditions, the first derivative of
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Hj , as a function of the tariff rate; while the chosen shape is arbitrary, the graph
will be positive across all values of tg and be sloping downwards. The straight,
upwards sloping lines represent the right-hand side of the equilibrium conditions.
The top line represents the line for an unorganized interest group; the middle line
for an organized interest group where α = .25; and the bottom line, which has
the flattest slope, is for an organized interest group where α = .75. Again, while
the specific slope of these lines is chosen arbitrarily, the equilibrium conditions in
equations (2.17) and (2.18) ensure that the slope is flatter for organized groups than
for unorganized ones and that the slope decreases in α. The intersections of the
lines with the downward sloping curve determine the equilibrium tariff levels for
the three groups, denoted by t1 (for unorganized groups), t2 (for organized groups
when α = .25), and t3 (for organized groups when α = .75); as the graph shows,
because the intersection is further to the right for organized groups and for higher
values of α, the equilibrium tariff level is higher for organized than for unorganized
groups, and it further increases in α, such that t1 < t2 < t3.
With respect to electoral institutions, because the tariff rate strictly increases in
α for j ∈ L and is unaffected by changes in α for j < L, it follows that the average
equilibrium tariff rate strictly increases in α. Thus, and as expected from standard
accounts of trade politics, a higher influence for narrow interest groups results in
higher average tariff rates under unilateral policy-making.
Finally, note that the equilibrium tariff rates in this model do not result in free
trade, even in the absence of organized lobbies that attempt to influence trade
policies. The reason is that protectionist trade policies benefit voters, such that
modest tariffs are the optimal policy. However, the presence of organized groups
increases tariffs to a level that is no longer optimal from the view of aggregate
welfare, and as the influence of narrow interest groups increases, the distortion
becomes larger, as reflected in higher average tariff rates.
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Figure 2.A.3.: Illustration of equilibrium tariff policies, defined in equations (2.17)
and (2.18), for unorganized and organized interest groups, for two values of α, .25
and .75. The equilibrium tariffs are determined by the intersection of the downward
sloping curve and the respective upward sloping line, as indicated by t1, t2, and t3
on the horizontal axis. The equilibrium tariff is higher for organized groups than
for unorganized groups and increases in α.
84
II.A.2.2 Reciprocal trade policy
If tariffs are determined in a reciprocal trade agreement, the utility of voters and
groups associated with import-competers remains unchanged. However, the utility
functions change for those associated with exporters. Let j be an arbitrary group in
the set of exporters; j may be represented by an organized lobby, but need not be.
Suppose that in a reciprocal trade agreement, the foreign country is willing to lower
its own tariffs on good j if the home country of j is willing to lower its domestic
tariffs on good j ′ , j. Thus, the two governments can exchange concessions through
intersectoral reciprocity; as is standard in the negotiations, the concessions are,
roughly, reciprocated in value: larger concessions on the home tariff on j ′ result
in larger concessions on the foreign tariff on j. For group j ∈ E, Hj(tg) =Hj(tg(j ′)),
where
Hj(tg(j
′)) > Hj(to(j ′)) if tg(j ′) < to(j ′),
∂Hj(tg)
∂tg(j ′)
< 0,
∂2Hj(tg)
∂tg(j ′)2
< 0, if tg(j
′) < to(j ′),
Hj(tg(j
′)) =Hj(to(j ′)) if tg(j ′) ≥ to(j ′),
∂Hj(tg)
∂tg(j ′)
= 0 if tg(j
′) ≥ to(j ′). (2.19)
Thus, as long as the government’s proposed tariff on good j ′ is below the status
quo, members of group j benefit from a decrease in the tariff; if the tariff on good
j ′ is equal to the status quo or larger, the direct economic utility of group j is
unaffected by the tariff (the group members still suffer from the higher price on
good j ′). These assumptions reflect that the two governments are engaging in the
possibility of reciprocal trade liberalization, but not in reciprocal protectionism or
even retaliation (in which case the partial derivative in equation (2.19) would be
negative at all levels of tg(j ′)) – that is, an increase in the domestic tariff on good j,
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compared to the status quo, is not reciprocated with an increase in the foreign tariff
on good j ′. While the following results do not depend on ruling out such retaliatory
trade policy, the conditions in (2.19) allow isolating the effect of reciprocal trade
liberalization on trade policies.
Voters follow the same voting rule as before, and lobbies follow the same
contribution rule as described in equations (2.14), such that
Cj,g = max
{
0,
ψh
J
[
Hj(tg)−Hj(to)
]}
,
Cj,o = −min
{
0,
ψh
J
[
Hj(tg)−Hj(to)
]}
. (2.20)
However, the identity of contributing groups now changes. Under unilateral
policy-making, only import-competing lobbies contributed in equilibrium. Groups
associated with exporters never made positive contributions for or against the
government. In reciprocal negotiations, exporters may make positive contributions
in equilibrium. If exporters make any contributions, these are always in favor of
the current government, but never against it: If the government were to increase
the price on good j ′ beyond the status quo, the utility of the lobby representing
exporter j would not be affected by this policy, and its equilibrium contributions
therefore would be zero. Moreover, note that either group j or group j ′ may make
contributions in favor of the government, but never both: if the proposed tariff
is higher than the status quo, such that tg(j ′) > to(j ′), only the import-competing
group, j ′, will make a contribution; if the proposed tariff is below the status quo,
such that tg(j ′) < to(j ′), the exporting group, j, will make a contribution in favor of
the government, while the import-competing group, j ′, will make a contribution
against the government. Thus, a government benefits from lowering tariff rates
by attracting contributions from exporters and by increasing the welfare of all
consumers, but the government also invites contributions that are directed against
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it from lobbies representing the affected import-competing group. Finally, note that
the situation of import-competers that are not faced with demands for reciprocal
trade liberalization and of exporters without an opportunity for making reciprocal
demands does not change compared to unilateral policy-making.
That exporters potentially join import-competing groups in making contribu-
tions is reflected in aggregate net contributions, which now are given by
Cg −Co = ψhJ2
∑
j∈L∩I
[
Hj(tg)−Hj(to)
]
+
ψh
J2
∑
j∈X
[
Hj(tg)−Hj(to)
]
, (2.21)
where X is the set of exporters making positive contributions in equilibrium (that is,
all exporters who receive lower foreign tariffs in exchange for domestic concessions).
Which exporters are in this group is determined by the government’s equilibrium
policy vector, which is derived in the following.
For determining the equilibrium trade policy vector, first note that for goods
where no reciprocal liberalization is offered, the government’s equilibrium policies
remain the same as in the unilateral case. Let R⊆ I be the set of goods produced
by import-competers on which the foreign government requests reciprocal trade
liberalization, offering to lower its own tariff on some good exported by the home
country in turn, whileN ⊆ I , with R∪N = I and R∩N = ∅, is the set of goods on
which no reciprocal liberalization is offered. Then, for j ∈ N the equilibrium tariffs
determined in equations (2.17) and (2.18) remain, such that
∂Hj(tg)
∂tg(j)
= 2ρ−1tg(j) for j ∈ (L− ∩N ), (2.22)
∂Hj(tg)
∂tg(j)
= 2[ρ(1 +α)]−1tg(j) for j ∈ (L∩N ), (2.23)
Thus, for any goods that are unaffected by reciprocal trade liberalization,
the same conclusions as in the unilateral case follow. In particular, tariffs are
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higher for groups represented by organized lobbies than for groups represented
by unorganized lobbies, and among the former, tariffs increase in the influence of
narrow interest groups. For j ∈ R, the government faces two decisions: Whether to
liberalize tariffs on j in exchange for trade liberalization by the foreign government
on some j ′ , j; and, depending on the first decision, at what level to set the
equilibrium tariffs.
Let tl(j) denote the equilibrium tariff on j ∈ R if the government decides to
lower the tariff rate below the status quo in exchange for concessions on good j ′, and
let tp(j) denote the tariff rate on j ∈ R if the government does not lower the tariff
rate below the status quo; equilibrium expressions for these tariff rates are derived
further below, in equations (2.25) through (2.30). For good j, the government
implements the lower tariff rate over the higher tariff rate if and only if
ρ−1
[
t2p(j)− t2l (j)
]
+ (1 +Dj ′α)
[
Hj ′ (tl(j))−Hj ′ (tp(j))
]
≥ (1 +Djα)
[
Hj(tp(j))−Hj(tl(j))
]
,
(2.24)
where Dj is an indicator variable equal to one if group j is represented by an
organized lobby and equal to zero otherwise.
To find expressions for the equilibrium tariff rates tl(j) and tp(j), suppose the
government does not lower the tariff on good j ∈ R, as determined by condition
(2.24). In this case, the presence of exporters does not affect the government’s
tariff decision, and the main difference for the government is whether the import-
competing group j is represented by an organized lobby or not. This yields the
same equilibrium tariffs as under unilateral policy-making, such that
∂Hj(tg)
∂tg(j)
= 2ρ−1tg(j) for j < L, (2.25)
∂Hj(tg)
∂tg(j)
= 2[ρ(1 +α)]−1tg(j) for j ∈ L. (2.26)
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Now, suppose the government lowers the tariff on good j ∈ R in exchange for
concessions on j ′. Then, the equilibrium tariff rate depends on whether j and j ′ are
represented by organized lobbies. The tariff rates can be derived from the first-order
conditions to the government’s objective function and are defined by27
∂Hj(tg)
∂tg(j)
= 2ρ−1tg(j)−
∂Hj ′ (tg)
∂tg(j)
for j < L∧ j ′ < L, (2.27)
∂Hj(tg)
∂tg(j)
= 2ρ−1tg(j)− (1 +α)
∂Hj ′ (tg)
∂tg(j)
for j < L∧ j ′ ∈ L, (2.28)
∂Hj(tg)
∂tg(j)
= 2[ρ(1 +α)]−1 tg(j)− (1 +α)−1
∂Hj ′ (tg)
∂tg(j)
for j ∈ L∧ j ′ < L, (2.29)
∂Hj(tg)
∂tg(j)
= 2[ρ(1 +α)]−1 tg(j)−
∂Hj ′ (tg)
∂tg(j)
for j ∈ L∧ j ′ ∈ L. (2.30)
These tariff rates, together with the tariff rates in equations (2.25) and (2.26),
the government’s decision rule in (2.24), and the conditions for the lobbies’
contributions and voters’ decisions, implicitly determine the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of the game. Note that the tariff rates defined by equations (2.27)-(2.30)
will in general be lower than the tariff rates in (2.25)-(2.26), due to the additional
term on the right-hand side that reflects the exporting group’s welfare, weighted
by the influence of narrow interest groups where exporters are represented by
organized lobbies.28
The tariff rate defined implicitly in equation (2.27) does not depend on α, while
the tariff rate defined in equation (2.28) decreases in α and the tariff rates defined
in equations (2.29) and (2.30) both increase in α, as can be shown by application of
the implicit function theorem. However, the net effect of an increase in α on tariff
27That is, provided the following expressions are non-negative; if any of the expressions yields a
negative right-hand side, the tariff rate is equal to zero. This condition is omitted from the following
equations merely for ease of notation.
28In that sense, the model shows how reciprocity, by changing the incentives for exporters to lobby
against specific import-competers, “would affect government’s willingness and ability to protect
particular sectoral interests but would not affect politicians’ weighting of campaign contributions
relative to general voter dissatisfaction” (Grossman and Helpman, 1994, p. 834).
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rates is not immediately evident from this result alone, because the government’s
decision on whether to provide lower or higher tariffs than in the status quo, and
hence whether to provide the tariffs defined in equations (2.25)-(2.26) or the tariffs
defined in equations (2.27)-(2.30), also depends on α, as is clear from condition
(2.24).
To show that an increase in the influence of narrow interest groups has an
ambiguous effect on average tariff levels, consider the scenario where the import-
competer, j, is not represented by an organized lobby, while the exporter, j ′, is
represented by an organized lobby. Then, condition (2.24) will be easier to satisfy
as α increases. To see this, note that the condition is easier to satisfy as α increases
if
Hj ′ (tl(j)) +
∂tl(j)
∂α
[
(1 +α)
∂Hj ′ (tl(j))
∂tl(j)
+
∂Hj(tl(j))
∂tl(j)
− 2ρ−1tl(j)
]
> 0. (2.31)
Applying the implicit function theorem to equation (2.28) yields that ∂tl(j)∂α < 0;
substituting the expression for
∂Hj (tl(j))
∂tl(j)
from equation (2.28) yields that the term in
brackets is zero, such that the condition is always true, which shows that condition
(2.24) is easier to satisfy as α increases. Thus, an increase in α ensures that the
condition for trade liberalization on good j is easier to satisfy and, once the condition
is met, an increase in α further decreases the equilibrium tariff rate. Thus, the net
effect of an increase in α on goods where the import-competer is not represented
by an organized lobby, while the exporter is represented by an organized lobby
is a decrease in tariff rates. At the same time, for goods on which no reciprocal
liberalization is offered by the foreign government, the equilibrium tariff rate strictly
increases in α for groups that are represented by organized lobbies. Thus, the overall
effect of α on average tariff rates is ambiguous: for some goods, an increase in α
implies lower tariff rates, while for other goods an increase in α is associated with
higher tariff rates. This result, and the comparison to tariff patterns under unilateral
policy-making derived in the previous section, underscores how reciprocal trade
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agreements break the relationship between narrow interest institutions and tariff
levels, which now becomes ambiguous and, indeed, can become non-monotonic,
such that, for instance, average tariff rates first decrease in α and then increase.
Finally, because an increase in α creates lower tariff rates on some goods and higher
tariff rates on other goods, increases in α are associated with more variation in
tariff rates across products as measured, for instance, by the standard deviation. In
particular, notice that if an increase in α yields higher tariff rates on some products
and lower tariff rates on others, the average tariff rate moves less than some of the
individual tariff rates affected by changes in α, thereby contributing to an increase
in the variance in tariff rates.
To further illustrate these points, Figure 2.A.4. shows both average tariff rates
and the standard deviation in tariff rates when making specific functional form and
parameter assumptions for the model. The figure shows that the average tariff rate
increases in α at times, but also shows two sharp drops in the average tariff rate
- which in this specific example occur whenever α increases sufficiently that the
government starts liberalizing a good, instead of providing protection, such that
condition (2.24) holds. In contrast to the zig-zag pattern on average tariff rates, the
standard deviation in tariff rates is strictly increasing in α, reflecting the incentives
to provide higher tariff rates on some goods and lower tariff rates on others.
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Figure 2.A.4.: Average tariff rate and standard deviation in tariff rates under
reciprocal policy-making for various levels of α. Equilibrium tariff levels
as described in the text, but under specific functional form and parameter
assumptions.
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CHAPTER III
Political Rhetoric and Trade
The question of why some governments are more responsive than others to
lobbying by interest groups has long occupied political science. Several scholars
identified electoral institutions as a key determinant of the extent to which special
interest groups can influence policy-makers (Rogowski, 1987; Cox, 1990; Persson
and Tabellini, 2002; Rogowski and Kayser, 2002; Park and Jensen, 2007; Persson,
Roland and Tabellini, 2007; Rickard, 2008). Trade policies are a prominent
application in this regard. In trade politics, according to most accounts, import-
competing interest groups lobby their government for protectionist trade policies
that redistribute wealth from the broad public. Consequently, institutions that
further the influence of interest groups should result in more protectionist trade
policies and higher average tariff rates (Nielson, 2003; Grossman and Helpman,
2005; Kono, 2009); conversely, high average tariff rates are viewed as a manifestation
of the influence of interest groups.
At least since Rogowski (1987), the standard expectation has been that plurality
rule (as opposed to proportional representation), through small electoral districts,
a large number of legislators, and weak party discipline, should be associated
with higher average tariff rates. However, the literature has produced conflicting
evidence on this proposition. While a number of authors report that plurality rule
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Figure 3.1.: Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index, OTRI
(Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga, 2009), for different electoral
systems. Graph shows mean, upper and lower quartile,
and upper and lower adjacent values. 87 countries, 2009.
is associated with more trade barriers (Rogowski, 1987; Ehrlich, 2007; Evans, 2009),
others find the opposite (Mansfield and Busch, 1995; Rogowski and Kayser, 2002;
Pinheiro, 2013) or that the association is not due to the mechanisms commonly
emphasized (Hatfield and Hauk, 2014). This inconclusive evidence is also visible
in the raw data. Figure 3.1. displays the Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (Kee,
Nicita and Olarreaga, 2009) for plurality and proportional representation systems.
The index provides an aggregate measure of protection afforded by tariffs. It is the
tariff rate that, if applied uniformly to all products, would leave the aggregate level
of imports unchanged. Figure 3.1. shows that, in a sample of 87 developed and
developing countries, there are virtually no differences between electoral systems
in terms of the average level of protectionism.
While these conflicting empirical results may call for a theoretical explanation,
it is plausible that the problem lies not with the theory, but with the dependent
variable. Average tariff rates have a number of shortcomings for evaluating the
influence of special interest groups on trade policies. For instance, it is not
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immediately obvious whether a tariff rate of 1,000% on one product is more
protectionist than a tariff rate of 100% on ten products (McGillivray, 2004).
Moreover, while a tariff rate of 10% may be sufficient to shut out imports on
one product, another case may require a much higher tariff rate to obtain effective
protection. Aggregating tariff rates across industries blurs such differences. These
problems are further confounded when, in order to account for the economic
relevance of different sectors, tariff rates are weighted by import shares. If
protectionist tariffs are effective in reducing imports, a trade-weighted measure
implies a lower weight for this tariff in the composite index, downplaying its
protectionist impact. In the extreme case of a prohibitively high tariff, imports
are zero and the prohibitively high tariff rate would have the same impact on the
composite index as a zero tariff. Finally, governments may reduce tariff barriers
but turn to non-tariff barriers for providing protection to select industries. A
finding that a certain set of electoral institutions is associated with lower tariff
rates may therefore indicate less influence of interest groups and a more open trade
regime. Alternatively, it may also indicate that policy-makers operating under these
institutions are more motivated to substitute less transparent non-tariff barriers
for tariffs and to engage in ‘optimal obfuscation’ (Magee, Brock and Young, 1989;
Kono, 2006). Hence, it is not clear whether the conflicting empirical results reflect
a problem with the theory or with the data.
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, drawing on data on party
statements issued in electoral campaigns, collected by the Comparative Manifesto
Project (Volkens et al., 2011), I show that the conflicting empirical results are
also evident in other data sources. References to protectionism and free trade in
party programs are public statements, and as such are a potentially costly way
for parties to signal their support for specific interest groups. If special interest
groups are more attractive targets under plurality rule, and special interest groups
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are protectionist, we should observe more support for protectionist trade policies
in party programs under plurality rule and less support for free trade. Indeed, I
show that parties make references to protectionist trade policies more often under
plurality rule than under proportional representation, consistent with the literature
which argues that plurality rule creates more incentives to cater to protectionist
interest groups.
Yet, parties in plurality electoral systems also make more references to free trade
policies. These mixed results reinforce the conflicting evidence from the data on
tariff rates. Below, I sketch an explanation for these results and emphasize the role
of exporters as narrow interest groups, which become relevant when trade policy is
set in reciprocal trade agreements (which is covered in more detail in Chapter II as
well). The focus on international agreements in modifying the effects of domestic
institutions reinforces recent calls to consider more explicitly the “interactions
between domestic institutions and international environments” (West and Lee,
2014) when considering the political incentives of policy-makers.
Second, this chapter introduces an empirical model to accommodate the
dependent variable, which is a percentage with a substantial fraction of zeros. In
scenarios where the dependent variable is a percentage or a ratio, linear regression
models can be problematic. Some of the problems are analogous to the use of
linear regression models with binary data.1 A common alternative to modeling
proportions that avoids these problems is a maximum likelihood estimator based
on the beta distribution (Paolino, 2001; Ferrari and Cribari-Neto, 2004). However,
because the beta distribution is confined to the (0,1) interval, this estimator cannot
accommodate dependent variables that are sometimes zero (or, analogously, one).
1Predicted values of linear regression models can result in (meaningless) negative values,
underscoring the poor fit between the model and the data; marginal effects fail to flatten out
at the boundaries and therefore do not take into account that, as the bounds of the distribution are
approached, large changes are impossible; and residuals tend to be non-normal and heteroskedastic,
since the conditional variance changes with the mean, which in turn is a function of covariates.
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Such dependent variables are quite common in political science, for instance in
the study of legislative success rates, bilateral trade flows (when measured as a
ratio of total trade), or policy goals such as water sanitation rates. The estimator
presented here therefore combines the beta regression model, which models the
proportion, with a logit model, which accounts for the zeros in the data, similarly
to zero-inflated negative binomial models that are widely used with count data (see,
e.g., Zorn 1998).
The next section specifies the empirical model linking campaign statements to
electoral institutions. I demonstrate through simulations the performance of the
adjusted beta regression model and discuss the results when applied to the data on
campaign statements. The final section concludes.
III.1 Electoral institutions and trade
The literature on the relationship between electoral institutions and trade
politics suggests that plurality rule should be associated with more references
to protectionist trade policies. Import-competing groups – firms and industries
that face competition from abroad – receive large benefits from protectionist
measures that reduce or block entry of foreign firms into their home market. As
such, these protectionist groups are able to overcome collection action problems
and form interest groups to lobby their government for protection. It follows,
according to this literature, that institutions furthering the influence of special
interest groups create more incentives to appeal to protectionist groups. This
association may be reflected in policy outcomes, such as average tariff rates, but it
should also be evident in electoral statements directly. Consequently, plurality rule
should be associated with more positive references to protectionist measures than
proportional representation systems. By contrast, references to free trade, which
appeal to the broader public, but not to protectionist interest groups, should be less
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attractive to policy-makers operating under plurality rule.
To assess the link between electoral statements and the electoral rule, I draw
on data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2011), CMP,
which provides data on policy positions of parties, as determined by the parties’
election programs. The CMP codes the percentage of quasi-sentences devoted to
specific topics. Most relevant for the present purposes are statements in favor
of protectionist policies (entry 406) and statements that challenge protectionist
policies or support free trade (entry 407). I construct two separate dependent
variables. The first variable measures the percentage of references in favor of
protectionism, averaging data across parties for each election-year. Parties’ positions
are weighted by their vote shares in order to give larger weight to parties that are
politically more influential and to avoid that the positions of extreme but politically
irrelevant parties bias the results. The second variable measures positive references
to free trade and is constructed analogously to the previous variable.
For the electoral rule, I use a dummy variable from the Database of Political
Institutions (Beck et al., 2001) that distinguishes plurality rule (with value 1) from
proportional representation systems (with value 0). For countries that use mixed
systems, the variable indicates the electoral system that is used to elect the majority
of seats. The main models in the following include two control variables, the
economic size of a country as measured by logged gross domestic product (GDP)
and the wealth of a country as measured by gross domestic product per capita; both
variables have been associated with both the electoral rule and a country’s ability
and willingness to support free trade policies. These data are obtained from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The data set contains observations on
up to 48 countries from 1975 to 2010.
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III.1.1 Adjusted beta regression model
Because the variables on references to free trade and protectionism are coded in
percentages, they are constrained to the interval from zero to one. A common way
to model such data empirically is the beta regression model proposed by Paolino
(2001) and Ferrari and Cribari-Neto (2004). The density of a beta-distributed
variable y ∈ (0,1), with parameters p,q > 0, is given by
f (y;p,q) =
Γ (p+ q)
Γ (p)Γ (q)
yp−1(1− y)q−1. (3.1)
To arrive at a regression model, Paolino (2001) and Ferrari and Cribari-Neto (2004)
suggest to reparametrize the density in equation (3.1) by defining µ = pp+q and
φ = p+ q. Note that µ ∈ (0,1) and φ > 0. Then, the density in equation (3.1) can be
written as
f (y;µ,φ) =
Γ (φ)
Γ (µφ)Γ ((1−µ)φ)y
µφ−1(1− y)(1−µ)φ−1, (3.2)
such that the expectation and variance are given by
E[y] = µ and Var[y] =
µ(1−µ)
1 +φ
. (3.3)
To specify a regression model, and just as in logit and probit models, µ can be
related to a combination of covariates x and coefficients β through a link function
g(·) such that g(µ) = x′β, where g(·) is a link function that maps from the unit
interval onto the real line, such as the logit function; it follows that µ = g−1(x′bβ),
where g−1(·) is the logistic function. The likelihood function is then obtained as
usual as the joint density of all observations.
Because the beta distribution restricts the dependent variable to the unit interval
such that y ∈ (0,1), it cannot accommodate a dependent variable that is zero for
some observations. These observations would either have to be dropped from the
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data set or recoded to assume an arbitrarily small positive value. While neither
of these decisions seems well justified on theoretical grounds, they can produce
estimates that are drastically different from each other and biased relative to the
true parameter values. This is particularly problematic if zero values arise from a
different process than positive values on the dependent variable. For instance, in
the case of party statements, in elections with a large number of parties running
each individual party may be more likely to talk about any given issue, because
its competition requires it to take a stance; at the same time, because there is a
larger number of issues, each covered issue receives less space in the party platform.
Common empirical models such as beta regression and ordinary least squares
have to either disregard zero observations and hence could not take into account
differences between zero and non-zero observations, or they would have to disregard
the bounded nature of the dependent variable.
To accommodate the presence of zeros on the dependent variable, the density
can be augmented by a separate process to account for zeros. This process, in turn,
may be a function of covariates z with coefficients γ , linked through some function
η(·). Some or all of the variables in z and x may be identical, but this need not be
the case. For the following, let η(·) be the logit function, such that a logit model
is used to predict whether a zero value occurs and the probability of observing a
positive outcome is given by η−1(z′γ). The density for the regression model then is
f ∗(y;x,z,φ,β,γ) =

1− η−1(z′γ) if y = 0,
η−1(z′γ)f (y;x,β,φ) if y > 0.
(3.4)
The log-likelihood function is obtained as the log of the joint density of all
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observations i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,N } in the sample, which is
lnL =
N∑
i=1
lnf ∗(yi ;xi , zi ,φ,β,γ) (3.5)
=
N∑
i=1
I[yi = 0]ln
(
1− η−1(z′iγ)
)
+
N∑
i=1
(1− I[yi = 0]) ln
(
η−1(z′iγ
)
+
N∑
i=1
(1− I[yi = 0]) ln
Γ (φ)yg−1(x′iβ)φ−1(1− y)(1−g−1(x′iβ))φ−1Γ (g−1(x′iβ)φ)Γ ((1− g−1(x′iβ))φ)
 . (3.6)
where I[yi = 0] is equal to one if yi = 0 and zero otherwise, and g−1(·) = η−1(·)
is the logistic function. The first-order conditions from maximization of the log
likelihood function with respect to β,γ, and φ yield the maximum likelihood
parameter estimates.
The model yields three different marginal effects. The first is the marginal effect
of a covariate on the probability of observing a positive response. This is calculated
analogously to binary response models. The average marginal effect of covariate zk
on observing a non-zero response is
τ1k = γk
N∑
i=1
exp(z′iγ)
[1 + exp(z′iγ)]2
. (3.7)
The second is the ‘direct effect’, the marginal effect of a covariate on the response,
given that the response is positive. The average marginal effect of covariate xk is
τ2k = βk
N∑
i=1
exp(x′iβ)
[1 + exp(x′iβ)]2
. (3.8)
If a covariate appears in both equations, a third potentially relevant effect is the
‘total effect’, which is the marginal effect of a covariate on the expected value of
the response, taking into account both the first and the second effect. Suppose
xk appears in both equations, with associated coefficients γk and βk, respectively.
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Then, the total effect is
τ3k = βk
N∑
i=1
exp(x′iβ)
[1 + exp(x′iβ)]2
exp(z′iγ)
1 + exp(z′iγ)
+γk
N∑
i=1
exp(z′iγ)
[1 + exp(z′iγ)]2
exp(x′iβ)
1 + exp(x′iβ)
. (3.9)
It follows that, if γk and βk have different signs, the sign of the total effect is
not immediately obvious from the regression coefficients alone. Because it is a
non-linear function of both covariate values and coefficient estimates, the sign of
the total effect is not even obvious from the relative size of γk and βk. Moreover,
note that dropping observations that are zero and estimating an unadjusted beta
regression model or a linear regression model on this subsample typically yields
estimates comparable to τ2, the ‘direct effect’, while estimating a linear regression
model on the entire data set and ignoring the bounded nature of the dependent
variable yields an estimate that should be comparable to τ3. As equation (3.9)
suggests, the latter approach can be particularly problematic if γk and βk have
different signs; at the same time, dropping observations where the dependent
variable is zero risks losing information contained in τ1.
III.1.2 Monte carlo results
This section assesses the performance of the adjusted beta regression model
through a number of Monte Carlo studies. For the Monte Carlo studies, the
conditional mean is created as
µi =
exp(β0 + β1x1i + β2x2i + β3x3i)
1 + exp(β0 + β1x1i + β2x2i + β3x3i)
, (3.10)
where x1i follows a standard normal distribution, x2i is a random draw from a
binomial distribution with five trials and a success probability of ten per cent, and
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x3i is a random draw from a binomial distribution with a success probability of one
half. By construction, µi is contained in the interval (0,1). The dependent variable,
yi , is then created as a random draw from a beta distribution with parameters µi
and φ. To recode the dependent variable to zeros for some of the observations,
another variable is created as
wi = γ0 +γ1x1i + ei , (3.11)
where ei is drawn from a logistic distribution with mean zero. Then, yi is recoded
as zero whenever wi < 0. I consider two different designs for the Monte Carlo
experiments. In both designs, φ is set to 30. For design A, I set (β0,β1,β2,β3) =
(−4,1,1.5,0) and (γ0,γ1) = (2,3). For design B, I set (β0,β1,β2,β3) = (−2,1,1,0) and
(γ0,γ1) = (1,−4). In the first case, the effect of x1 from the logit model reinforces
the effect from the beta regression model, while in the second case the two effects
run counter to each other.
Table 3.1. reports the bias and rejection rates based on Wald tests relative to the
true coefficient value, with a nominal size of 5 per cent, for the estimates of γ1, β1,
β2, and β3 for both designs and for varying numbers of observations in the data set,
based on 5,000 simulations for each scenario. This yields a 95% confidence interval
of [.044, .056] for the rejection rate of a test with nominal size 5%.
Since β3 = 0, the rejection rates for β3 indicate the occurrence of type I errors,
such that for rejection rates above .05 statistically significant effects are found at a
higher rate than suggested by the nominal size of the test. Note also that x3 mirrors
the variable on the electoral rule used in the manifesto data below, in that it is a
binary variable.
Table 3.1. shows that the estimates from the adjusted beta regression model have
little bias and good rejection rates, with improvements especially for the estimate of
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Table 3.1.: Monte Carlo: Bias and Rejection Rates
Design A γ1 β1 β2 β3
100 Obs. .258 .009 .014 .000
.040 .061 .065 .057
200 Obs. .107 .004 .006 .001
.048 .056 .062 .055
1000 Obs. .026 .001 .001 .000
.045 .054 .058 .049
Design B γ1 β1 β2 β3
100 Obs. -.361 .006 .009 -.001
.034 .063 .066 .070
200 Obs. -.162 .005 .003 -.000
.046 .063 .058 .059
1000 Obs. -.026 .001 .001 .000
.048 .048 .052 .052
Bias and rejection rates (in italics). 5000
simulations.
γ1 as the sample size increases. The relatively poor performance of the logit estimate
of γ1 in small samples is not surprising. With a small number of observations only
few observations may record a zero on the dependent variable, and it is well known
that sparse data can prove problematic in logit models, exacerbating the small
sample bias. While not pursued further here, incorporating adjustments, such
as the penalized maximum likelihood estimator suggested by Firth (1993), can
improve the small-sample performance of the estimator considerably. For instance,
with the penalized maximum likelihood estimator in place of the logit estimator,
the rejection rate for γ1 in design A with 100 observations improved to .052, which
is well within the 95% confidence interval, while the bias dropped markedly to
-.001.
Since coefficient estimates are not directly comparable across estimators, Table
3.2. reports the marginal effects from the adjusted beta regression model for the
variable x1 and provides a comparison to alternative estimators. Table 3.2. reports
both τ2, defined in equation (3.8), and τ3, defined in equation (3.9). The former is
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Table 3.2.: Monte Carlo: Average Marginal Effect of x1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τˆ2 Beta OLS+ τˆ3 Beta∗ OLS
τˆ2/τ2 Beta/τ2 OLS+/τ2 τˆ3/τ3 Beta∗/τ3 OLS/τ3
Design A .058 .071 .077 .064 .070 .063
1.00 1.21 1.33 1.00 1.12 .998
Design B .143 .108 .097 -.022 -.047 -.022
1.00 .752 .676 .999 2.16 .999
Average marginal effects and, in italics, ratio of average marginal effect to true
marginal effect. (1) τˆ2: adjusted beta regression model, effect conditional on ob-
serving positive response. (2) Beta: beta regression model, omitting observations
that are zero. (3) OLS+: ordinary least squares, omitting observations that are
zero. (4) τˆ3: adjusted beta regression model, total effect. (5) Beta∗: beta regres-
sion model, recoding observations that are zero. (6) OLS: ordinary least squares,
all observations.
the direct effect, the effect of x1 on the response conditional on observing a positive
response, while the latter is the total effect of x1 on the response, which takes into
account the effects both on the probability of observing a positive response and on
the response, conditional on it being positive. τ2 is compared to the estimate from
the undadjusted beta regression model, where observations where the dependent
variable is zero are omitted, and to the estimate from ordinary least squares, where
again observations where the dependent variable is zero are omitted. τ3 is compared
to the estimate from the unadjusted beta regression model, recoding observations
where the dependent variable is zero to an arbitrarily small, positive number,2 and
to ordinary least squares. The numbers in italics report the ratio of the average
marginal effect calculated from the respective estimator to the true marginal effect.3
Ratios above 1 indicate that the estimator produces an upwardly biased marginal
effect, while ratios below one indicate a downward bias in the marginal effect.
Table 3.2. shows that the adjusted beta regression model produces essentially
2Specifically, zeros are replaced by the product of one tenth of the observed smallest positive
value of the response variable and a variable drawn randomly from the unit interval.
3Because of the non-linear nature of the model, the true marginal effect was simulated based on
a data set with 10,000 observations, constructed as described above.
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unbiased estimates of the average marginal effect, consistent with the results in
Table 3.1., for both the direct effect (column 1) and the total effect (column 4).
The adjusted beta regression model also performs notably better than common
alternatives, especially when interest is in the direct effect, where the unadjusted
beta regression model (column 2) and OLS (column 3) substantially overestimate
marginal effects in design A and substantially underestimate marginal effects in
design B. In design A, the unadjusted beta regression model overstates marginal
effects by 21 per cent and ordinary least squares produces marginal effects that are
33 per cent too large. In design B, the unadjusted beta regression model results in
marginal effects that are about three quarter the size of the true marginal effects;
ordinary least squares again fares even worse, producing marginal effects of only
two thirds the size. Thus, when interest is in the effect of a covariate on the response
variable conditional on observing a positive response, standard approaches can
result in severely biased estimates of marginal effects.
The unadjusted beta regression model also performs poorly when recoding
zero observations to small, positive values, in which case the bias is about 10 per
cent in design A and over 200 per cent in design B (column 5) – in the latter
case, the unadjusted beta regression model finds effects that are twice as large, in
absolute terms, than their nominal size. Thus, neither dropping observations that
are zero nor recoding them to arbitrary small, positive values produces satisfying
estimates from the unadjusted beta regression model, and the two effects can differ
considerably not only in size, but also in sign.
On the surface, with respect to the total effect, the OLS estimates (column 6)
are on par with the estimates from the adjusted beta regression model, producing
virtually unbiased estimates of the total effect. However, the OLS estimate has two
shortcomings. First, because it is based on a single equation, it fails to uncover the
distinction in the effect on the probability of observing a positive response and on
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the expected value of the response conditional on being positive. By construction,
the single-equation model can only report a single effect. This is particularly
problematic from a substantive point of view if the two effects work in opposite
directions or if a covariate is relevant only in one of the equations. From column
3, it moreover follows that OLS is inadequate to estimate the effects separately by
splitting the sample.
Second, the OLS estimates do not take into account that the marginal effects
need to flatten out at the boundaries of the dependent variable: analogously to
binary response models, as the predicted value of the dependent variable reaches
zero or one, marginal effects need to diminish (Berry, Demeritt and Esarey, 2010).
An implication is that marginal effects depend on values of other covariates, which
is the case in non-linear models such as the beta regression model but not in a
linear model. This is illustrated in Figure 3.2., which shows the distribution of
marginal effects from the adjusted beta regression model in a single sample that
was constructed according to design A; the vertical line indicates the marginal
effect obtained from OLS. At x2 = 0 the total effect of x1 calculated from the
beta regression model is .028, whereas at x2 = 2, the total effect increases to .203.
The beta regression model accurately reflects this compression inherent in non-
linear models, while the OLS estimate suggests a constant effect of .064, masking
substantial heterogeneity in the effect of x1 on the response, which underscores the
poor fit to the data.
III.1.3 Manifesto data
The previous discussion suggests that the adjusted beta regression model
performs well in finite samples in terms of bias, rejection rates, and uncovering
of marginal effects. This section presents the empirical results linking political
rhetoric on trade to electoral institutions. Table 3.3. shows that, across a variety of
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Figure 3.2.: Distribution of marginal effects within a sample
created according to design A, calculated from adjusted beta
regression model. Vertical line represents the marginal effect
estimated from OLS.
models, plurality rule is associated with more statements in favor of protectionist
trade policies; plurality rule also tends to be associated with a higher probability
of making any statements in favor of protectionism, but this latter effect is not
statistically significant in most cases. The first column reports results from the
simplest model, which controls only for log GDP and GDP per capita; the marginal
effects are illustrated in the top panel of Figure 3.3., where marginal effects are
reported as the percentage increase relative to proportional representation systems,
together with 95 per cent confidence intervals. Figure 3.3. shows that plurality
systems are associated with an 18 per cent increase in the probability of making
any statements in support of free trade and, if any such statements are made,
plurality systems make 78 per cent more references in support of protectionism
than proportional representation systems. Jointly, these two effects imply that the
expected share of statements in support of protectionism is more than twice as high
in plurality systems than in proportional representation systems, as indicated by
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the third bar in the top panel of Figure 3.3. As noted previously, these effects hide
substantial heterogeneity in the size of effects across observations. Figure 3.4. plots
the distribution of the total effect in the sample, together with the average marginal
effect (which in Figure 3.4. is indicated by the dashed vertical line and equivalent
to the third bar in the top panel of Figure 3.3.).
Columns 2 through 6 consider a variety of robustness checks. Column 2 controls
for trade openness, measured by the ratio of total trade (exports plus imports) to
GDP, to alleviate concerns that support for protectionism arises as backlash to
open markets, where market openness in turn should be a function of the electoral
rule.4 The results show that plurality rule is associated with more references to
protectionism even after controlling for trade openness. Moreover, trade openness
has offsetting effects: on the one hand, support for protectionism is more likely
to happen as trade openness increases, supporting the idea that some backlash
to globalization may be occurring; on the other hand, the amount of support for
protectionism decreases as trade openness increases. Column 3 includes the lagged
dependent variable in order to account for persistence in the data. As the results
show, the lagged dependent variable is an excellent predictor of both the current
level of support for protectionism and the occurrence of protectionist statements;
nevertheless, despite a sharp reduction in the sample size, the result remains that
plurality rule is associated with more support for protectionism than proportional
representation.
Column 4 controls for statements in favor of free trade to account for the
possibility that the coefficient on plurality rule might reflect that plurality rule
results in higher support for free trade by some parties which then gets challenged
by other parties. Column 5 replaces the dependent variables with support of
protectionism as a percentage of all sentences in party platforms devoted to
4Similar results are obtained when using the average tariff rate instead.
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economic issues. The coefficient on plurality rule remains stable in size and retains
statistical significance at the 1 per cent level in both cases. Finally, column 6 re-
estimates the model from column 1, but instead of aggregating party positions
across election-years uses the proportion of sentences in support of protectionism
made by each individual party, and instead of weighting the dependent variable by
party size controls for the party’s vote share.
Yet, Table 3.4. shows that, at the same time, plurality rule is associated with more
references to free trade. Columns 1 through 6 replicate the respective models from
Table 3.3., but use references to free trade in place of references to protectionism as
the dependent variable. The bottom panel of Figure 3.3. reports the marginal effects
from the model in column 1. Plurality systems are 12 per cent more likely than
proportional representation systems to make any references in support of free trade,
as shown by the first bar. The second bar shows that plurality systems make about
twice as many references in support of free trade as proportional representation,
and the joint effect amounts to an increase in the expected percentage of sentences
in support of free trade of over 125 per cent.
The results in column 2 show that the coefficient on plurality rule does not
merely reflect that support for free trade arises as a challenge to high trade barriers,
which might be higher under plurality rule, and column 3 shows that the result is
robust to including a lagged dependent variable. These results are surprising from
the perspective of standard accounts of trade politics, which focus on protectionist
interest groups as the sole relevant interest groups. One potential explanation is that
narrow interest institutions are associated with more protectionist trade policies
which then get challenged in electoral campaigns. Yet, as shown in column 4, the
results do not seem to be reflecting challenges to protectionist policy statements
by other parties, which in turn should be more common under plurality rule. As
with free trade, the results are also robust to recoding the dependent variable as the
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percentage of statements on economic issues (column 5) and to using individual
party positions instead of a weighted average (column 6).
In sum, these results show that plurality rule is associated with more support for
protectionism, but also with more support for free trade – a result that corroborates
the mixed and ambiguous results in the empirical literature.
III.2 Conclusion
If plurality rule is indeed associated with more incentives to appeal to narrow
interest groups, then these results suggest that there must be influential interest
groups in favor of free trade. Standard accounts of trade policy-making leave
no room for such interest groups supporting free trade, where the only actors
potentially in favor of free trade are consumers. Yet, because of collective action
problems, consumers are assumed to face substantial difficulties in organizing
politically. Consequently, the current literature assumes political conflict between
narrow, protectionist interest groups, on the one hand, and broad, unorganized
consumer interests in favor of free trade, on the other.
One potential explanation for these results can be provided by recognizing that
most trade policies, over the course of at least the last century, have been set in
reciprocal trade agreements (see, e.g., Pahre 2008 on reciprocal trade agreements),
such as the World Trade Organization and its predecessor, the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. With reciprocity, a government can obtain market access
abroad through tariff concessions from trading partners by lowering some of its
own, domestic tariffs in turn. Under reciprocal trade agreements, then, exporters,
who benefit from expanding market access abroad, have strong incentives to support
domestic trade liberalization. Moreover, exporters satisfy many of the criteria that
are commonly associated with succcessful interest groups (see, e.g., the survey in
Bernard and Jensen 1999). Most notably, most goods are exported by a relatively
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small number of firms, often less than half a dozen (Cebeci et al., 2012), providing
for concentrated benefits and alleviating potential collective action problems. Many
exporters also tend to be geographically concentrated; for instance, in the United
States, more than 80 per cent of exporting firms have a single location (United
States Census Bureau, Department of Commerce), allowing them to take advantage
of the single-member districts provided by plurality rule.
While exporters have been acknowledged in several parts of the literature on
trade politics as potentially influential actors (Milner, 1988; Gilligan, 1997a), their
role for the relationship between domestic institutions and trade policy-making
has been much less acknowledged. If both exporters and protectionist groups
are politically relevant special interest groups, parties under electoral institutions
favoring special interest groups should be more prone to support both free trade and
protectionist trade policies. As a consequence, these electoral systems may produce
higher tariffs on some goods and lower tariffs on others, explaining the overall
ambiguous results in the empirical literature. It also implies that the domestic
politics of trade, and the effects of electoral institutions in particular, cannot be
understood in isolation of the international environment.
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Table 3.3.: Estimation Results Manifesto Data, Support for Protectionism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Beta equation
Plurality rule .566*** .500*** .502*** .514*** .579*** .344*
(.001) (.007) (.008) (.001) (.000) (.062)
log GDP -.037 -.070* -.009 -.032 -.032 .005
(.379) (.085) (.835) (.444) (.457) (.915)
GDP per capita -.869** -.482 -.883*** -.863** -.789* -.848*
(.018) (.205) (.009) (.018) (.051) (.059)
Trade -.286*
(.074)
Lagged DV 126***
(.000)
Free Trade 24.3
(.256)
Party size -.991***
(.001)
Constant -5.54*** -4.51*** -6.38*** -5.70*** -8.88*** -4.49***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (0.000) (.000)
Logit equation
Plurality rule .704* 1.03** .474 .664 .704* .683***
(.099) (.017) (.207) (.120) (.099) (.004)
log GDP -.156 .018 -.193* -.169 -.156 -.018
(.186) (.869) (.092) (.190) (.186) (.812)
GDP per capita .278 -1.31 .690 -.097 .278 -.593
(.833) (.353) (.599) (.945) (.833) (.517)
Trade 1.65***
(.000)
Lagged DV 1.42***
(.000)
Free Trade 1.31***
(.000)
Party size -.280
(.584)
Constant 4.80* -.665 4.80* 4.34 4.80* -.287
(.084) (.797) (.092) (.159) (.084) (.870)
Obs. 341 341 269 341 341 2048
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Coefficient estimates and p-values (in parentheses). Standard errors clustered by
country. Dependent variable: Percentage of sentences in party platforms support-
ing protectionism by country-election year (models 1-4), by country-election year,
relative to references to economic issues (model 5), and by party-election year
(model 6).
113
Table 3.4.: Estimation Results Manifesto Data, Support for Free Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Beta equation
Plurality rule .695*** .563*** .663*** .603*** .639*** .365**
(.000) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.018)
log GDP -.056 -.118** -.058 -.053 -.050 -.062*
(.256) (.019) (.255) (.280) (.341) (.078)
GDP per capita .114 .817** .264 .240 .104 -.109
(.792) (.046) (.527) (.576) (.796) (.788)
Trade -.521***
(.002)
Lagged DV 65.9***
(.002)
Protectionism 73.6***
(.005)
Party size .026
(.913)
Constant -5.06*** -3.16** -5.12*** -5.24*** -8.33*** -3.29***
(.000) (.014) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Logit equation
Plurality rule .457 .606 .275 .298 .457 .488
(.321) (.182) (.554) (.497) (.321) (.122)
log GDP -.030 .050 .011 .009 -.030 -.029
(.780) (.684) (.918) (.932) (.780) (.704)
GDP per capita 1.46 .725 1.02 1.57 1.46 1.68**
(.131) (.534) (.278) (.165) (.131) (.035)
Trade .722
(.144)
Lagged DV 1.60***
(.000)
Protectionism 1.31***
(.000)
Party size 2.32***
(.000)
Constant 1.39 -1.10 -.552 -.470 1.39 -.963
(.590) (.729) (.836) (.853) (.590) (.591)
Obs. 341 341 269 341 341 2048
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Coefficient estimates and p-values (in parentheses). Standard errors clustered
by country. Dependent variable: Percentage of sentences in party platforms sup-
porting free trade by country-election year (models 1-4), by country-election year,
relative to references to economic issues (model 5), and by party-election year
(model 6).
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Figure 3.3.: Marginal effects and 95 per cent
confidence intervals. Marginal effects expressed
as percentage increase. For instance, τ2 in the
top panel shows that plurality systems make
about 78 per cent more references in support of
protectionism than proportional representation
systems. Top panel: calculated from Table
3.3., column 1. Bottom panel: calculated from
Table 3.4., column 1. τ1: effect on probability
of observing statements in favor of free trade
(top panel) or protectionism (bottom panel). τ2:
effect on number of references in favor of free
trade (top panel) or protectionism (bottom panel),
conditional on any references being made. τ3:
total effect, taking into account both τ1 and τ2.
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Vertical dashed line is average marginal effect.
Sample Distribution of Marginal Effects
Figure 3.4.: Distribution of marginal effects in the sample, marginal effects
expressed as percentage increase. Dashed vertical line represents the average
marginal effect shown in the third bar in Figure 3.3. Left panel: calculated from
Table 3.3., column 1. Right panel: calculated from Table 3.4., column 1. For
comparison, the corresponding average marginal effects calculated from OLS
estimates would be 171 per cent (left panel) and 219 per cent (right panel), well
outside the range of marginal effects in the sample.
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CHAPTER IV
Trade Disputes
Some of the most enduring debates in the international relations literature
concern the question of how international law can be enforced. The literature
distinguishes between two main mechanisms. First, domestic compliance
constituencies – interest groups that have incentives to monitor compliance
of their own government – can help enforce international norms (Dai, 2007;
Simmons, 2009; Chaudoin, 2014a). Second, the literature emphasizes formal
sanctioning mechanisms, such as dispute settlement bodies. About half of all
international agreements contain explicit dispute settlement mechanisms, such as
international courts and arbitration panels (Koremenos, 2007; Koremenos and Betz,
2012). Rulings by dispute settlement bodies can produce high reputational costs
and authorize enforcement measures and thereby contribute to compliance with
international norms (Guzman, 2008; Alter, 2012).
Both mechanisms have notable limitations. Domestic compliance constituencies
can only affect their own government’s behavior, not the behavior of foreign
governments. In agreements where non-state actors are concerned about a foreign
government’s compliance, the domestic compliance constituency mechanism
therefore has little bite. Likewise, compliance can be forced upon foreign
governments through sanctioning and dispute settlement mechanisms, but
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governments may be hesitant to provide this enforcement because of the associated
costs (Thompson, 2010). Consequently, in agreements where interest groups are
primarily concerned with compliance by foreign governments, enforcement may be
difficult to achieve: non-state actors are not able to, and governments are not willing
to, provide enforcement. This raises two closely related questions: First, how can
these limitations be overcome and enforcement be provided? Second, why are some
governments more actively participating in the enforcement of international law
than others?
This chapter suggests that these limitations can be overcome where the two
mechanisms complement each other and that, as a consequence, domestic political
institutions can become an important determinant of government dispute behavior.
In many international agreements, those most adversely affected by a government’s
non-compliance are interest groups in other countries – or what might be called
foreign compliance constituencies. In trade agreements, for example, producers
in other countries are typically those most adversely affected by a government’s
illegal imposition of trade barriers. Such groups cannot act as domestic compliance
constituencies, because they are concerned with the policies of a foreign government.
Moreover, alternative means of enforcing international law, such as the filing
of disputes at dispute settlement bodies, are usually not available to foreign
compliance constituencies either, because only governments can initiate disputes
against foreign governments.
Yet, even where non-state actors cannot directly enforce international law, they
can be a driving force behind dispute initiations by lobbying their own government
to initiate a dispute against the foreign government. They are more likely to do
so successfully where governments are more responsive to their interests because
they value the political support of interest groups. Differences in the electoral
rule can be a major determinant of the responsiveness of governments to interest
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groups. Plurality rule, as compared to proportional representation, has been argued
to provide less insulation from domestic groups that represent narrow interests
(Rogowski, 1987; Persson and Tabellini, 2002; Ashworth and Mesquita, 2006). As a
consequence, where foreign compliance constituencies represent narrow interest
groups, plurality rule should be associated with more dispute initiations than
proportional representation.
Data from trade dispute initiations at the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), where governments
enforce international commitments by trading partners through the initiation of
trade disputes on behalf of exporting firms, provide support for these expectations.
Plurality electoral systems are associated with about three times as many dispute
initiations as countries with proportional representation systems. The differences
between electoral systems are especially pronounced where exporters, and disputes
on their behalf, represent narrow interests: in developed economies and in countries
with diversified exporting sectors.
Moreover, and as a corollary, these differences between electoral institutions
should decline as the predictability of rulings increases over time. As uncertainty
about the rulings of the dispute settlement body is reduced and rulings become
more predictable, filing a dispute as well as lobbying a government for dispute
initiations become less risky, and the advantages provided by plurality rule decrease.
The chapter shows that the effect of plurality rule on dispute initiations decreases
as legal precedent accumulates (which facilitates the predictability of rulings) and
after reforms to the dispute settlement body streamlined the litigation process and
enhanced its legalization. This conditional effect shows that the effects of domestic
institutions are intertwined with the legalization of international institutions. As
international legalization increases, the effects of domestic institutions become more
muted. This result is consistent with the interplay of domestic and international
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institutions in the context of trade politics, emphasized in Chapter II.
This argument resonates with a large literature that finds domestic institutions
to be an important determinant of government behavior in international relations
(Milner, 1997; Schultz, 2001), and it underscores a somewhat unexpected
consequence of institutional design. Because many international agreements bar
domestic actors from filing disputes themselves, domestic politics – and, in turn,
domestic institutions – provide an explanation for differences in dispute behavior,
and they do so in a deliberately state-centric institution. Moreover, the finding
provides an explanation for differences in the participation of governments in the
enforcement of international norms. Although almost all governments have a deep
bench of potential cases they could bring to the GATT/WTO dispute settlement
body, only few of these result in actual dispute initiations (Allee, 2008), and while
some governments make extensive use of this dispute settlement mechanism,
others rarely do. The responsiveness of governments to domestic interest groups
can provide one explanation for these differences, even across similar levels of
development or economic power.
These effects of domestic institutions on the incentives for governments to
enforce compliance of foreign governments also bears a certain irony: Electoral
institutions that increase the influence of domestic interest groups have also been
associated with more incentives to violate international commitments (Rickard,
2010). Consequently, the same set of institutions is associated with a more
active enforcement of international norms and more frequent non-compliance.
While these simultaneous effects may be in tension with each other, they do not
conflict so long as the temporary violation of norms does not undermine the
stability of the institution in the long term – and dispute settlement bodies may,
in fact, facilitate this concomitant non-compliance and enforcement of other’s
commitments (Rosendorff, 2005).
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Finally, that the political incentives created by domestic institutions make
it more attractive for some governments than for others to participate in the
enforcement of international agreements has important implications for the
functioning and the distributional effects of international institutions, especially
when considering that the enforcement of international agreements can have
externalities for third parties. Notably, while the enforcement of international
norms can have positive externalities for other countries, the differences in
government engagement with dispute settlement bodies can have substantial
negative consequences for third parties if disputes are settled in a discriminatory
fashion – which, at least at the GATT/WTO, tends to be the case (Kucik and Pelc,
2013). These effects compound, as filing disputes allows governments “to effectively
shape the law’s interpretation and application over time to their advantage” (Shaffer,
2003, p. 11), and the legal precedent accumulated over time helps governments
defend their trading rights more effectively in the future.1
The next section outlines the argument relating domestic institutions to the
initiation of international disputes, using the example of trade disputes at the
GATT/WTO, and derives three propositions: plurality rule should be associated
with more trade dispute initiations; the effect of plurality rule should be most
pronounced in countries with diversified exports, where exporter interests plausibly
represent narrow interest groups; and the effect of plurality rule on dispute
initiations should decline as the predictability of rulings increases. The second
section provides empirical support for these propositions. The final section
concludes.
1While, formally, the WTO rules do not give any authority to legal precedent, Pelc (2014, p. 547)
finds substantial evidence that countries and courts behave as if legal precedent exists – “precedent
may be a legal fiction, but it is one that courts and countries tacitly accept to be bound by.”
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IV.1 Trade disputes at the GATT/WTO
Violations of international commitments often benefit domestic actors at
the expense of foreigners. In the case of the GATT/WTO, violations of treaty
commitments generally provide advantages to domestic industries (Rickard, 2010),
hurting foreign firms and industries in turn – predominantly exporting firms that
face trade barriers imposed by foreign governments (Bown and Reynolds, 2014).
The dispute settlement body of the GATT/WTO identifies and publicizes such
violations of treaty obligations in order to restore compliance. If compliance is not
achieved during the dispute settlement process, the dispute settlement body can
authorize retaliatory actions to force compliance upon the government in violation
of its obligations (Hudec, 2002).
While private actors, such as exporting firms, often have the strongest incentives
to contest the policies of a foreign government, they are explicitly excluded from
filing disputes at the dispute settlement body of the GATT/WTO.2 As stated on
the WTO web site, “Since only WTO Member governments can bring disputes,
it follows that private individuals or companies do not have direct access to the
dispute settlement system. [...] Of course, [they] can, and often do, exert influence
or even pressure on the government of a WTO Member with respect to the triggering
of a dispute.”3 Therefore, firms with an interest in enforcing treaty commitments
have to rely on their government to pursue disputes on their behalf. This design
feature is quite common in international agreements. Only about one third of
international agreements with dispute settlement procedures give any role to
non-state actors (individuals, firms, or NGOs) in the dispute settlement process
(Koremenos, 2013a). Even among these agreements, non-state actors rarely can
2Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April 15, 1994.
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401; 33
I.L.M. 1226(1994).
3http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c1s4p1_e.htm.
Last accessed on October 24, 2012.
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initiate disputes. However, non-state actors may “exert influence or even pressure”
on their governments.
The problem for a domestic firm hurt by a foreign government’s policies is
that, in most circumstances, asking for a trade dispute is a rather narrow and
particularistic demand from the perspective of the government. First, pursuing
disputes at the GATT/WTO can be associated with substantial financial costs. A
dispute at the WTO can easily cost US$500,000 in legal fees alone (Bown and
Hoekman, 2005, 870), and more complex disputes total more than US$10 million
(Nordstrom and Shaffer, 2007, 9). Indeed, in a survey of delegations at the WTO,
more than half of respondents reported the “high costs of litigation” among the
reasons for not having filed a trade dispute (Busch, Reinhardt and Shaffer, 2009, p.
18). Second, while private firms may contribute to cover these financial costs (Bown
and Hoekman, 2005), disputes may raise diplomatic tensions and spur retaliation,
and this backlash can raise the costs of trade dispute initiations sufficiently that
some governments refrain from pursuing trade disputes (Busch, Reinhardt and
Shaffer, 2009; Sattler and Bernauer, 2010). Third, while the success rate of those
WTO disputes that are filed is very high, the risk of losing a dispute can put a
government’s foreign policy reputation with voters on the line, increasing the
reluctance of governments to file trade disputes. Finally, and most specific to trade
disputes, an increase in a country’s exports can, by raising domestic prices, harm
consumers. While, as common in studies of trade policies, this foregone consumer
welfare is unlikely to harm individual consumers sufficiently to induce political
action, governments may take this additional cost into account.
In the GATT/WTO, the costs of initiating disputes are compounded by the
need to potentially enforce a ruling of the dispute settlement body, which typically
authorizes a government to implement retaliatory trade policies. These retaliatory
trade policies impose costs on exporters in the foreign country that is found to be
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in violation of its treaty commitments, and political pressure by these exporters
may force the foreign government back into compliance. For instance, in the course
of the WTO dispute over the steel tariffs imposed by United States President Bush,
the European Commission threatened to retaliate with protectionist measures of
its own, targeting, among others, oranges from Florida, which was a key state
in the upcoming midterm elections. As an observer put it, “[the Europeans] are
trying to retaliate where they think they can get the maximum amount of political
leverage” (Chicago Tribune, April 5, 2002). Retaliatory protectionist measures
also have domestic political consequences for the sanctioning country. On the
one hand, they provide protection to the affected domestic industry, which can be
politically expedient (Pond, 2014); on the other hand, they raise the price of goods
imported from the targeted country, which, even if only temporarily, hurts domestic
consumers of the imported goods. The enforcement of a ruling once it is issued
imposes costs on governments, and the ability and willingness of governments to
absorb these costs affects the incentives to litigate a dispute.
Many of the costs of pursuing trade disputes are borne by the government. By
contrast, the benefits of trade disputes are mostly concentrated on a small number
of firms. A quarter of WTO disputes challenges policies affecting two or fewer
products at the HS6 level (which distinguishes, for instance, between ‘upright
pianos’, with code 92.01.10, and ‘grand pianos’, with code 92.01.20), covering
less than US$5 million worth of imports a year (Bown and Reynolds, 2014). The
median value of imports covered in trade disputes initiated at the WTO is about
US$66.1 million. Even where goods are produced by large industries, the number
of exporting firms is often small within each industry, and few firms reap benefits
from disputes. Figure 4.1. underscores this point with data from the Exporter
Dynamics Database (Cebeci et al., 2012), which provides data from 45 countries
for years from 1997 through 2011 on various exporter characteristics. The figure
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displays a histogram of the median number of exporters per product (at the HS6
level) across country-years in the sample. For the majority of observations, the
median number of exporters per product is between one and three, showing that
most potential trade disputes affect few firms.
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Figure 4.1.: Histogram of the median number of exporting firms
per product, with products defined by HS6 categories. Data from
45 countries, 1997-2011, from the Exporter Dynamics Database
(Cebeci et al., 2012). The data show that for most product
categories, only one to three exporting firms exist.
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It follows that many trade disputes can plausibly be understood as supporting
narrow exporter interests and can have significant costs for the government. The
costs “to identify, analyze, pursue, and litigate a dispute” (Guzman and Simmons,
2005, p. 559) make governments reluctant to file disputes. Governments that
are more willing to absorb these costs in exchange for the political gain from
supporting narrow interest groups should be more likely to pursue trade disputes.
A large literature suggests that domestic electoral institutions are a key factor
affecting the willingness of governments to absorb these costs and to provide
costly policies to narrow interest groups. In the context of trade policies, at least
since Rogowski (1987) the literature paid particular emphasis to the distinction
between proportional representation (PR) and plurality rule. The premise in
this literature is that narrow interest groups, through lobbying or other political
contributions, obtain favorable policies from the government, which needs to trade
off narrow and broad public interests. The influence of narrow interest groups
is supposed to be larger in plurality electoral systems. The small population size
per district in single-member districts and the typically weaker parties in plurality
systems are key factors enabling narrow interests to exert disproportionate influence
(Rogowski, 1987; Grossman and Helpman, 2005). The smaller district size implies
that individual legislators should be more willing to influence government policy
on behalf of constituents. In the context of the United States, the President and
members of the Senate are thought to pursue more broad-based interests than
members of the House of Representatives, due to the differences in constituency
size. Weaker parties under plurality rule, moreover, give individual legislators
more influence in policy-making (McGillivray, 2004). Proportional representation
systems, by contrast, tend to favor broad-based public spending on homogeneous,
but geographically dispersed groups. Since most trade disputes benefit few firms,
plurality rule should create more political incentives to initiate disputes on behalf
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of narrow domestic groups.
While the decision to initiate a trade dispute is a decision by the executive, the
electoral rule can still matter for dispute initiations. In parliamentary systems,
the electoral fortunes of the executive are directly linked to the electoral rule for
legislators; in presidential systems, the executive is dependent on the legislature
to pass legislation and has incentives to provide policies to politically important
constituents – as was evident in the steel tariffs under United States President Bush
in anticipation of the 2002 midterm elections. Similarly, the distinction between
plurality rule and proportional representation has been linked to violations of
international trade commitments (Rickard, 2010), even though the implementation
of some of these violating measures falls under the purview of the executive. Even
if the executive has little direct interest in pursuing a trade dispute, individual
legislators may pressure the executive for the initiation of trade disputes, thereby
assuming functions similar to access points (Ehrlich, 2007). This view is consistent
with the finding that members of the United States Congress frequently interact
and intervene with the International Trade Commission (Allee and Miler, 2009),
which is an agency with the authority to impose non-tariff barriers to trade, even if
individual members of Congress cannot set these policies directly. Legislators exert
such influence more successfully if they hold seats in politically important districts
and a trade dispute is providing sufficiently large political benefits to affect the vote
outcome in those districts – which, given the narrowly targeted benefits of most
trade disputes, is more likely in smaller, single-member districts, where narrow
interests receive disproportionate influence relative to the broader population.
If the legislator’s political success is more dependent on narrow interest groups,
the legislator has more incentive to push harder for a dispute initiation by the
government, for instance by offering political support to the government through
issue-linkage on other political issues. Thus, even though individual legislators
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cannot initiate trade disputes directly on behalf of their district constituents, they
can exert political pressure on a government to initiate a dispute.
This discussion yields a first proposition.
Proposition 4.1. Plurality rule should be associated with more trade dispute initiations
at the GATT/WTO than proportional representation.
The previous argument hinges on the assumption that trade disputes benefit
narrow interest groups, but not the broader public. This is most plausibly the case
in developed economies with diversified export markets, where pursuing trade
disputes for maintaining and securing trade in any specific exported good can
be politically expedient, but it is not an economic imperative. By contrast, for
countries with less diversified exports, maintaining exports of any single good can
be crucial from a macroeconomic perspective. For instance, the banana regime
of the European Union caused estimated losses to Ecuador of about US$500,000
a day, and bananas account for about a third of Ecuador’s exports (Davis and
Bermeo, 2009). Export losses on such dimensions can pose problems for a country’s
balance-of-payments position, with the attendant implications for foreign currency
reserves, currency management, and debt repayment. Banana exporters can hardly
be considered narrow interest groups for Ecuador, and Ecuador’s challenge to the
European Union’s policies on banana imports at the WTO dispute settlement body
is better understood as an attempt to defend broad, public interests than narrow
exporter interests. More generally, where countries depend on few export markets,
defending access to these markets benefits small interest groups, but it also has
larger macroeconomic benefits. In such circumstances, the relevance of trade
disputes as a tool to garner political support from narrow interest groups decreases,
since trade disputes also benefit broader interests. Hence, if the association between
plurality rule and trade disputes is due to plurality rule being more sensitive to
narrow interest group demands, then the effect of plurality rule on trade dispute
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initiations should be prevalent only in countries with diversified export markets;
plurality rule should not be associated with more trade dispute initiations where
countries depend on few export goods and markets. A second proposition therefore
is as follows.
Proposition 4.2. The effect of plurality rule on trade dispute initiations should be most
pronounced in the presence of diversified export markets.4
If electoral institutions rule affect the responsiveness of governments to lobbying
by domestic interest groups, then the effect of these institutions should depend
on the legalization of the dispute settlement body and the availability of legal
precedent, both of which increase the predictability of rulings. Domestic actors
affected by another country’s policies may have some general idea of the legal
merit of a potential case, but they might be uncertain about whether the dispute
settlement process will result in the expected ruling; the closer the link between
the perceived legal merits of a case and the expected outcome of the dispute
settlement process, the more predictable a ruling is. In many cases, and especially
in developed economies, private firms contribute to the dispute settlement process
by providing financial resources (Bown and Hoekman, 2005), such that losing a case
has direct costs for domestic actors. Even in the absence of direct contributions to
the litigation process, a lost dispute implies that the involved firms expanded
resources and political capital on lobbying with little to no economic return.
Because of the possibility of losing a dispute, the predictability of rulings is relevant
for domestic actors that are considering whether to lobby their government for a
dispute initiation: the less predictable the dispute settlement rulings are, the more
risky this lobbying is. A lower predictability of rulings, therefore, magnifies the
effects of electoral institutions. Even relatively uncertain cases are worth pursuing
4As a corollary, because developed economies have, on average, more diversified export markets
than developing economies, we might expect the differences in dispute initiation rates among
electoral systems to be most pronounced among developed economies.
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if lobbying is inexpensive. By contrast, if rulings are more predictable, lobbying for
cases of low legal merit becomes uniformly less attractive, and lobbying for cases
of higher legal merit becomes uniformly more attractive, such that the effect of
electoral institutions on dispute initiation rates declines.
To make this discussion more explicit, suppose a government, denoted by g,
can initiate a dispute on behalf of a domestic actor, f . The domestic actor can
provide resources to the government in exchange for the initiation of a dispute.
The resources provided by the domestic actor, denoted by l ≥ 0, may constitute
direct lobbying contributions, but they may also come in the form of political
support. The government weights these with some coefficient, κ, in its utility
function, and it pays a cost, cg , for litigating a dispute. κ represents how much the
government values narrow interest groups over the general public and is assumed
to be larger in plurality systems than in proportional representation systems. Then,
the government receives a payoff of κl − cg for initiating a dispute and a payoff of
zero for refusing to initiate a dispute. Consequently, the government initiates a
dispute if and only if
l ≥ cg
κ
. (4.1)
The domestic actor receives some utility, uf > 0, from winning the dispute and
zero from losing. Contributions l enter the payoffs of the domestic actor through
a function c(l), where c(l) is strictly increasing and convex in l, and c(0) = 0, such
that the domestic actor pays no cost when not providing any contributions. The
domestic actor knows the potential case has some legal quality, w ∈ [−b,b]. For any
specific domestic actor, w is drawn from a distribution with (twice differentiable)
cumulative distribution function Fw(w) and probability density function fw(w). A
case of legal quality w results in a ruling in favor of the domestic actor with
probability p(w) ∈ (0,1) if the case is brought to the dispute settlement body.
Cases of higher legal quality result in a ruling in favor of the complainant with a
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higher probability, such that ∂p(w)/∂w > 0. The domestic actor receives a payoff of
p(w)uf − c(l) if the case is brought to the dispute settlement body, and a payoff of
−c(l) if the government does not pursue the case. Thus, the domestic actor receives
a negative return, the cost of making contributions, if the government declines to
pursue the dispute or if the dispute is lost.
In a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the domestic actor will never provide
more contributions than necessary, such that condition (4.1) holds with equality. It
follows that the domestic actor lobbies the government if
p(w) ≥
(
uf
)−1
c
(cg
κ
)
. (4.2)
Thus, if condition (4.2) holds, f lobbies the government by providing l∗ = cgκ ,
and the government initiates a dispute in turn. If condition (4.2) fails, f makes no
contributions and the government refrains from initiating a trade dispute.
The predictability and timeliness of legal rulings is reflected in differences in the
function p(w). If the value of p(w) is close to .5 regardless of the legal merit of a case
and if it hardly changes with the legal quality of a case, rulings are unpredictable;
by contrast, the more closely the outcome of the ruling is linked to the legal
quality of a case, the more predictable it is. Figure 4.2. illustrates this relationship.
The horizontal axis represents the legal quality of a case, while the vertical axis
represents the probability with which the dispute settlement body issues a ruling in
favor of the complainant. The graphs correspond to varying degrees of uncertainty
about the outcome of a dispute. The dotted function represents the scenario where
legal rulings are rather certain from knowledge of the legal merit of a case; by
contrast, the dashed line represents the scenario where the outcome of a dispute
is almost unrelated to the legal merit of a case, and the probability of a favorable
ruling is closer to .5 than in the former case.
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Figure 4.2.: Illustration of the relationship between the perceived
legal quality of a case (w, horizontal axis), and the probability of
a ruling in favor of the complainant from the dispute settlement
body (p(w), vertical axis). Steeper graphs correspond to a better
predictability of rulings. The graph plots the function defined in
equation (4.3) for various levels of α.
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The different graphs in Figure 4.2. can be represented by a function such as
p(w) =
1
α
w
2(1 +w2)
1
2
+
1
2
, (4.3)
where α ≥ 1 determines how accurately w maps onto panel rulings. For larger
values of α, panel rulings are less sensitive to changes in w; in particular, for α→∞,
the panel ruling is in favor of the complainant with probability .5, and both low
and high quality cases would be settled by a coin toss. Larger values of α represent
more uncertainty about the dispute settlement body’s ruling, while lower values α
can be interpreted as higher levels of legalization in the institution. The functional
form in equation (4.3) ensures a sigmoid shape and further guarantees to return a
probability that is bounded between zero and one.
f lobbies the government and a dispute is initiated if
w
(1 +w2)
1
2
= ρ(w) ≥ 2αc
(
cg /κ
)
uf
−α ≡ φ. (4.4)
Letφ ∈ [ρ(−b),ρ(b)], such that the costs of disputes are sufficiently high that disputes
are not filed indiscriminately and such that the benefits of disputes are sufficiently
high that disputes are filed at least sometimes. If w is distributed according to
a cumulative distribution function Fw(w), it follows that r = ρ(w) is distributed
according to Fw(ρ−1(r)) on the set R = {r = ρ(w)|w ∈ [−b,b]}. Since ρ(w) is strictly
increasing in w, the inverse function ρ−1(r) exists and is itself strictly increasing in
r. For the following, suppose Fw(w) is representing a uniform distribution on [−b,b].
The uniform distribution has some appeal for its simplicity, and it guarantees that
the average expected ruling does not depend on the predictability of rulings – that
is, it ensures that the average outcome of rulings is unaffected by changes in the
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predictability of rulings. Then, ρ(w) has cumulative distribution function
Fr(r) =

0 if r < −b
(1+b2)1/2
,
r
[
2b(1− r2) 12
]−1
+ 12 if r ∈
[
−b
(1+b2)1/2
, b
(1+b2)1/2
]
,
1 if r > b
(1+b2)1/2
.
(4.5)
The probability of a dispute initiation is given by Pr(dispute) = 1− Fr (φ) , which
is strictly increasing in κ (thereby providing a derivation of Proposition 4.1). To
determine how the effect of plurality rule changes with the predictability of rulings,
consider the cross-partial derivative of this probability with respect to α and κ.
Since larger values of α represent a lower predictability of rulings, a positive
cross-partial derivative indicates that the effect of plurality rule decreases in the
precision of rulings, while a negative cross-partial derivative implies that the effect
of plurality rule increases in the precision of rulings. The cross-partial is positive
whenever fr(φ) +φf ′r (φ) > 0. From the cumulative distribution function in equation
(4.5) it follows after simplification that this condition is equivalent to 1 + 2φ2 > 0,
which always holds. This result implies that the effect of plurality rule decreases
in the predictability of rulings (or, equivalently, that the partial derivative with
respect to κ increases in α).
This discussion yields a third proposition.
Proposition 4.3. The effect of plurality rule on dispute initiation rates should decline
as the predictability of rulings increases.
Before proceeding to an empirical evaluation of these three propositions it
is worthwhile noting that increasing the predictability of rulings itself has an
ambiguous effect on the probability of dispute initiations. This theoretical result is
consistent with evidence presented in Busch (2000), which suggests that reforms
to the GATT’s dispute settlement body had little direct effect on dispute filings;
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it also resonates with theoretical arguments as in Gilligan, Johns and Rosendorff
(2010) that strengthening international courts can have ambiguous effects on the
settlement of disputes. However, the model does suggest that a higher predictability
of rulings modifies the effects of domestic institutions. While the effect of this
institutional change may not be evident directly, it should have an empirically
discernable impact on the functioning of the dispute settlement body of the
GATT/WTO through its effect on the link between domestic institutions and dispute
initiations.
IV.2 Empirical evidence
To test the propositions, I rely on data on dispute initiations at the GATT and
at the WTO. The data set is organized by the country-year and is restricted to
members of the GATT and WTO, respectively, that had at least two legal political
parties running for parliamentary seats in the past election.5 Most of the models
are further restricted to high-income countries, as indicated by membership in the
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). The restriction
to high-income countries has three motivations. First, these countries are most
likely to have the experience and resources to pursue trade disputes for domestic
political reasons (Smith, 2004; Kim, 2008). Second, the sample controls for variables
such as legal capacity that are hard to measure for a cross-section time-series. Third,
many of these countries are plausibly affected to a similar extent by changes in trade
policies in foreign countries, which increases the plausibility that each country in
the sample has an equal ‘chance’ of filing a trade dispute.
The dependent variable captures the number of trade disputes initiated by a
country in any given year, which is available from Eric Reinhardt (1996) for the
GATT and from Horn and Mavroidis (2011) for the WTO. I consider a dispute to
5Members of the European Communities and, later, the European Union are omitted.
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be initiated whenever a country submits a request for consultations at the dispute
settlement body.6
Data on political institutions are available from Beck et al. (2001); the variable
on plurality rule is coded 0 for countries that use proportional representation
systems and 1 for countries that use plurality rule. I consider alternative variables
for narrow interest institutions – the number of electoral districts, the incentives of
legislators to cultivate a personal vote, and the share of legislators with sub-national
districts – below.
The main models include three control variables, obtained from the World
Bank; additional control variables are considered as robustness checks. Country
size is associated with both electoral institutions and trade openness (Katzenstein,
1985), and together with wealth also with the ability to engage with international
institutions (Kim, 2008). I therefore include the log of gross domestic product,
GDP, and gross domestic product per capita, as control variables. Because larger
exports are associated with more opportunities for pursuing trade disputes, and
trade openness has been linked to electoral institutions, I further include the logged
value of a country’s exports as control variable. Taking data limitations into account,
the sample restricted to OECD countries comprises 23 countries for years between
1975 and 2010, for a total of 456 observations. The main models in the following
are negative binomial models to accommodate the dependent variable, which is
a count (ranging from 0 to 17) as well as the overdispersion in the data (with the
unconditional variance being about four times as large as the mean). Alternative
models are considered as robustness checks.
6Ideally, I would be able to use data on disputes filed under preferential trade agreements as
well, since these often have distinct dispute settlement bodies and governments may use them
strategically to avoid WTO dispute settlement rulings (Busch, 2007). However, to date there are few
instances of dispute settlement under preferential trade agreements, and most dispute settlement
bodies of preferential trade agreements have never been invoked (Son, 2008). For these reasons, I
restrict the analysis to GATT/WTO disputes in the following.
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IV.2.1 Domestic institutions
Table 4.1. reports estimation results from negative binomial models with
standard errors clustered by countries. The first model includes the three control
variables and shows that plurality rule is associated with more dispute initiations.
The coefficient on plurality rule is statistically significant, with a p-value of .000.
The differences between countries with plurality rule and with proportional
representation are quite substantial (Figure 4.3.). Countries characterized by
plurality rule initiate about .83 disputes per year, while proportional representation
systems initiate about .23 disputes per year. The difference between these two
quantities, the average marginal effect of moving from proportional representation
to plurality rule, amounts to .60 trade disputes per year: plurality rule is
associated with more than three times as many disputes per year as proportional
representation.7
This result is robust to the inclusion of two additional control variables,
the size of the agricultural sector relative to GDP and the number of previous
dispute initiations (column 2). A country’s economic structure, and the size of
its agricultural sector, may be related to dispute initiations to the extent that
agricultural products are typically undifferentiated, which makes it harder for firms
to overcome collective action problems in lobbying for dispute initiations. Larger
agricultural sectors, in particular when subsidized through government programs,
may also be related to a country’s electoral institutions. Through previous dispute
initiations, governments acquire expertise and experience with the procedural
aspects of the dispute settlement system (Davis and Bermeo, 2009). The variable
7All predicted values and marginal effects reported in the following are calculated at observed
sample values, such that marginal effects represent average marginal effects (as opposed to marginal
effects at sample averages). To obtain these average marginal effects, the marginal effect is calculated
for each observation at the observed sample values; the marginal effects are then calculated as the
average across all observations in the sample; see Cameron and Trivedi (1998) for a discussion.
Confidence intervals are obtained analytically from the Delta method or, where marginal effects are
conditional on interaction terms, through simulations.
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Figure 4.3.: Predicted number of trade disputes for proportional
representation (PR) and plurality rule, and average marginal effect
of plurality rule, together with 95 percent confidence intervals.
Calculated from column 1 in Table 4.1.
also effectively captures unobserved country characteristics related to dispute
initiations.
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IV.2.2 Export diversification
Proposition 4.2 states that the effect of plurality rule should depend on the
diversification of a country’s exports: the effect of plurality rule should be most
pronounced in countries with diversified exports, and negligible in countries with
exports concentrated on a few goods. Column 3 includes a variable on export
market concentration. The variable, obtained from the United Nations Conference
on Trade Development, is available only for years after 1995, which restricts the
number of observations substantially, but it has good coverage across countries.
The variable theoretically can range from zero to one. In the estimation sample, it
ranges from .045 to .474. Higher values indicate less diversified export markets, and
the coefficient on the interaction term consequently should be negative. Column 3
supports this expectation, and the result holds in the sample including non-OECD
countries (column 4).
Figure 4.4. displays the results in the sample of OECD countries, showing the
average marginal effect of plurality rule at various levels of export concentration
together with a 95 percent confidence interval. The distribution of the variable
on export concentration is displayed as a histogram. For the most diversified
export markets, at the left end of the distribution, plurality rule is associated with
a substantial increase in the number of trade disputes. Most observations in the
sample of OECD countries are towards the left end of the distribution, where
exports are very diversified. Consequently, for most observations in the sample,
the effect of plurality rule is to statistically significantly increase dispute initiation
rates. As a country’s exports become more concentrated and trade disputes become
more valuable for broader public concerns, the effect of plurality rule decreases,
and it turns negative if a country’s export concentration is sufficiently large. The
negative effect of plurality rule on dispute initiations is not evident when extending
the sample to non-OECD countries. However, it hints at the possibility that
140
export diversification, while distinct from it, shares similarities with geographical
concentration, in that both variables can modify the effect of electoral institutions
on policy choices: concentrated export markets imply that defending exports on
any single good benefits the general public as much as it benefits narrow interest
groups; similarly, geographically diffuse industries become attractive targets for
broad-based policies (Rickard, 2008).
Column 5 includes a dummy variable equal to zero for OECD members and
equal to one for non-OECD members; the variable is interacted with the electoral
rule variable. The results show that, consistent with the previous interpretation
of the results, plurality rule is associated with more trade disputes among OECD
countries, but that the effect is wiped out completely among non-OECD countries.
By contrast, there is little evidence for common alternative explanations for
the different effects among OECD and non-OECD countries. Differences in the
economic size of countries or their per capita wealth cannot explain the differences
among OECD and non-OECD countries (not reported). When including both the
interaction with the non-OECD dummy and the export concentration variable, the
coefficient on the latter remains significant and stable in size, while the former is
small and not statistically significant (not reported), suggesting that the export
concentration variable accounts for the divergent effects of plurality rule among
OECD and non-OECD countries.
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Table 4.1.: Dispute Initiation and Electoral Rule
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Plurality rule 1.29*** 1.28*** 5.25*** 1.53*** .873**
(4.3) (4.9) (7.5) (3.1) (2.2)
x Export concentration -29.7*** -6.86**
(-7.1) (-2.5)
x Non-OECD -1.09**
(-2.1)
ln(GDP) .036 -.083 -.321 .756*** .741***
(.12) (-.33) (-1.3) (4.2) (4)
GDP per capita -.015 -.029* -.031** -.028*** -.024**
(-1.5) (-1.8) (-2.5) (-2.7) (-2.2)
ln(exports) .660** .430** .852*** -.127 -.032
(2.2) (2.1) (2.9) (-.62) (-.16)
Agriculture -.138**
(-2.5)
Previous disputes .011**
(2.2)
Export concentration 2.39 -.244
(1.4) (-.19)
Non-OECD .426
(1.1)
Constant -18.8*** -9.18*** -14.2*** -17.3*** -19.8***
(-6.6) (-2.9) (-7.4) (-7.5) (-11)
Obs. 456 443 212 1398 2338
Coefficient estimates and t-statistics. *** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%.
Negative binomial models, clustered standard errors.
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Figure 4.4.: Average marginal effect of plurality rule on dispute
initiations and 95 percent confidence intervals, as a function of
export concentration ratio. Histogram in the background shows
the distribution of the export concentration variable in the sample.
Calculated from column 3 in Table 4.1.
143
IV.2.3 The predictability of rulings
Table 4.2. presents models to assess Proposition 4.3, which posits that the
effect of plurality rule decreases as the predictability of rulings increases. The
first two models leverage the reforms to the dispute settlement body of the GATT
in the 1989 Dispute Settlement Procedures Improvements and again in 1994 to
evaluate this proposition. The reforms are generally perceived to have increased
the institutionalization and legalization of the institution (Goldstein et al., 2000).
For instance, the time lines for distinct parts of the dispute settlement process were
tightened, complainants received the right to a panel, and the possibility of a review
of panel decisions by the Appellate Body was introduced. While some of these
reforms may have increased the procedural costs of litigation at the GATT/WTO,
they also increased the predictability of the dispute settlement process from the
perspective of the complainant (Kim, 2008). The stricter time lines help speed
up the litigation process, resulting in potentially more timely relief in response to
violations of treaty commitments by trade partners, and the possibility to demand a
review of panel decisions adds a second layer of judicial expertise. Consistent with
more general views of institutionalization (Keohane, 1984), these reforms should
decrease uncertainty in the dispute settlement process, and the effect of plurality
rule on dispute initiations should diminish.
The first two models include a dummy variable coded 1 for years after 1989,
when the dispute settlement body of the GATT was reformed first, and 0 for years
up to 1989. Column 6 includes the three initial control variables, column 7 includes
agricultural production as a percent of GDP and the number of previous disputes.
Based on the results in column 6, Figure 4.5. displays the average marginal effect of
moving from proportional representation to plurality rule in both time periods as
well as the difference between the two marginal effects, together with 95 percent
confidence intervals. The effect of plurality rule is smaller after 1989 than before
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1989; in both time periods, plurality rule remains associated with a statistically
significant increase in the number of trade disputes. The third bar shows that the
difference between the two effects is statistically significant.
Second, the predictability of rulings should also increase over time as countries
and domestic actors gain experience with the dispute settlement body and a body of
legal precedent accumulates (Davis and Bermeo, 2009; Pelc, 2014). Complainants
not only benefit from their own experience with the dispute settlement body, but
also from cases brought by other countries, rulings on which give hints about
the likely outcome if a similar case were brought to the dispute settlement body.
Thus, the effect of plurality rule should decrease in the number of previously
initiated disputes. Column 8 includes a variable on the logged cumulative number
of previous disputes initiated by any country at the GATT/WTO. Column 9 only
considers disputes initiated by other countries in order to isolate the effect of
learning from the substantive interpretation of past rulings from the effect of
learning about the procedural aspects of litigating cases at the GATT/WTO (Kim,
2008; Davis and Bermeo, 2009). The results are substantively similar and support
the theoretical expectation: the effect of plurality rule decreases as governments
and domestic actors learn about the interpretation of international law and the
predictability of rulings increases. Figure 4.6. reports the marginal effect of plurality
rule as a function of cases previously litigated at the GATT/WTO by other countries,
as calculated from column 9. The effect of plurality rule is initially strong and
significant and declines as the number of previous cases increases. The results are
similar without the log transformation and robust to additional controls, such as
year trends (not reported).
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Figure 4.5.: First two bars: Average marginal effect of plurality rule
on dispute initiations and 95 percent confidence interval, before
and after reforms to dispute settlement body in 1989. Third bar:
Difference in the marginal effects before and after 1989. Calculated
from column 6, Table 4.2.
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147
Table 4.2.: Predictability of Rulings
(6) (7) (8) (9)
Plurality rule 2.23*** 2.37*** 6.98*** 7.57***
(4.2) (4.4) (3.7) (4.2)
x post 1989 -1.25** -1.47**
(-2.3) (-2.5)
x ln(past disputes) -1.01*** -1.11***
(-3.0) (-3.5)
post 1989 .973* 1.26**
(1.8) (2.3)
ln(past disputes) .625* .530
(1.8) (1.6)
ln(GDP) -.022 -.127 -.123 -.320
(-.079) (-.6) (-.45) (-1.2)
GDP per capita -.014* -.029** -.013* -.010
(-1.7) (-2.2) (-1.6) (-1.4)
ln(exports) .738** .467* .883*** 1.10***
(2.4) (1.9) (2.7) (3.3)
Agriculture -.138**
(-2.5)
Previous disputes .012***
(2.9)
Constant -20.1*** -9.91** -23.9*** -23.6***
(-6.1) (-2.6) (-6.4) (-6.8)
Obs. 456 443 456 456
Coefficient estimates and t-statistics. *** significant at 1%, **
at 5%, * at 10%. Negative binomial models, clustered standard
errors.
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IV.2.4 Robustness checks
Tables 4.3. and 4.4. provide results from several robustness checks. The
association between plurality rule and trade dispute initiations is not affected
by any of these changes. Turning first to Table 4.3., column 10 excludes the United
States from the sample, which has a plurality system and is the leading single
initiator of trade disputes at the GATT/WTO. Column 11 replaces the count of
dispute initiations as dependent variable with a dummy variable. The substitution
ensures that the previous results are not sensitive to observations with an unusually
large number of dispute initiations. Column 12 includes world economic growth
as a control variable, which may cause a protectionist turn and thereby increase
opportunities for dispute initiations. Column 13 includes year dummies to control
for year-specific effects that are identical across countries.
The average number of trade disputes in the sample is less than one. Such coarse
data can result in biased coefficient estimates with binary dependent variables
(King and Zeng, 2001), and similar concerns apply with a dependent variable that
is a count. The low average number of trade disputes implies a large number of
country-years with no trade disputes at all. While a common approach in the
literature is to estimate a zero-inflated negative binomial model to accommodate
what are considered excess zeros, the large number of zeros may accurately reflect a
low mean, which does not justify a zero-inflated model (which posits the presence
of two distinct data generating processes). Firth (1993) proposes a penalized
maximum likelihood estimator, which has been applied fruitfully to scarce data
with binary dependent variables (Heinze and Schemper, 2002; Zorn, 2005). The
estimator introduces an additional term into the likelihood function, which has
two advantages. First, the penalization term removes the first-order bias from the
coefficient estimates, which in small data sets can bring a substantial reduction
in bias. Second, because the penalization term effectively adds a small number to
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each observation, the excess zeros are no longer present. I implement a version of
the penalized maximum likelihood estimator by adjusting it to the dependent
variable and obtain coefficient estimates through iteratively re-weighted least
squares. The relationship between plurality rule and dispute initiations is robust to
this estimation method (column 14).8
8I leave a more thorough description of the penalized maximum likelihood estimator when
applied to Poisson distributed count data and its implementation using iteratively reweighted least
squares to a separate paper.
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Table 4.3.: Disputes: Robustness Checks I
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Plurality rule 1.68*** 1.56*** 1.30*** 1.33*** 1.10***
(6.3) (4.6) (4.4) (3.9) (4.6)
ln(GDP) -.685*** -.177 .051 -.167 .169
(-3) (-.35) (.17) (-.6) (1.5)
GDP per capita -.007 -.013 -.015 -.005 -.022***
(-.82) (-.85) (-1.4) (-.5) (-3.5)
ln(exports) 1.11*** .928* .637** .941*** .598***
(4.2) (1.7) (2.1) (3.1) (3.9)
World growth -.907
(-1.3)
Constant -11.5*** -20*** -18.6*** -21.7*** -20.6***
(-5.5) (-5.7) (-6.5) (-6.7) (-11)
Obs. 420 456 456 456 456
Year FE No No No Yes No
Coefficient estimates and t-statistics. *** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%.
Columns (10), (12), (13): Negative binomial models, clustered standard errors.
Column (11): Logit model, clustered standard errors.
Column (14): Penalized maximum likelihood.
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Table 4.4. provides additional robustness checks. Column 15 includes a variable
for government partisanship. Right-wing governments are more likely to come to
power in plurality systems (Iversen and Soskice, 2006). If right-wing governments
are also more prone to supporting business interests, then the association between
plurality rule and trade disputes might be due to the higher incidence of right-wing
governments. While the coefficient on plurality rule remains relatively stable, left
governments are more likely to pursue trade disputes.
Columns 16 through 18 include variables to control for potential relationships
between electoral rule, trade policies, and exchange rate policies. Column 16
includes a variable from Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) to distinguish
between managed and floating exchange rate regimes. Managed exchange rates, by
reducing flexibility on exchange rate policies, may create additional demands for
active trade policy management and therefore be associated with trade disputes.
At the same time, monetary commitments have been associated with proportional
representation systems (Bernhard and Leblang, 1999). Columns 17 and 18
control for exchange overvaluation. Overvalued and appreciated exchange rates
have been associated with more demands for trade disputes by domestic actors
(Betz and Kerner, 2014); because overvalued exchange rates and exchange rate
appreciation advantage consumers at the expense of firms producing traded goods,
they also may be associated with the electoral rule. Column 17 includes a variable
measuring exchange rate appreciation simply as the percentage increase in the
nominal exchange rate; data on nominal exchange rates is available from the Penn
World Tables (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2006). Column 18 includes a variable
measuring real exchange rate overvaluation as the ratio between the nominal
exchange rate and the purchasing power parity rate, adjusted for differences in real
income per capita as suggested in Rodrik (2008), using again data from the Penn
World Tables (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2006).
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Table 4.4.: Disputes: Robustness Checks II
(15) (16) (17) (18)
Plurality rule 1.20*** 1.32*** 1.31*** 1.29***
(4.4) (3.7) (4.3) (4.3)
ln(GDP) .082 -.229 .044 .028
(.31) (-.89) (.14) (.091)
GDP per capita -.018* -.011 -.014 -.015
(-1.7) (-.93) (-1.3) (-1.5)
ln(exports) .636** 1.05*** .647** .668**
(2.5) (3.5) (2.1) (2.2)
Partisanship: center -.163
(-.51)
Partisanship: left .475*
(1.9)
Floating rate -.051
(-.22)
Currency value -.005 .002***
(-.98) (4.6)
Constant -19.5*** -21.7*** -18.8*** -18.8***
(-7.7) (-5.2) (-6.6) (-6.6)
Obs. 401 340 453 455
Coefficient estimates and t-statistics. *** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%.
Negative binomial models, clustered standard errors.
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If the reported results are in fact due to differences in electoral institutions, then
replacing the variable on plurality rule with other measures of institutions that
increase the influence of narrow interests should yield similar results. I consider
three variables in the following. First, the incentives to provide policies to narrow
interest groups should increase in the number of electoral districts (Rogowski,
1987): through a larger number of districts, even relatively small interest groups
can gain representation in the political process (Ehrlich, 2007). Data on the number
of electoral districts (in bicameral systems for the lower level of the house) are
available from Golder (2005). Second, legislators from national constituencies
should have more broad based interests than legislators from smaller geographic
constituencies. I obtain a variable on the proportion of national constituencies from
Seddon et al. (2002), which ranges from zero to one; I invert the measure, such
that a value of zero represents a system where all legislators come from national
districts. Third, as legislators have more ‘Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote’
(Carey and Shugart, 1995), the influence of narrow interest groups should increase.
Data are again available from Seddon et al. (2002). The variable is an index of
party control over ballots, whether and how votes are pooled, and how votes are
allocated. In the sample, the resulting index ranges from zero to five, with higher
values indicating more incentives to cater to narrow interest groups.
Table 4.5. presents the results when replacing the variable on plurality with these
variables. The coefficients on the number of electoral districts and the personal
vote index have the expected positive sign and are statistically significant at the
one percent level. The effects of these variables are also notable in substantive
terms. Moving from the sample median to the sample maximum on the variable on
the logged number of electoral districts increases the predicted number of trade
disputes by a factor of five. Similarly, moving from the sample median to the sample
maximum on the personal vote index more than doubles the predicted number of
154
Table 4.5.: Disputes: Alternatives to Plurality Rule
(19) (20) (21)
log(districts) .576***
(2.9)
subnational districts -1.97
(-1.0)
Personal vote .450***
(4.4)
ln(GDP) -.023 .058 -.045
(-.13) (.12) (-.23)
GDP per capita -.009 -.025 -.014
(-.6) (-1.3) (-1.1)
ln(exports) .707*** 1.03 .791***
(3) (1.5) (2.7)
Constant -20.6*** -25.6*** -20.5***
(-5.3) (-3.7) (-6.5)
Obs. 579 293 293
Coefficient estimates and t-statistics.
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%.
Negative binomial models, clustered standard errors.
trade disputes, to more than one full dispute per year. By contrast, and contrary to
expectations, the coefficient estimate on the proportion of subnational districts is
statistically not significant at conventional levels and carries a negative sign.
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A potential caveat to the argument in this chapter is the possibility to settle
disputes informally. If plurality rule creates more incentives for governments to
initiate and litigate disputes, as argued above, and if this is known to the defendant
in a potential dispute, the parties should be able to solve the dispute amicably
without a formal complaint. However, the defendant may be uncertain about
the strength of the complainant’s commitment to litigate a dispute and enforce
a ruling on behalf of its own constituency. This is especially the case where the
dispute is politically motivated and where the political strength and relevance of
the complainant’s domestic constituency is in question. If such uncertainty exists,
the defendant may prefer to wait for a formal dispute initiation, rather than concede
the issue prematurely.
Additionally, an informal settlement presumes that the defendant does not host
an equally strong domestic constituency which caused the rule violation and wants
to uphold it. In this case, the defendant has incentives to refuse concessions through
informal discussions, seeking ‘political cover’ for a policy change that is unpopular
domestically (Allee and Huth, 2006b). Indeed, Rickard (2010) shows that plurality
rule, by favoring narrow interest groups, is associated with more rule violations
that are challenged through trade disputes. By favoring narrow interest groups,
plurality rule is not only associated with more rule violations but also with more
reluctance to cave in to informal demands by trading partners.
This discussion points to the importance of domestic institutions in the
defendant country as well. Indeed, and consistent with the notion that protectionist
domestic interest groups may block policy change, Table 4.6. shows, using data
from Reinhardt (1996), that governments elected under plurality rule are less
likely to concede an issue after a formal complaint is made but before a panel is
formed: Proportional representation systems are about twice as likely to concede
the issue without a formal panel ruling. Of course, the significance of this finding
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Table 4.6.: Concessions
Concessions
No Yes
PR 99 12
89% 11%
Plurality 146 7
95% 5%
Total 245 19
Number and percentage of
cases where defendant admit-
ted rule violations before panel
formation. Data from Rein-
hardt (1996).
is limited, given the small number of cases where defendant conceded. However,
it does suggest that electoral systems are not only associated with incentives
for governments to push complaints against other countries, but also to uphold
violations for a longer time, underscoring the concurrent incentives to violate and
to complain in order to satisfy both pro-trade and anti-trade interest groups.
IV.3 Conclusion
Compliance constituencies, which protest rule violations by their own govern-
ment, can be crucial for the monitoring and enforcement of international agree-
ments. In this regard, domestic politics is a crucial element in enforcing interna-
tional agreements – for instance, where international agreements provide focal
points for the mobilization of domestic interest groups and where courts can en-
force international norms domestically (Simmons, 2009). This chapter suggests a
different mechanism through which domestic politics matter for the enforcement
of international agreements. Domestic groups may not only force compliance onto
their own government. They also may push their own government to force compli-
ance onto foreign governments. Such demands from compliance constituencies are
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more likely to result in the enforcement of international agreements through dis-
pute initiations where domestic institutions increase a government’s responsiveness
to interest groups.
The focus on domestic institutions as determinant of dispute initiations
complements systemic factors, such as the precision of international law (Huth,
Croco and Appel, 2011) and the economic prowess of countries (Sattler and
Bernauer, 2010). By providing an explanation for differences in dispute initiation
rates among countries of similar levels of development, it adds to the domestic
political determinants of dispute behavior, such as the legal capacity of governments
(Kim, 2008; Busch, Reinhardt and Shaffer, 2009). The explanation may also be
relevant beyond trade. For instance, VanLoozen (2012) finds instances of firms
pushing their governments into international dispute resolution procedures in
maritime border disputes. If some governments are systematically more susceptible
to these demands, then they should be more frequently engaged in such disputes.
More generally, if international agreements require the enforcement of norms, then
domestic institutions, by shaping the political incentives of governments, can affect
which countries provide such enforcement.
In the context of trade politics, the relationship between domestic institutions
and dispute initiations implies that those electoral institutions that are believed to
favor protectionist trade policies, because they offer ‘protection for sale’ at cheaper
rates (Rogowski, 1987; Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Nielson, 2003; Grossman and
Helpman, 2005), also create more incentives for governments to defend a liberal
international trading order in order to support domestic exporter interests. This
suggests the need to consider the role of exporters in trade policy-making more
explicitly, and how this consideration, in turn, affects the relationship between
electoral institutions and trade policies – especially when the incentives to appeal
to exporters and to protectionist firms conflict. Interests conflict, for instance, in the
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presence of reciprocal trade negotiations, where expanding market access abroad
requires a country to lower its own trade barriers, such that advancing exporter
interests comes at the expense of import-competing interests. Domestic institutions
that put protection for sale also should put trade liberalization for sale, and the
simultaneous influence of exporters and protectionist groups implies that narrow
interest institutions consequently need not result in more protectionist policies on
average (Chapter II). The initiation of trade disputes therefore provides a promising
alternative to variables such as average tariff rates or trade flows, which can be
problematic for evaluating differences in the influence of domestic interest groups
on trade policies (McGillivray, 2004; Kono, 2006).
The argument in this chapter points to the interplay between domestic
institutions and the design of international institutions. Domestic institutions can
only play a role for dispute initiations when governments have to file disputes on
behalf of private actors. This implication speaks to the question of why governments
would want to maintain responsibility for dispute filings. While filing disputes can
have substantial costs, the upside of maintaining discretion over which disputes are
filed and when they are filed is that governments can use trade disputes to garner
domestic political support among affected domestic groups – which is the more
important in the context of international agreements that limit other channels to
cater to interest groups, such as the provision of protectionist trade policies, which
is restricted by the GATT/WTO. However, the example of the GATT/WTO also
highlights the importance of viewing design elements of international institutions
in conjunction. Governments are not only responsible for initiating disputes, but
also need to enforce the ruling once it is issued. Having direct access to the dispute
settlement body is of little use to private actors if their government refuses to
implement policies that enforce the ruling. Even if private actors could initiate
disputes directly, they would still have to rely on their government’s support for
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enforcing a ruling, which in turn will influence which disputes are brought by
which actors. Thus, the design of dispute settlement bodies and of enforcement
mechanisms cannot be viewed independently when considering their implications
for the functioning of international institutions.
Finally, while this chapter focuses on the case where governments have to file
disputes on behalf of domestic actors, in some cases the flipside of this scenario
applies. In July 2014, for instance, newspaper reports suggested that the German
government pressured Microsoft to challenge a ruling by a New York judge.
The ruling would have given the United States government access to customer
data stored on servers overseas, much to the dismay of European governments
already upset about wide-reaching data collection efforts by United States agencies.
The German government itself was in no position to challenge the ruling, but
it successfully persuaded Microsoft to do so – which, as the New York Times
acknowledged, was “the first time an American company is believed to have fought
back against a domestic warrant for data held overseas.”9 Such linkages between
the interests of governments and the interests of non-state actors in filing legal
complaints, and how this relationship is shaped by differences in legal standing,
may gain further prominence as the activities of transnational non-state actors,
such as non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations, become
more prominent.
9Microsoft’s Top Lawyer Is the Tech World’s Envoy. New York Times, July 20, 2014.
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IV.A Appendix
This appendix provides a derivation of the three propositions in the chapter.
Consider a model that involves a government, g, and a domestic actor, f . The
government can decide whether to initiate a trade dispute on behalf of the domestic
actor; the domestic actor can provide resources to the government in exchange for
the government initiating a dispute. The resources provided by the domestic actor,
denoted by l ≥ 0, may constitute direct lobbying contributions, but they may also
come in the form of political support. The government weights these with some
coefficient, κ, in its utility function, and it pays a cost, cg , for litigating a dispute. κ
here represents how much the government values narrow interest groups over the
general public, and as has been argued in the main body of the text, κ is assumed to
be larger in plurality systems than in proportional representation systems. Finally,
suppose the government’s objective function includes a term γ ≥ 0, which reflects
broader, possibly macroeconomic, benefits of disputes. The government receives
a payoff of κl + γ − cg for initiating a dispute, and it receives a payoff of zero for
refusing to initiate a dispute. Consequently, the government initiates a dispute if
and only if
l ≥ cg −γ
κ
. (4.6)
The domestic actor receives some utility, uf > 0, from winning the dispute, and
zero from losing the dispute. f pays a cost of c(l) for providing contributions
to the government, where the function c(l) is strictly increasing and convex in
l, and c(0) = 0, such that the domestic actor pays no cost for not providing any
contributions. The domestic actor knows that the potential case has some legal
quality, w ∈ [−b,b]. A case of legal quality w results in a ruling in favor of the
domestic actor with probability p(w) ∈ (0,1) if the case is brought to the dispute
settlement body. Cases of higher legal quality result in a ruling in favor of the
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complainant with a higher probability, such that ∂p(w)/∂w > 0. The domestic actor
receives a payoff of p(w)uf − c(l) if the case is brought to the dispute settlement
body, and a payoff of −c(l) if the government does not pursue the case.
In a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the domestic actor will never provide
more contributions than necessary, such that condition (4.6) holds with equality.
This determines the equilibrium level of contributions, which is given by l∗ =
max
[
0,
cg−γ
κ
]
. First, suppose that cg < γ . In this case, the broader value of a dispute
is sufficiently large to induce a dispute initiation, even without any lobbying by the
domestic actor. In this case, no lobbying contributions are made in equilibrium.
It follows that the responsiveness of the government to narrow interest groups,
as reflected in κ, does not enter the government’s decision and hence does not
affect the probability of dispute initiations, as suggested in Proposition 4.2. In
equilibrium, f makes no contributions and the government initiates a dispute.
In the following, suppose that cg > γ . It follows that f lobbies the government if
p(w) ≥
(
uf
)−1
c
(cg −γ
κ
)
. (4.7)
It follows that in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, if condition (4.7) holds,
f makes contributions l∗ = cg−γκ and the government initiates a dispute; if condition
(4.7) fails to hold, f makes no contributions, and the government does not initiate
a dispute.
To evaluate how the probability of dispute initiation varies with domestic
institutions and the precision of legal rulings, suppose that, for any specific
domestic actor, w is drawn from some distribution with cumulative distribution
function Fw(w) and probability density function fw(w). It follows that the
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probability of a dispute initiation is
Pr(dispute) = 1−Fw
(
p−1
[(
uf
)−1
c
(
(cg −γ)/κ
)])
(4.8)
Taking the first derivative with respect to k yields
Pr(dispute)
∂k
=
(cg −γ)
κ2
fw
(
p−1(m)
) c′ ( (cg−γ)κ )
uf p′(p−1(m))
, (4.9)
where m =
(
uf
)−1
c
(
(cg−γ)
κ
)
and z′(·) denotes the first derivative of z with respect to
its argument. This expression is always positive, thus providing a derivation of
Proposition 4.1.
To allow for differences in the predictability of legal rulings, suppose that the
function p(w) is given by
p(w) =
1
α
w
2(1 +w2)
1
2
+
1
2
, (4.10)
where α ≥ 1 determines how accurately w maps onto panel rulings. For larger
values of α, panel rulings are less sensitive to changes in w; in particular, note that
for α→∞, the panel ruling is in favor of the complainant with probability .5. Note
that the function is increasing in w, such that cases with higher legal quality are
more likely to result in a ruling in favor of the complainant; and that, for higher
values of α, the function increases less sharply in w and is closer (in absolute value)
to .5, such that the outcome becomes less predictable from knowledge of w.
f lobbies the government and a dispute is initiated if
w
(1 +w2)
1
2
= ρ(w) ≥ 2αc
(
(cg −γ)/κ
)
uf
−α ≡ φ. (4.11)
Letφ ∈ [ρ(−b),ρ(b)], such that the costs of disputes are sufficiently high that disputes
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are not filed always and such that the benefits of disputes are sufficiently high that
disputes are filed at least sometimes. Note also that this implies that φ ∈ (−1,1). Ifw
is distributed according to a cumulative distribution function Fw(w), it follows that
r = ρ(w) is distributed according to Fw(ρ−1(r)) on the set R = {r = ρ(w)|w ∈ [−b,b]}.
Since ρ(w) is strictly increasing in w, the inverse function ρ−1(r) exists and is itself
strictly increasing in r. For the following, suppose Fw(w) is representing a uniform
distribution on [−b,b]. The uniform distribution has some appeal for its simplicity,
but it also guarantees that the average expected ruling, as defined in equation (4.10),
does not depend on the predictability of rulings – that is, it ensures that the average
outcome of rulings is unaffected by changes in the predictability of rulings. Then,
ρ(w) has the cumulative distribution function
Fr(r) =

0 if r < −b
(1+b2)1/2
,
r
2b(1−r2)− 12
+ 12 if r ∈
[
−b
(1+b2)1/2
, b
(1+b2)1/2
]
,
1 if r > b
(1+b2)1/2
.
(4.12)
The probability of a dispute initiation is given by Pr(dispute) = 1 − Fr (φ).
Proposition 4.3 predicts that the cross-partial of this equation with respect to
α and κ is positive. Using that
∂φ
∂κ
= α
∂2φ
∂κ∂α
and
∂φ
∂α
=
φ
α
, (4.13)
yields that the cross-partial can be written as
∂2 Pr(dispute)
∂κ∂α
= fr(φ) +φf
′
r (φ). (4.14)
From the cumulative distribution function Fr , derived in equation (4.12), it follows
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that
fr(φ) =
1
2b
(
1−φ2
)− 32 ,
f ′r (φ) =
1
2b
3φ
(
1−φ2
)− 52 .
Substituting these expression into condition (4.14) yields
(
1−φ2
)− 32 + 3φ2 (1−φ2)− 52 > 0, (4.15)
1 + 2φ2 > 0, (4.16)
which always holds, and where the second line follows from φ ∈ (−1,1). This result
completes the derivation of Proposition 4.3.
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CHAPTER V
The Domestic Costs of Commitment
Domestic politics are central in large parts of the international relations
literature (Putnam, 1988; Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2003; Bueno de Mesquita and
Smith, 2012). This is also the case for the literature on international institutions,
which uses the presence of domestic groups supporting and opposing international
cooperation to explain when and why governments rely on international institutions
(e.g., Dai 2007; Simmons 2009; Chaudoin 2014a): governments use international
agreements to overcome the resistance of domestic groups which oppose desired
policy changes, whereas domestic groups benefiting from international cooperation
are key drivers of the formation and negotiation of international agreements.
Such arguments gained prominence, for instance, in the literatures on exchange
rate regime choices (Bernhard and Leblang, 1999), trade agreements (Gilligan,
1997a), and the Bretton Woods institutions, the International Monetary Fund in
particular (Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000; Vreeland, 2003; Mukherjee and Singer,
2010). The line of argument assumes that international agreements as commitment
devices lock in policy reforms and therefore pose an attractive opportunity to
governments. They help governments to move policy in a desired direction, to
gain support from domestic groups favoring cooperation, and to prevent future
policy reversals by tying the hands of governments. From the perspective of
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this literature, it is surprising that many international agreements, in particular
those that attempt to solve commitment problems and are driven by domestic
pro-cooperation groups, fail to include formal sanctioning mechanisms, contain
dispute settlement mechanisms that fail to punish violations effectively, or allow
governments to escape their obligations.
This chapter argues that agreements that lock in policies can undermine
cooperation that is driven by pro-cooperation groups. Drawing on a formal model,
the chapter emphasizes the trade-off between a government’s policy preferences,
which an international agreement may help to satisfy, and the government’s ability
to collect political support in the future, which is frustrated by an international
agreement that ties its hands. International agreements imply mutual policy
adjustments (Keohane, 1984). If domestic groups benefit from these adjustments,
they are willing to support cooperation, which can help governments overcome
the resistance of groups opposed to cooperation. In this regard, by activating pro-
cooperation groups, international agreements indeed help governments move policy
and obtain a new policy equilibrium, which can make international institutions
attractive political tools.
Yet, an international agreement that locks in a policy also makes the issue
politically irrelevant in the future. If deviating from the announced international
obligations becomes prohibitively costly, due to external enforcement mechanisms,
the government has no incentives to change the policy anymore. Consequently, the
issue loses salience in political contests. With the issue off the table, pro-cooperation
groups no longer have to support the government to obtain the desired policy (while
groups initially opposed to the agreement have little reason to change their mind
and increase their support of the government after the agreement is signed), which
undermines the government’s efforts to use an international agreement to shift
its support base. Anticipating these consequences of tying its hands through
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an international agreement, the government might be better off retaining policy
discretion through unilateral policy-making than with setting policy through an
international agreement that ties its hands, even if this means that the government
will end up with policy further away from its ideal point.
This is not to say that the presence of pro-cooperation groups inhibits
cooperation. Rather, it becomes attractive to governments to negotiate agreements
that are relatively weak with respect to their formal enforcement mechanisms and
that allow them to violate their commitments. The lack of formal enforcement
mechanisms, and the inability of these agreements to effectively tie a government’s
hands, implies that domestic groups interested in sustaining cooperation need to
maintain their support for the government even after the agreement is in place.
This, in turn, can be necessary for the government to have an interest in signing the
agreement in the first place. While strong enforcement mechanisms may facilitate
the international feasibility of agreements – by ensuring compliance by all sides –
they can undermine their domestic feasibility. Thus, domestic and international
enforcement mechanisms cannot substitute for each other.
This argument has a number of implications. First, a lack of formal enforcement
mechanisms need not be evidence of a government’s intention not to comply with
the agreement (Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, 1996). Instead, such an agreement may
reflect a government’s unwillingness to surrender an issue that it could leverage for
domestic political gain. This logic also helps to connect and explain two empirical
findings. More than half of agreements with an underlying commitment problem,
in which case an agreement should tie a government’s hands, also feature an
escape clause, which allows governments to abrogate their obligations.1 Similarly,
governments sometimes fail to pursue policies that are perceived to be in their
partisan interests – such as economically conservative parties that fail to lock in
1Data are from the Continent of International Law project (Koremenos, 2013b, 2015).
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restrictive monetary policies through exchange rate pegs (Steinberg and Walter,
2012) or that fail to lock in property rights protection through bilateral investment
treaties (Allee and Peinhardt, 2010). The argument shows that both of these patterns
may be traced to similar domestic concerns.
Second, the possibility for governments to defect from an agreement becomes
important to sustain a political equilibrium. However, and in contrast to previous
arguments, this possibility becomes a necessity not only because of the presence
of groups opposed to cooperation, but also because of the presence of groups
supporting cooperation. This has ironic consequences in agreements based on issue
linkage or reciprocal concessions. In such agreements, domestic groups benefit from
compliance with the agreement’s terms by the foreign government. These domestic
groups are therefore willing to support their own government’s compliance. This is
the case in trade agreements, for instance, where interest groups with an interest
in maintaining free trade policies of their trading partners have incentives to
support their own government’s free trade policies. Under these conditions, a
foreign government that is fully committed to maintaining the agreement terms
is an unattractive partner for the home government: knowing that the foreign
government will never violate the agreement terms, the pro-cooperation group can
cease to support cooperation by its own government. It is the possibility for the
foreign government to violate the agreement, and the need for the home government
to prevent such a violation through, for instance, the threat of reciprocal retaliation,
that makes an international agreement attractive to governments. The result adds to
recent arguments, which show that cooperation is difficult to sustain in agreements
when one government is unilaterally committed to free trade (Gray, Lindstaedt and
Slapin, 2011; Chaudoin and Urpelainen, 2015).
The next section outlines a formal model. I show how an international
agreement, by mobilizing domestic interest groups, can move a government’s policy
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choice. I then derive conditions under which locking in policy reforms through an
international agreement can be politically unattractive to a government, whereas a
weak agreement without enforcement is attractive. The last section concludes.
V.1 Policy-making unilaterally and internationally
The model comprises a government, g, and two interest groups, a and b. The
game has two time periods, t ∈ {1,2}. The government can set some policy, xt, on
which its preferred policy choice is xg > 0, and it benefits from contributions made
by the two interest groups. In the first period, the government decides whether to
set policy unilaterally or within an international agreement. The interest groups
then offer contributions to potentially influence the government’s policy choice,
and given these contribution schedules, the government sets the policy x1.2 In the
second period, both interest groups can again choose contribution schedules and
the government may again choose where to set the policy x2. The government’s
choice of x2 is restricted with an international agreement in place; the government
can set x2 freely if policy is set unilaterally in the first period.
The policy xt could be an economic policy such as tariffs, or it could represent
a policy such as environmental regulation. The government may care about
this policy intrinsically, because it has an agenda of its own. Alternatively, the
government may take into account the preferences of core constituencies or the
electorate as a whole. Likewise, the government may benefit from contributions
because it values discretionary spending or even corruption; it may benefit from
contributions because these can be used for electoral campaigns; or contributions
take the form of political support more abstractly defined. For the following, which
of these interpretations is chosen is inconsequential.
2This modeling choice follows, in particular, Grossman and Helpman (1994).
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The government values policy relative to contributions with γg > 0,3 such that
the government’s per-period utility from policy choice xt in period t can be written
as
ut,g(xt) = −γg(xt − xg)2 +Ct,a(xt) +Ct,b(xt), (5.1)
where Ct,i(x) ≥ 0 for i ∈ {a,b} are the contributions made by interest group i in
period t and contributions are possibly a function of the policy choice xt. Since
γg determines the value of policy relative to contributions, the term −γg(xt − xg)2
captures the government’s policy preference net of contributions. I assume that
across time policy preferences are non-fungible, such that in the first period the
government fully discounts any utility it receives from the policy choice in the
second period. Relaxing this assumption would be a relatively straightforward
extension.
The government also chooses whether to set policy unilaterally or through an
international agreement with a foreign government. This choice is denoted by ζ,
where
ζ =
 0 if policy is set unilaterally;1 if policy is set internationally. (5.2)
If policy is set unilaterally, the government sets xt without concern for the
policy choices xft by the foreign government. Conversely, the foreign government’s
policy xft is independent of the domestic policy xt. By contrast, if the government
sets policy through an international agreement, for cooperation to occur the two
governments must mutually adjust their policies (Keohane, 1984). Such mutual
adjustment implies that the foreign government’s policy xft now is a function of the
domestic policy xt. Instead of modeling explicitly this negotiation stage, I assume
that, in order to achieve a higher value xft on the foreign government’s policy, the
3For γg = 0, the government has no policy preferences of its own and only cares about
contributions. Then, the government essentially becomes a ‘clearing house’ of lobbying interests, a
view of policy-making championed by Becker (1983).
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domestic government has to provide a higher level xt on its own policy. For instance,
if the two governments are negotiating over a trade agreement, higher values of
xt and x
f
t would imply lower tariffs in both countries. Similarly, in negotiations
over an environmental agreement, higher values of xt and x
f
t would imply stricter
regulations. Specifically, I assume that in a negotiated agreement the foreign policy
moves with the domestic policy, whereas under unilateral policy-making the foreign
policy is constant, such that
x
f
t (xt) =
 x
f if ζ = 0;
xt if ζ = 1.
(5.3)
In the following I label interest group a the anti-cooperation group and group b
the pro-cooperation group. Interest group a is concerned about the domestic policy
choice, xt, and can offer contributions to the government in exchange. Hence, its
utility function in each period is given by
ua(xt) = −γa(xt − xa)2 −Ct,a(xt). (5.4)
Interest group b has no immediate concern for its own government’s policy
choice xt, but it may be concerned with the foreign government’s policy choice,
x
f
t . For instance, suppose xt is a tariff. If interest group a is an import-competing
firm or industry, it prefers higher tariffs on its own products, which here would be
reflected by lower values of xt. Group b then could be an exporting firm that prefers
lower tariffs imposed by the foreign government. However, absent an international
agreement that negotiates and reciprocally adjusts tariffs, group b is not directly
concerned with its own government’s tariff policy xt.
Alternatively, suppose xt is an environmental policy concerned with regulating
the discharge of pollutants into a river crossing two countries. Interest group
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a may be a polluting industry that is concerned with maintaining low levels of
regulation. By contrast, b could represent an environmental interest group. Absent
international cooperation, interest group b recognizes that a unilateral change in
domestic regulation would have little effect on pollution levels, and hence it has no
interest in affecting xt absent a concomitant change in x
f
t .
4 In sum, in each period,
b’s utility function is given by
ub(xt) = −γb(xft (xt)− xb)2 −Ct,b(xt). (5.5)
For both groups, γi can be interpreted as the ease with which contributions can
be made or, conversely, as the intensity of their policy preferences. For most of the
following, I will assume that γa = γb = γ in order to abstract from differences in
group characteristics, which are not of central concern here. For future reference,
define α = γ/γg , which is the preference intensity of interest groups relative to the
government. Some of the results in the following can be expressed as a function of α.
Moreover, as was the case with the government, I assume that policy preferences are
non-fungible across time. Finally, given the previous definitions, and given group
a’s status as anti-cooperation group, let its ideal point be xa = 0. For analogous
reasons, let xb = 1. None of the following results depend on these two assumptions,
but they simplify the exposition and notation. I will call a policy more ‘progressive’
the larger is the value of xt.5
In the following, I restrict attention to subgame perfect equilibria. I present
the equilibrium policies under unilateral policy-making and when policy is set
through an international agreement. I then discuss the government’s decision over
4The difference between pro-cooperation groups that are concerned with the foreign government’s
policy choice and the domestic policy choice may be important for some aspects of international
cooperation (Chaudoin and Urpelainen, 2015); I abstract from this difference in the following.
5The government’s preferred policy xg may be outside the interest groups’ preferences. In
particular, for xg > 1, the government prefers a policy that is more progressive than what either
interest group prefers.
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whether to set policy unilaterally or through an international agreement, and how
the ability of an agreement to lock in policy impacts this decision.
V.1.1 Unilateral policy-making
Under unilateral policy-making, the government cannot affect the foreign
government’s policy choice. For instance, if trade policy is set unilaterally, a
government cannot influence a foreign government’s tariffs in a way that would
matter for its own tariff regime. To be sure, a government could force a change
in tariffs onto foreign governments, such as in European mercantilism during
the 17th century or through the threat of sanctions, but this would not affect the
government’s choice for its own tariff. As a consequence, with unilateral policy-
making, the government essentially faces only one interest group, a. The other
interest group, b, has nothing to gain from making contributions, since changing
the government’s choice with respect to the domestic policy xt does not affect its
utility.
With unilateral policy-making, the government can freely set policy in each
period, and any choices it makes in the first period do not affect its later policy
options. Since the model abstracts from changes to the government’s or the interest
groups’ utility functions over time, the government faces the same choice in each
period. The following therefore omits time subscripts to ease notation. If such
changes over time were incorporated, of course, the government would obtain an
additional reason to refrain from policy commitments. Omitting any such changes
allows to isolate the present argument. For the role of uncertainty and the attendant
incentives to create more flexible agreements, see, for instance, Koremenos (2001)
and Rosendorff (2005).
To derive the equilibrium policies and contributions, note that the government
can always decline any contributions and secure a payoff of zero by setting x = xg .
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It follows that the anti-cooperation group needs to offer contributions that match
this payoff. From equation (5.1) this implies that a needs to provide contributions
of at least
Ca(x) ≥ γg(x − xg)2. (5.6)
In equilibrium, a will never make more contributions than necessary, such that
condition (5.6) holds with equality.6 Substituting this expression into equation (5.4)
yields for group a’s utility
ua(x) = −γa(x − xa)2 −γg(x − xg)2. (5.7)
The equilibrium policy under unilateral policy-making, xˆ, then is determined as
xˆ = argmaxx{−γa(x − xa)2 −γg(x − xg)2}. (5.8)
Solving yields the equilibrium policy and, after substituting the resulting expression
into condition (5.6), the equilibrium amount of contributions by group a as
described in the following proposition.
6It is straightforward to verify that interest group a is always better offmaking contributions and
influencing policy than declining to make contributions and obtaining xg as policy.
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Proposition 5.1 (Unilateral policy-making). Under unilateral policy-making, the
policy and contributions in each period are given by
xˆt =
γa
γa +γg
xa +
γg
γa +γg
xg ≡ xˆ, (5.9)
Cˆt,a =
γgγ
2
a
(γa +γg)2
(
xg − xa
)2 ≡ Cˆa, (5.10)
Cˆt,b = 0 ≡ Cˆb. (5.11)
Proposition 5.1 shows that policy will be a weighted average of the ideal points
of interest group a and the government g, where the weights are determined by
their emphasis on policy relative to contributions. Interest group b does not enter
any of these calculations, since interest group b’s preferences do not depend on the
domestic policy choice. Consequently, b does not make any contributions.
Since xa < xg , the equilibrium policy under unilateral policy-making is always to
the left of the government’s policy ideal point and therefore less progressive than if
no interest groups were present. Put differently, the anti-cooperation a biases policy.
This dynamic is, of course, familiar from models of the political economy of trade
(Grossman and Helpman, 1994): import-competing, protectionist interest groups
bias policy towards higher tariffs (here represented by lower levels of xt). Moreover,
the more the government values contributions relative to policy (the lower is γg),
which possibly is a function of institutional characteristics (Nielson, 2003), the
larger this bias will be and the more protectionist trade policies arise. The following
section, which considers policy-making with an international agreement, shows
how this can change in the presence of an international agreement.
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V.1.2 Policy-making with an international agreement
If the government sets policy in an international agreement it can negotiate
a change in the foreign government’s policy xft , which affects group b’s utility.
This possibility, in turn, invites lobbying by group b. As shown in the following,
the presence of an international agreement, by changing the domestic political
dynamics, thus changes a government’s domestic policy choices.
Suppose the international agreement locks in the policies x1 and x
f
1 after the
first round.7 The literature advances several mechanism of enforcement to lock
in policies. For instance, governments may suffer large, essentially automatic
reputational costs for reneging on international commitments (see, e.g., Tomz
2007; Guzman 2008). Similarly, and relatedly, an influential literature draws on
the concept of ‘audience costs’ to suggest that in particular democratic leaders
pay large costs for not following through on promises (Fearon, 1994), which in
turn has been argued to help enforce international agreements (Simmons, 2010).
Just as prominently feature institutional mechanisms, such as dispute settlement
bodies (Lacarte-Muró and Gappah, 2000), which in turn can impose sanctions
or reputational costs (Brewster, 2013), and punishment or sanctioning strategies
(Thompson, 2010).
If the policy is locked in externally, in the second period the policy cannot be
moved in either direction but is fixed at x1. In the first period, the government’s
utility function over both time periods is therefore given by8
ug(x1) = −γg(x1 − xg)2 +C1,a(x1) +C1,b(x1) +C2,a(x1) +C2,b(x1), (5.12)
7If this were to be modeled explicitly, it would be sufficient to assume that setting a policy x2 , x1
in the second period results in a sufficiently large cost to the government.
8Recall that, at the start of the first period, both the government and the interest groups fully
discount the utility from policy in the second period.
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and similarly for both interest groups:
ua(x1) = −γa(x1 − xa)2 −C1,a(x1)−C2,a(x1), (5.13)
ub(x1) = −γb(x1 − xb)2 −C1,b(x1)−C2,b(x1). (5.14)
To find the equilibrium policies and contributions in the presence of two
interest groups, I follow the standard approach and, in addition to equilibria
that are subgame perfect, restrict attention to truthful contribution schedules.9 The
equilibrium policy and contributions are determined as described in the following
proposition and, together with all other results, derived in the appendix.
Proposition 5.2 (Agreement with commitment). If policy is set in an international
agreement and the policy is locked in, the policy and contributions in each period are
given by
x˜ =
γg
γa +γb +γg
xg +
γa
γa +γb +γg
xa +
γb
γa +γb +γg
xb, (5.15)
C˜1,a = γg
[
(x˜ − xg)2 − (x˜b − xg)2
]
+γb
[
(x˜ − xb)2 − (x˜b − xb)2
]
, (5.16)
C˜1,b = γg
[
(x˜ − xg)2 − (x˜a − xg)2
]
+γa
[
(x˜ − xa)2 − (x˜a − xa)2
]
, (5.17)
C˜2,a = C˜2,b = 0, (5.18)
where x˜a and x˜b are defined in the appendix and are the policy implemented if only
interest group a and b, respectively, provides contributions to the government.
The policy defined in equation (5.15) takes into account group b’s interests,
which sets it apart from the policy under unilateral policy-making described in
equation (5.9). Larger values of the equilibrium policy x˜ imply policy that is further
9See, e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1994); Acemoglu and Robinson (2006); Gehlbach (2006).
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away from group a’s ideal point and, moreover, a policy that moves further beyond
the policy under unilateral policy-making, xˆ. As such, larger values of x˜ can be
interpreted as deeper cooperation in the sense of Downs, Rocke and Barsoom (1996).
Conversely, lower values of x˜ would be tantamount to more shallow agreements.
Since xb > xa, taking into account group b’s interests should result in policies
that are more progressive than the unilateral policy. Indeed, this is not only a
reasonable property of x˜ relative to xˆ, but the requirement that x˜ should exceed xˆ
could be interpreted as an international participation constraint: if the condition
fails, the policy in an international agreement would fall behind the policy set
in the unilateral case, and as such the foreign government would have had little
reason to participate in an agreement that requires it to make policy adjustments of
its own. The most shallow, feasible agreement, then, would be one that results in
x˜ = xˆ: an agreement that fails to move beyond what the government would do in the
unilateral case. Some argue that such agreements are quite frequent, because they
will be easy to implement (Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, 1996); at the same time,
of course, such agreements will have no consequences for changing state behavior
relative to the absence of an agreement.
Yet, such agreements are hard to come by in the context here.10 A sufficient
condition for x˜ to move beyond xˆ is that the government’s ideal point xg is in-
between the ideal points of the anti-cooperation and the pro-cooperation groups –
or, put differently, that the interest groups have positions that are more extreme
than the government’s position. The following lemma describes the condition more
generally.
10Indeed, as will be shown later, such an agreement can never make the government better off
than unilateral policy-making.
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Lemma 1 (International participation constraint). The policy negotiated in an
international agreement is more progressive than the unilateral policy whenever
xg ≤ 1 +α. (5.19)
When the condition fails, the agreement’s equilibrium policy would fall behind the
equilibrium policy under unilateral policy-making.
Since α > 0, as long as the government is not more progressive than both
interest groups, the policy set in an agreement is more progressive than the policy
set in the unilateral case, due to the influence of the pro-cooperation group’s
lobbying. Conversely, when the condition fails, the government is sufficiently
more progressive than both interest groups that the additional lobbying by the
pro-cooperation group will actually make it more difficult for the government to
pull policy towards its own desired level.
Another feature of the equilibrium policy x˜ is that its relationship to γg , the
government’s emphasis on policy relative to contributions, may be reversed relative
to unilateral policy-making. Under unilateral policy-making, larger values of γg
always imply more progressive policies, that is, higher values of xˆ. As noted, this
attribute mirrors prominent results in the literature on, for instance, trade politics.
Governments that pay more attention to interest group support, relative to policies,
are typically argued to pursue more protectionist trade policies in order to cater to
import-competing firms. At least since Rogowski (1987), electoral institutions have
been found to be a key determinant of the willingness to substitute contributions
for policy.11 With an international agreement, the relationship between domestic
institutions and policy outcomes can be reversed, since now an increase in γg no
11For similar examples, see also Nielson (2003); McGillivray (2004); Grossman and Helpman
(2005); Ehrlich (2007).
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longer necessarily translates into an increase in the policy, as described in the
following lemma.
Lemma 2 (Reversing the effect of γg). The policy negotiated in an international
agreement is more progressive when γg decreases when
xg ≤ 12 . (5.20)
Under this condition, an increase in the government’s emphasis on contributions relative
to policy results in more progressive policies x˜, which reverses the relationship between
γg and xˆ under unilateral policy-making.
Put differently, institutions that induce governments to value contributions
over policy may result in lower tariffs, rather than higher tariffs, a result that
mirrors the outcome in Chapter II. The result also squares with Dai (2006), who
shows that domestic institutions may affect the responsiveness of governments to
interest groups, but that the effect of institutions on compliance is contingent on
the preferences of those interest groups. The result further may help explain why
the literature on electoral institutions and trade produced such ambiguous results.
Electoral institutions that benefit interest groups not only benefit protectionist
interest groups; in the context of reciprocal trade agreements, which invite lobbying
by exporters, they also benefit interest groups that support free trade policies
domestically in exchange for market access abroad. As a consequence, the link
between electoral institutions and average tariff rates breaks down. The result
further demonstrates a specific effect of international institutions: they can reverse
the effects of domestic institutions on policy outcomes compared to policy-making
under autarky, a point emphasized by West and Lee (2014).
While the international agreement will, in general, shift policy towards higher
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levels, it also has an effect on the lobbying contributions. Most notably, the pro-
cooperation group now makes positive contribution as well, because it has a stake
in the issue. This, in turn, induces a change in the contributions by the anti-
cooperation group. It no longer has to simply compensate the government for
moving policy away from its desired level xg . With the pro-cooperation group in
the game, the government gained a new outside option: instead of implementing its
own policy xg , the government has the option of accepting contributions from the
pro-cooperation only and foregoing any contributions from the anti-cooperation
group. This effect is reflected in equation (5.16). The first term in square brackets
arises from the government’s policy preference; the second term in square brackets
stems from the government’s opportunity cost of accepting a’s contributions, which
in turn is linked to the second interest group’s policy preferences. Indirectly, the
anti-cooperation group needs to take into account the pro-cooperation group’s
utility, for which it has to compensate the government.
The additional lobbying contributions by the pro-cooperation group can be
particularly costly for the anti-cooperation group: despite and in addition to policy
being moved away from its own preferred policy, it now may have to provide higher
contributions than in the unilateral case. Yet, without providing any contributions,
policy would be pulled even further away from its ideal point xa, and hence the
group has no choice but to increase its contributions. The following lemma describes
under what circumstances contributions by the anti-cooperation group increase,
relative to unilateral policy-making.
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Lemma 3 (Contributions by the anti-cooperation group). The equilibrium contribu-
tions by the anti-cooperation group a increase under an international agreement, relative
to unilateral policy-making, if
(
x˜ − xg
)2
+α (x˜ − xb)2 ≥
(
x˜b − xg
)2
+α (x˜b − xb)2 + 2
(
xˆ − xg
)2
, (5.21)
which is the unshaded area graphed in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1. displays condition (5.21) and shows where interest group a’s
contributions increase relative to the unilateral case in relationship to α and xg . In
the unshaded area, interest group a makes higher contributions in the presence of
an international agreement than under unilateral policy-making, yet it receives a
policy further away from its ideal point. In the shaded region, contributions from
group a are lower with an international agreement than in the unilateral case. The
triangular area beneath the dotted line shows the region where the international
participation constraint, given by condition (5.19), fails. This leaves an area above
the dashed line where an international agreement would both be feasible (because
condition (5.19) holds) and group a would be able to reduce its contributions to the
government; however, in this area group a would still obtain a policy that is worse
than what it would obtain under unilateral policy-making.
One interpretation of these results is that international agreements not only may
move policy away from the unilateral equilibrium. They also reinforce domestic
political conflict over issues by pitching interest groups against each other, which
in turn drives up campaign expenditures, lobbying contributions, or political
support activities by the affected interest groups. This result squares well with a
recent literature that emphasizes how international agreements can cause domestic
contestation (see, e.g., Chaudoin 2014b). In contrast to this literature, however, the
contestation of the agreement is not about compliance once the agreement is formed,
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Figure 5.1.: Comparison of anti-cooperation group’s equilibrium contributions:
Comparison of equilibrium contributions by interest group a as a function of
government ideal point, xg , and relative preference intensity, α = γ/γg , for
unilateral policy and under an international agreement. To the left of the solid line,
in the unshaded area, contributions under an international agreement exceed the
contributions under unilateral policy-making. In the shaded area, to the right of the
solid line, contributions under unilateral policy-making exceed contributions under
an agreement. The dashed line in the lower right corner denotes the international
participation constraint defined in condition (5.19): in the area under the dashed
line, the policy under an international agreement would fall behind the unilateral
policy (x˜ < xˆ), which renders an international agreement infeasible. Thus, in the
unshaded area, interest group a makes higher contributions and receives a policy
further away from its ideal point than under unilateral policy-making; in the shaded
area above the dashed line, the interest group makes lower contribution in the
presence of an agreement but also receives a policy further away from its ideal
point.
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but it occurs at the time the agreement is negotiated. Moreover, the following
discussion will highlight two important aspects of this contestation. First, if the
agreement locks in the policy, contestation will only occur during the negotiation,
but not once the agreement is in place. This effect, in turn, disadvantages the
government. Second, this contestation can make international agreements attractive
to governments, because they can extract more contributions from interest groups
that are in competition with each other.
V.1.3 Unilateral vs international agreement
For the government, the contributions and policies described in Propositions
5.1 and 5.2 matter for its decision of whether to set policy unilaterally or through
an international agreement. The international agreement invites lobbying by the
pro-cooperation interest group, which has two effects. First, under the condition in
equation (5.19), this additional lobbying moves the equilibrium policy upwards,
which can benefit the government in terms of its own policy preferences (net of
contributions), as described in the following lemma.
Lemma 4 (Policy preferences of the government). The equilibrium policy under an
international agreement is closer to the government’s ideal point than the equilibrium
policy under unilateral policy-making if
α(α + 1)
α2 + 4α + 2
< xg <
α + 1
α
, (5.22)
which is the unshaded area graphed in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2. graphs this condition and shows under what circumstances the
government is better offwith the policy under an international agreement than with
the unilateral policy in terms of its policy preferences and net of any contributions.
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As the Figure shows, the government only prefers the unilateral policy when its
ideal point is close to that of the anti-cooperation group, a, or when its ideal point
is far beyond even the pro-cooperation group’s ideal point. Under a wide range
of circumstances, the government is better off with an international agreement in
terms of its policy preferences. Even for very large values of α, the government
prefers the policy from an international agreement when its ideal point is closely
aligned with that of the pro-cooperation group.
The result is consistent with common arguments of why governments look
to international institutions (Keohane, 1984). The reason why an international
agreement is able to affect policy choices is not because it enforces or implements
international norms. Instead, the agreement changes the environment in
which domestic political decisions are made. With the agreement, domestic
pro-cooperation groups have an incentive – and, indeed, an ability – to ask
for adjustments of domestic policies that turn into reciprocal concessions by
negotiating partners, which benefits the domestic group in turn. In this sense,
international agreements indeed enable governments to obtain more preferred
policies. Returning to the case of trade policies, a large literature argues that
the executive often has preferences that are relatively supportive of free trade
(Nielson, 2003). If the anti-cooperation group a represents an import-competing,
protectionist interest group, then the additional lobbying by the pro-cooperation
interest group b can move policy towards a policy that is more in line with the
executive’s preferences. Thus, at least in terms of its policy preferences, the
government gains from inviting the additional lobbying by interest group b, which
in turn can make an international agreement attractive to the government.12
12It is worth emphasizing that the change in the equilibrium policy does not arise because the
government uses an international agreement as ‘political cover,’ as has been argued to be the case
with territorial disputes (Huth, Croco and Appel, 2011). Instead, the agreement activates a second
interest group, which upsets the existing political equilibrium under unilateral policy-making.
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Figure 5.2.: Government’s policy preferences: Comparison of government payoff
from policy, net of contributions, as a function of government ideal point, xg , and
relative preference intensity, α = γ/γg . In the shaded area, the government prefers
the unilateral policy to the policy under an international agreement, leaving aside
changes in contributions. In the unshaded area, the government is better off with
the international agreement in terms of its policy preferences: in the unshaded area,
−γg(x˜ − xg)2 > −γg(xˆ − xg)2, where xˆ and x˜ are defined in Propositions 5.1 and 5.2
and define the policy when set unilaterally and under an international agreement,
respectively.
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The second effect of the additional lobbying is that the government now may
receive higher total contributions from the two interest groups in the first period.
The two interest groups are caught in an equilibrium that requires them to spend
more than if only one of them was present. This clearly hurts the anti-cooperation
interest group relative to the case of unilateral policy-making: not only is policy
pulled away from its preferred outcome, but the interest group now is forced to
spend relatively more to prevent policy from being pulled away even further.13
This additional lobbying can make the government better off with an interna-
tional agreement than without one, even if the resulting policy is further away
from the government’s ideal point than what would have been obtained with uni-
lateral policy-making. The following lemma describes the conditions under which
the government chooses to set policy in an international agreement, rather than
unilaterally.
Lemma 5 (Unilateral policy-making versus commitment). The government chooses
an international agreement that locks in xt if
xg <
1 + a+
√
1 + 5a+ 8a2 + 4a3
3 + 4a
, (5.23)
which is the unshaded area graphed in Figure 5.3.
Condition (5.23) is depicted in Figure 5.3. In the unshaded area in Figure 5.3.,
the government is better off with the international agreement; in the shaded area,
the government is better off with the unilateral policy. Note that the international
participation constraint, defined in condition (5.19) and in Figure 5.3. indicated by
the dashed line in the lower right corner, never binds: when the constraint would
13As an instructive case, consider the symmetric case where xg =
1
2 (xa + xb). Then, for γa = γb, the
equilibrium policy would be the same as if no interest group at all was present. Yet, in order to
prevent policy from being pulled in either direction, each group has to provide positive contributions
to the government, a result familiar from Grossman and Helpman (1994).
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bind, the government would strictly prefer unilateral policy-making anyways.
Hence, shallow agreements, which would not affect a government’s policy choice
compared to unilateral policy-making, can never arise; any negotiated agreement
must effectively move the equilibrium policy away from the policy under unilateral
policy-making.
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Figure 5.3.: Government’s utility from unilateral policy-making and international
agreement: In the unshaded area, the government prefers an international
agreement to unilateral policy-making, taking into account both the change in
policy and the change in contributions. In the shaded area, the government prefers
the discretion under unilateral policy to an international agreement. The dashed
line in the lower right corner denotes the international participation constraint
defined in condition (5.19). In the area under the dashed line, the policy under
an international agreement would fall behind the unilateral policy (x˜ < xˆ), which
renders an international agreement infeasible. In the area to the left of the dotted
line, the government prefers the policy under unilateral policy-making to the
policy under an international agreement, but the increase in contributions under
an agreement more than compensates for this loss.
Comparing Figure 5.3. to Figure 5.2. shows that under some circumstances, the
government is better off with an international agreement despite a deterioration of
the policy from the government’s perspective. In the unshaded area to the left of
the upward-sloping dotted line, the government prefers the policy under unilateral
policy-making to the policy under an international agreement. In this case, the pro-
cooperation group is sufficiently progressive that its involvement in the political
bargaining shifts policy away from the government’s preferred policy. At the same
time, its involvement more than compensates the government for this deterioration
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through the increase in contributions from both interest groups.
One attribute that stands out in Figure 5.3. is the wide range of cases in which
the government prefers retaining policy discretion over an international agreement
that locks in the policy. For small to moderately large values of α, the government
prefers policy discretion even when its own ideal point is in-between the ideal points
of the two interest groups. Most notably, Figure 5.3. shows that the government
prefers unilateral policy-making when its own interests align with that of the
pro-cooperation group, even though in this case the government would be able to
obtain a policy close to its own ideal point when setting policy in an international
agreement. Hence, an international agreement is particularly unattractive for a
government when its own interests are similar to that of an interest group that
benefits from the international agreement.
One reason for this result is that, if the government sets policy through an
international agreement, it locks in the policy and as a consequence renders
lobbying by the two interest groups unnecessary in the future. This benefits the
two interest groups, as they will no longer have to make contributions that, in
the extreme case, offset each other completely. To the extent that lobbying tends
to be less productive than other activities (Bhagwati, 1982), this may be viewed
as an attractive feature of international agreements. Essentially, an international
agreement, by taking an issue off the table, solves a commitment problem among
interest groups. (Notably, however, this benefit comes only after a period of
heightened conflict among interest groups over where to set policy.) They can
now refrain from making any contributions. For a government, this is a problematic
turn: while the policy is now locked in, maybe even in a place preferred by the
government, the government also foregoes any contributions in the future, which
in turn reduces the attractiveness of a commitment.
To further underscore how this result is caused by the agreement’s attribute
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of locking in policy, consider an agreement that fails to lock in policy. As before,
an agreement allows governments to mutually adjust policies. But the agreement
provides no mechanism to lock in policies or to enforce the negotiated policies.
Then, each government could, at any time, re-adjust its policies and, by way of
reciprocal punishments, respond to adjustments by its partner with adjustments
of its own. This possibility, in turn, requires pro-cooperation groups to maintain
support for their own government, since otherwise cooperation would cease. For
instance, in the case of a trade agreement, a government may respond to a violation
of an agreement by its trading partner by a violation of its own, such as by raising
tariffs. Anticipating this, pro-cooperation groups in the partner country will lobby
against trade violations. Such a dynamic unfolded over the steel tariffs imposed
by United States President George W. Bush. The European Commission quickly
threatened to retaliate with protectionist measures of its own, targeting politically
relevant export industries in the United States – most prominently, oranges from
Florida. Not only was the governor of Florida at the time the brother of President
George W. Bush, Florida also was a key state in the upcoming midterm elections. As
an observer put it, “[the Europeans] are trying to retaliate where they think they can
get the maximum amount of political leverage” (Chicago Tribune, April 5, 2002).
It did not take long until the United States administration gave in to the political
pressure from these key interest groups. This instance provides an example of
how pro-cooperation groups offset political pressure from anti-cooperation groups,
and how the possibility to adjust policies allowed governments to extract political
support. More generally, the following proposition describes the equilibrium policy
and contributions with an agreement that fails to lock in policies.
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Proposition 5.3 (Agreement without commitment). If policy is set in an
international agreement and the policy is not locked in, the policy and contributions
in each period are given by
x˜ =
γg
γa +γb +γg
xg +
γa
γa +γb +γg
xa +
γb
γa +γb +γg
xb, (5.24)
C˜a = γg
[
(x˜ − xg)2 − (x˜b − xg)2
]
+γb
[
(x˜ − xb)2 − (x˜b − xb)2
]
, (5.25)
C˜b = γg
[
(x˜ − xg)2 − (x˜a − xg)2
]
+γa
[
(x˜ − xa)2 − (x˜a − xa)2
]
, (5.26)
where x˜a and x˜b are defined in the appendix and are the policy implemented if only
interest group a and b, respectively, provide contributions to the government.
The proposition shows that the equilibrium policy remains the same as before: in
this specific example, the ability of an agreement to enforce policies does not affect
the depth of cooperation. However, contributions by the two interest groups now
have to be made in each period. This effect makes the agreement more attractive to
the government, which, in turn, can induce some types of government to negotiate
an international agreement rather than setting policy unilaterally.
Figure 5.3. shows several key results. First, the lightly shaded area depicts the
area where the government prefers unilateral policy-making over an international
agreement. As the Figure shows, this area is noticeably smaller than in the case of
an agreement that locks in policy. In fact, as long as the government’s ideal point
is located in-between the two interest groups (which could the case, for instance,
if the government internalizes some of the preferences of both interest groups, or
if the government’s ideal point represents the median voter and interest groups
are at the extremes of the electorate), an international agreement will always be
preferable to unilateral policy-making, regardless of the level of α.
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Second, the darker shaded area shows where an international agreement that
fails to lock in policy is chosen by the government over unilateral policy-making,
whereas unilateral policy-making is chosen over an agreement that locks in policy.
Thus, the darker shaded area shows where an agreement without commitment is
feasible domestically, whereas an agreement that locks in policy is not. Moreover,
this area covers those cases where the government’s ideal point is close to that of the
pro-cooperation group. Hence, when the government’s interests align with those of
the pro-cooperation group, the absence of enforcement mechanisms can be key to
the feasibility of international agreements – not because these agreements allow
governments to respond to new information or random shocks, but because they
don’t have to give up a previously salient issue. Put differently, if an agreement locks
in a policy, it can create a domestically driven cooperation problem for governments,
which in turn can make governments shy away from entering such agreements in
the first place.
With regard to trade agreements, this indicates that governments may have
difficulties switching from protectionist interest groups to exporters as their support
base if trade agreements were to lock in policies. Once other countries liberalize
their markets, exporters have little reason to continue supporting their government:
their own government can’t retract the foreign government’s decision to open its
market. By contrast, maintaining protectionist policies, and not entering a trade
agreement, would allow the government to continuously extract rents from import-
competing groups.
Pro-cooperation groups therefore would not be able to substitute for anti-
cooperation groups if it were not for other ways the government is needed in
applying and enforcing an agreement. On the one hand, this dynamic might explain
why trade policies tend to support protectionism, rather than free trade, or as Rodrik
(1997, p. 1476) put it, “there is no country [...] where the net effect of commercial
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policies is to expand rather than contract trade.” On the other hand, the argument
offers a domestic political rationale for why governments want to maintain some
form of involvement in international institutions. In the case of most trade
agreements, for instance, only governments can initiate trade disputes and thereby
challenge foreign trade barriers, which benefits domestic pro-cooperation groups.
The need for the government to participate in the enforcement of international
agreements through trade disputes, in turn, provides a rationale for pro-cooperation
groups to continue supporting the government through contributions.
This implies that calls for agreements with stronger, more credible, and
indeed automatic enforcement mechanisms can be problematic from the point
of view of governments, and agreements such designed may inhibit cooperation.
This contrasts with the predominant view in the literature, which suggests that
without strong enforcement mechanisms, attempts at cooperation may break down
during the negotiating phase, or even before that (Fearon, 1998). Thus, a lack of
enforcement is viewed as a prime obstacle to cooperation: because other states will
anticipate the temptation to defect from such an agreement, agreements without
enforcement are not viable. In the present argument, by contrast, international
agreements are unattractive to governments not because of a lack of enforcement,
but, when they are perfectly enforced, because of a lack of domestic political
incentives to enter such agreements. Indeed, the argument suggests that it is the
inability to commit and enforce agreements that makes them attractive to some
governments.
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Figure 5.4.: Locked in versus flexibility: Comparison of the government’s payoff
when setting policy unilaterally, through an international agreement that locks in
policy, or through an international agreement that lacks enforcement. The dashed
line in the lower right corner denotes the international participation constrain
defined in condition (5.19): in the area under the dashed line, the policy under
an international agreement would fall behind the unilateral policy (x˜ < xˆ), which
renders an international agreement infeasible. In the lightly shaded area, unilateral
policy-making is preferable to an international agreement that fails to lock in policy.
In the darker shaded area, an international agreement that fails to lock in policy
is chosen by the government over unilateral policy-making, but unilateral policy-
making is chosen over an agreement that locks in policy. In the unshaded area, the
government prefers an international agreement (regardless of whether it locks in
policy) to unilateral policy-making.
V.2 Conclusion
The same conditions that make international agreements attractive in the first
place – the existence of pro-cooperation groups that allow governments to move
policy in a desired direction – also make strong international agreements, which
lock in policies, unattractive. Conversely, international agreements that lack
external enforcement mechanisms, and thereby require the continued political
support from pro-cooperation groups, are attractive to governments not despite, but
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because of the presence of domestic groups supporting international cooperation.
As Donald Leon Blankenship, a United States industrialist, quipped in an interview
with the New York Times in 2009, “I’ve been around [...] long enough to know
that politicians don’t stay bought.” International agreements that effectively tie a
government’s hands ensure that politicians don’t need to be bought anymore once
the agreement is in place – which is attractive to interest groups, but problematic
for a government interested in collecting contributions. An agreement without the
ability to tie the government’s hands, on the other hand, ensures that lobbyists need
to keep buying politicians in the future as well. The chapter therefore suggests
an incompatibility between international and domestic enforcement mechanisms,
since the former render the latter redundant. By contrast, an agreement that fails to
lock in policy has (at least) two potential benefits to a government. By changing the
domestic political equilibrium, it allows moving policy away from the status quo,
and by reinforcing the domestic political struggle over policy choices, it increases
contributions from domestic interest groups.
An alternative interpretation for some of these results is that governments may
use international agreements to lock in their successors in office (see, e.g., Abbott
and Snidal 2000; Moravcsik 2000; Ginsburg 2005). This argument has been applied,
for instance, to propose that right-wing governments use international economic
agreements, such as bilateral investment treaties or trade agreements, to lock in
economic reforms and constrain potential left-wing successors. Most generally, as
Abbott and Snidal (2000, p. 439) put it, “a government less certain of its longevity
may seek to bind its successors through international legal commitments.” One
problem with this argument is that, if a government locks in the policy, it removes
the issue from the electoral agenda and hence gives up one reason to be elected
by supporters. For instance, constituents of right-wing parties no longer have
to support a specific party in government to obtain the desired policy once it is
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locked in credibly through an international agreement. Consequently, a right-wing
party in government faces a trade-off between implementing its policy preferences,
which an agreement will allow it to do, and securing political support in the future,
which an agreement may frustrate. Of course, if the government is certain to lose
office, the latter concern becomes obsolete; but if there is a chance to maintain
office, it may become the more relevant. In this case, it becomes unattractive for
governments to tie their and their successors’ hands, despite the match between an
agreement’s goals and their own policy preferences.14
The argument presented in this chapter makes a number of simplifying
assumptions which result in rather strong results – most notably, that an agreement
with commitment can never be more attractive to a government than an agreement
without commitment. Yet, there are a number of reasons why governments might
prefer agreements with commitment. For instance, if the government expects a
change in preferences in the future – either on its own part or of its domestic
interest groups – locking in a policy might become attractive. Even in this case,
however, the central tenet of the argument in this chapter would remain: locking
in a policy and tying its own hands would undermine the government’s ability to
obtain the support of interest groups in the future on that particular issue, which
would work against any gains from a commitment.
It would also be worthwhile to model more explicitly the dynamics of policy-
making over time, in particular with interest groups that are constrained in
their resources. In the present model, interest groups can promise contributions
in accordance with their marginal benefit from a policy change, but there are
no limitations on the amount of these contributions. This can clearly become
a problematic assumption, especially in the context of trade policies. Import-
competing firms that lose market shares and profits as a consequence of a reduction
14See Betz (2014) for a model that considers these trade-offs with two office-seeking parties in the
context of central bank independence.
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in tariffs negotiated in an international agreement may eventually be unable to
stay in business. This results in a reduction in protectionist pressures and the
potential for further trade liberalization, or what has been labelled the ‘juggernaut
effect’ (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2008). From the unilateral perspective, this
is a straightforward effect of trade liberalization. It becomes more complicated,
however, once the relationship between two governments is considered: because
there are fewer pressures in the foreign country to raise trade barriers, the pro-
cooperation group again loses incentives to support compliance by the domestic
government – the foreign government no longer can credibly threaten to move
tariffs upwards, which makes compliance by the home government obsolete. This,
of course, further compounds the negative effects on the home government of
losing any contributions from the anti-cooperation group that left the (political and
economic) market.
Finally, agreements typically don’t lock in policies at fixed points, but set
bounds on a government’s policy choices.15 For instance, in many environmental
agreements, governments commit to reduce the emission of pollutants to a certain
upper bound, but are free to produce fewer pollutants than agreed to. In most trade
agreements, governments commit to upper bounds on their tariffs, but governments
are again free to set tariffs lower than these bounds. An extension of the model
in this paper would be worthwhile to acknowledge this fact. Then, under some
circumstances, governments can continue to gain support from anti-cooperation
groups in order to prevent a further change in policy away from their ideal point.
For instance, in environmental agreements, pollutant industries will try to prevent
regulations that are stricter than what international standards suggest, and in
trade agreements, protectionist firms will try to prevent a further erosion of tariff
barriers. This effect can create incentives for governments to implement agreements
15See Amador and Bagwell (2013) for a discussion of policy-making under delegation, where
policies are capped by bounds.
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that are relatively shallow, because they then can credibly threaten domestic anti-
cooperation groups to unilaterally change their policies to a level beyond their
international obligations. By contrast, this effect disappears if an international
agreement could commit governments to not surpass their international legal
obligations – that is, if the international agreement ruled out ‘overachievers’ and
‘frontrunners.’ Contrary to intuition, therefore, it is not the inability of governments
to relax their international obligations, but their ability to unilaterally surpass them,
which makes shallow agreements more attractive. This is potentially most relevant
for multilateral agreements, where governments often negotiate up to least common
denominator and leave it open to individual governments to be frontrunners who
move beyond the agreement’s terms.
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V.A Appendix
V.A.1 Agreement with full commitment
Solving backwards, note that neither interest group provides contributions to
the government in the second period: since the policy is fixed at x1 regardless of
the level of contributions, both groups are better off ceasing any contributions. At
the same time, when negotiating the agreement, the government needs to take into
account that the policy will be locked in, which in turn forces the interest groups to
take this into account. The government’s maximization problem in the first period
therefore is
max
x
{−γg(x − xg)2 +C1,a(x) +C1,b(x)}. (5.27)
The first-order condition yields
−2γg(x − xg) + ∂C1,a(x)∂x +
∂C1,b(x)
∂x
= 0. (5.28)
From the interest groups’ utility functions it follows that for i ∈ {a,b},
∂C1,i(x)
∂x
= −2γi(x − xi). (5.29)
Substituting this expression into the government’s first-order condition and
rearranging yields
x˜ =
γg
2γ +γg
xg +
γ
2γ +γg
xa +
γ
2γ +γg
xb, (5.30)
which is the expression in Proposition 5.2 after setting γa = γb,
To obtain the equilibrium contributions, and following the exposition in
Gehlbach (2013), note that the anti-cooperation group a needs to choose C1,a to
make the government indifferent between accepting its contribution and setting
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policy accordingly and to turning down a’s offer and accepting only b’s offer.
Moreover, the condition will hold with equality. Consequently, the equilibrium
contribution needs to satisfy
−γg(x˜ − xg)2 + C˜1,a +C1,b(x˜) = −γg(x˜b − xg)2 +C1,b(x˜b), (5.31)
where x˜i is the equilibrium policy set if only group i was lobbying (hence, note that
x˜a = xˆ). Rearranging terms, this implies that
C˜1,a = −[γg(x˜b − xg)2 −γg(x˜ − xg)2]︸                              ︷︷                              ︸
difference in policy payoff
+ C1,b(x˜b)−C1,b(x˜b)︸                ︷︷                ︸
difference in contributions
, (5.32)
which shows that interest group a now has to compensate the government for two
things: first, the difference in terms of its policy preferences relative to accepting b’s
offer exclusively; and, second, the difference in contributions relative to accepting
b’s offer exclusively. The second term further implies that interest group a must,
implicitly, compensate interest group b for its difference in policy payoff. To see
why, note that in equilibrium interest group b must be indifferent between x˜b and x˜,
which implies that
−γb(x˜b − xb)2 −C1,b(x˜b) = −γb(x˜ − xb)2 −C1,b(x˜), (5.33)
and hence
C1,b(x˜b)−C1,b(x˜) = −γb(x˜b − xb)2 +γb(x˜ − xb)2. (5.34)
Hence, the equilibrium contribution by group a is determined as
C˜1,a = γg
[
(x˜ − xg)2 − (x˜b − xg)2
]
+γb
[
(x˜ − xb)2 − (x˜b − xb)2
]
, (5.35)
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and analogous steps yield the equilibrium contribution by group b.
V.A.2 Agreement with no commitment
To derive Figure 5.1., first note that the contributions by group a are larger with
an international agreement than in the unilateral case if
ω ≡ γg
[
(x˜ − xg)2 − (x˜b − xg)2 − 2
(
xˆ − xg
)2]
+γb
[
(x˜ − xb)2 − (x˜b − xb)2
]
≥ 0. (5.36)
xg appears on the left-hand side up to the second power. It is easy to show that
the second derivative of the left-hand side with respect to xg is always negative. It
follows that ω describes an upside-down parabola. Consequently, for xg between
the two roots of ω, an international agreement elicits higher contributions from a
than policy that is set unilaterally. These roots are
x′g =
a+ a2 + a
√
2
√
1 + 5a+ 8a2 + 4a3
1 + 7a+ 8a2
,
x′′g =
a+ a2 − a√2√1 + 5a+ 8a2 + 4a3
1 + 7a+ 8a2
.
Note that x′g is strictly increasing in a while x′′g is strictly decreasing in a.
Because x′′g is strictly decreasing in a, it follows that x′′g is at most 0. It follows
that, because xg ≥ 0, only x′g is binding. Figure 5.1. graphs the equation for x′g
against a. For any given level of a, for xg ≤ x′g the contributions by group a under
unilateral policy-making are smaller than the contributions with an international
agreement.
For Figure 5.2., note that the government prefers the policy in an agreement, x˜,
to the unilateral policy, xˆ, net of contributions whenever
−γg
(
x˜ − xg
)2
> −γg
(
xˆ − xg
)2
. (5.37)
203
The condition holds under two sets of cirumstances:
γ
γ +γg
< xg <
γ +γg
γ
, (5.38)
or
γ(γ +γg)
γ2 + 4γγg + 2γ
2
g
< xg <
γ
γ +γg
. (5.39)
Note that these ranges always exist (i.e., the left bound within each line is smaller
than the right bound). It follows that the government prefers x˜ to xˆ if
γ(γ +γg)
γ2 + 4γγg + 2γ
2
g
< xg <
γ +γg
γ
. (5.40)
Using that α = γ/γg and dividing both nominator and denominator on the left-hand
side by γ2g and on the right-hand side by γg yields the expression in condition (5.22)
in the text.
For Figure 5.3. and the government’s decision over whether to use an
international agreement, note that the government prefers an agreement to
unilateralism whenever
−γg(x˜ − xg)2 + C˜1,a + C˜1,b ≥ γg(xˆ − xg)2. (5.41)
η, defined as
η ≡ −γg(x˜ − xg)2 + C˜1,a + C˜1,b −γg(xˆ − xg)2, (5.42)
describes an upside-down parabola (the second derivative with respect to xg is
strictly negative). Hence, condition (5.41) is satisfied for any xg within the two roots
of η. The roots, in turn, are given by
x′g =
1 + a−√1 + 5a+ 8a2 + 4a3
3 + 4a
, (5.43)
x′′g =
1 + a+
√
1 + 5a+ 8a2 + 4a3
3 + 4a
. (5.44)
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Since x′g is strictly negative, the only binding constraint comes from x′′g . Hence,
any xg < x′′g will satisfy condition (5.41). Figure 5.3. graphs x′′g in relation to α and
xg . Note also that, since α > 0, it follows that x′′g < 1 +α, such that whenever the
government prefers an international agreement over unilateral policy-making, the
international participation constraint will hold as well.
For the case of an agreement that fails to lock in policy, similar steps as before
allow deriving the equilibrium policy and contributions given in Proposition 5.3.
The government prefers an agreement to unilateralism whenever
−γg(x˜ − xg)2 + 2C˜1,a + 2C˜1,b ≥ γg(xˆ − xg)2. (5.45)
Similar steps as above show that this condition holds for
0 ≤ xg < 2a+ 2a
2 +
√
1 + 12a+ 51a2 + 100a3 + 92a4 + 32a5
1 + 8a+ 8a2
, (5.46)
which is graphed in Figure 5.4. in the main text. Note that, for α→ 0, the upper
bound approaches one, and that the upper bound is strictly increasing in α. Thus,
for all xg ∈ (0,1), i.e., whenever the government’s ideal point is contained within
the two interest group’s ideal points, the government prefers an international
agreement to unilateral policy-making.
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusion
This dissertation provided a number of new links between domestic and
international politics. It shows how international institutions can matter for
domestic politics. By encouraging political involvement of new interest groups,
they modify the relationship between domestic institutions and policy outcomes.
In the context of trade politics, the presence of international agreements mutes the
protectionist bias of narrow interest institutions in terms of average tariff rates and
creates more dispersion in tariff rates across products.
The dissertation further relates domestic institutions to differences in govern-
ment engagement with international institutions, which is shown at the example of
trade disputes. Institutions that increase the influence of narrow interest groups
are associated with substantially more trade dispute initiations. Concerns about the
unequal participation of developing and developed countries in the global trade
institutions have risen to one of the GATT/WTO’s most noted shortcomings, both
among policy-makers and among academics. Differences in participation rates
among countries of similar levels of development may, likewise, have substantial
consequences for interest groups and firms located in these countries. Finally, the
dissertation points out how domestic political concerns, and specifically the unwill-
ingness of governments to jettison politically salient issues, may undermine the
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ability of governments to rely on strong international institutions that lock in policy
choices – even if those agreements result in policies preferred by the government.
Even more specific to trade politics, by paying close attention to the joint
influence of domestic and international institutions, the dissertation portrays
a richer model of trade politics than what is currently found in the literature,
which helps explain some of the ambiguous results in the literature. While the
existing literature connects institutions that create more incentives to cater to
narrow interests to on average more protectionist trade policies, I showed that this
view is biased due to the joint omission of exporter interests and of international
institutions.
This oversight appears as an important limitation for both the theoretical
and the empirical link between institutions and trade policy-making. In the
presence of international trade agreements, electoral institutions that are typically
thought to be associated with more protectionist trade policies can result in more
liberal trade policies domestically and in attempts to enforce liberal trade policies
abroad. The argument may also be applicable to other domestic institutions, such
as the comparison between democracies and autocracies – where democracies
are argued to have more incentives to provide free trade (Milner and Kubota,
2005) and at the same time more incentives to provide protectionist trade policies
(Milner and Rosendorff, 1997). This part of the dissertation therefore suggests
that an international political economy approach that accounts for international
factors, namely the presence of international agreements, can explain some of the
inconsistencies in the ‘domestic’ political economy literature. The dissertation
thereby contributes to two distinct fields in political science and shows how
integrating them may help resolve remaining puzzles.
By underscoring the ambiguous relationship between domestic institutions and
trade policies in the context of trade agreements, the dissertation further adds to
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calls to move beyond average tariff rates as measures of protectionism (McGillivray,
2004), but it provides a new rationale for why such averages can be misleading.
The dissertation further suggested a number of new avenues to assess the influence
of interest groups – the variance in tariff rates, the initiation of trade disputes, and
references in political campaigns.
Lastly, the use of reciprocal trade liberalization to accommodate exporters may
help resolve what is sometimes considered the anti-trade puzzle – the question of
why trade policies are biased systematically towards protectionist interest groups
and why they do not expand trade more than they restrict trade (see, e.g., Rodrik
1997). One reason is that (domestic) trade policy in the form of tariffs can only
benefit protectionist interest groups; to benefit exporters, a government needs to
achieve a reduction in foreign tariffs. A government that wants to support exporters
as pro-trade groups can achieve in a reduction in foreign tariffs through a reciprocal
lowering of its own tariffs. However, and notably, such pro-trade behavior is
not evidenced in pro-trade policies domestically, but in the removal of anti-trade
policies.1 Consequently, the observed implications of a government supporting
groups in favor of free trade need not be an increase in explicit trade-expanding
domestic policy measures.
Finally, the dissertation points to a number of other issues that may deserve a
more thorough treatment in future work. First, the dissertation emphasizes the
role of interest groups and therefore non-state actors in world politics. A sizeable
literature suggests that non-state actors increasingly exercise independent authority
in international affairs (Hall and Biersteker, 2002; Falkner, 2003; Vogel, 2008; Büthe
and Mattli, 2011). Some of the arguments in this dissertation underscore that
governments may also involve non-state actors strategically in international affairs.
By providing additional monitoring capacities, non-state actors can increase
1In fact, the GATT/WTO rule out ‘visible’ pro-trade policies, such as export subsidies.
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the expected cost of defection by increasing the likelihood of being detected;
this increases the effectiveness of enforcement and allows to install less costly
enforcement measures or to negotiate deeper agreements. And through the
provision of resources to litigation, such as in the form of legal expertise, non-state
may even contribute directly to the enforcement of international law. Moreover, if
differences exist among states of how to share the benefits and costs of cooperation,
that is, which of the potential equilibrium points to choose, governments may
rely on non-state actors that can exert political influence – either domestically
or in foreign countries – to influence bargaining outcomes. More generally, then,
non-state actors may help governments address major cooperation problems, in
particular those related to distributional conflict, enforcement problems, and
informational problems, and governments may choose which issues and which non-
state actors to include in negotiations strategically, keeping an eye on addressing
these issues.
Second, while reciprocity can be key for achieving trade liberalization, it has
important limitations when it comes to universal trade liberalization. Reciprocity
may undermine, rather than further, universal trade liberalization through a
number of channels. For instance, reciprocal trade agreements create incentives for
governments to maintain higher tariffs on select products as bargaining tools. As an
example, in the late 19th century, the German government faced domestic demands
to lower tariffs on agricultural products in order to counter high food prices.
However, because of concurrent negotiations over a trade agreement with Austria,
German exporters lobbied heavily against such unilateral tariff reductions, which
would have eliminated a bargaining tool for German negotiators and therefore
would have weakened Germany’s bargaining position.
One implication is that international institutions may, at times, endogeneously
create what appears to be effectiveness. As long as there is the possibility of a trade
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agreement being negotiated in the future, governments refrain from unilateral
liberalization, knowing that any unilateral reform would mean to forgo concessions
in a future trade agreement. Once the trade agreement is negotiated, concessions
are made. On the one hand, these are due to the trade agreement, since they
would not have been able without it. On the other hand, if it weren’t for the
possibility of a trade agreement in the first place, the same reforms might have
been implement long before. Such incentives to increase tariffs and to refrain from
unilateral tariff reductions for bargaining purposes can be particularly damaging
when trade negotiations fail, in which case it may be hard to reverse protectionist
policies that were originally kept in place or even instituted merely as bargaining
tools. Similar concerns may also be relevant not across time, but across institutions.
For instance, Dutch negotiators in the 18th century were reluctant to lower tariffs
towards France, fearing that Britain would ask for similar tariff concessions from
the Netherlands once concessions were made to another country (Wright, 1955).
Third, the previous chapters largely ignored some of the temporal aspect to
international cooperation. International cooperation implies the mutual adjustment
of policies (Keohane, 1984) and as a consequence typically will create domestic
winners and losers. This has two implications. First, governments need not only
be able to credibly convey that they can undertake reforms, but also that they
can sustain them when faced with future domestic political pressure. One way
to ensure that this is the case is to establish agreements that are able to lock in
policy reform through strong commitment and enforcement mechanisms; at the
same time, however, the absence of any flexibility mechanisms may undermine an
agreement’s stability in the long run (Rosendorff, 2005). Second, there is a question
of whether the losers will accept their losses, or if they continue to contest the
policy adjustment once it is made. In the case of economic agreements, there is a
good chance that losers will not be around in the future, because they lose sufficient
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market shares and profits that they go out of business. If that is the case, resistance
to future cooperation will decline, which has been termed the ‘juggernaut effect’ in
the context of trade liberalization (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2008). Of course,
this dynamic impact implies that potential losers from an agreement will fight even
harder to prevent its negotiation. But it also implies that countries may be put
on very different dynamic development paths, depending on when and in what
form reforms are undertaken. It appears worthwhile to pay more attention to these
issues to gain a better understanding of the negotiation, functions, and effects of
international institutions.
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